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Abstract 
 
 
Since the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2), accident in 1979 which 
led to the meltdown of about one half of the reactor core and to 
limited releases of radioactive materials to the environment, an 
important international effort has been made on severe accident 
research. The present work aims to investigate the behaviour of the 
Small Modular Reactor during severe accident conditions. In order 
to perform these analyses, a SMR has been studied for the 
European reference severe accident analysis code ASTEC, 
developed by IRSN and GRS. The thesis consists of six parts. In 
the first part we will be dealt with the concept of the nuclear safety 
and its evolution in the last thirty years, moreover will be briefly 
introduced the two different analysis approaches: probabilistic and 
deterministic and will be explained the difference between 
mechanistic and parametric computers codes: computational tools 
normally used to carried out the deterministic analysis. The second 
part will be focused on the ASTEC code, the integral code used in 
this work; will be described the code modular structure, and 
explained the function of every module. The third part will be 
devoted to the different type of small modular reactor, currently 
available on the market. For each one will be presented the 
characteristics and the design solutions adopted. In the fourth part 
of the thesis will be described in detail the IRIS Small Modular 
Reactor; the reference reactor chosen to develop the ASTEC input 
deck. This input-deck was developed in the framework of a research 
collaboration with the IRSN development team. The IRIS SMR as 
well as the advanced nuclear water reactors rely on containment 
behaviour in realization of some of their passive safety functions. 
Thus, to simulate correctly the main phenomena involved during an 
accident scenario, the coupling between primary circuit and 
containment has to be reproduced accurately. This is the reason 
why in the fifth part will be described systematically the creation of 
the ASTEC IRIS input deck: the nodalization scheme adopted, the 
solution used to simulate the passive safety systems and the strong 
interaction reactor vessel containment. In the sixth part of the thesis, 
the ASTEC SMR model will be tested against the RELAP-GOTHIC 
coupled code model, with respect to a Design Basis Accident, to 
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evaluate the capability of ASTEC code on reproducing correctly the 
behaviour of the nuclear system. Once the model has been 
validated, a severe accident scenario will be simulated and the 
obtained results along with the nuclear system response will be 
analysed in the last part of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
 
1. NUCLEAR SAFETY 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
The objectives of nuclear safety consist in ensuring the siting and 
the plant conditions need to comply with adequate principles, such 
as, for example, the internationally accepted health, safety and 
radioprotection principles. In particular, the plant at the chosen site 
shall guarantee that the health of the population and of the workers 
does not suffer adverse radiation consequences more severe than 
the established limits and that such effects be the lowest reasonably 
obtainable (the ALARA – As Low As Reasonably Achievable – 
Principle) in all operational conditions and in case of accidents. 
These objectives are frequently subdivided into a General Objective, 
a Radiation Protection Objective and a Technical Objective, in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criteria [1]. 
The General Nuclear Safety Objective is to protect individuals, 
society and the environment from harm by establishing and 
maintaining effective defences against radiological hazards in 
nuclear installations.  
The Radiation Protection Objective is to ensure that in all operational 
states radiation exposure within the installation or due to any 
planned release of radioactive material from the installation is kept 
below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable, and to 
ensure mitigation of the radiological consequences of any accidents.  
The Technical Safety Objective is to take all reasonably practicable 
measures to prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to 
mitigate their consequences should they occur; to ensure with a high 
level of confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into account 
in the design of the installation, including those of very low 
probability. The target for existing power plants consistent with the 
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Technical Safety Objective has been defined by the INSAG 
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, advisor to the IAEA 
Director General) as a likelihood of occurrence of severe core 
damage that is below about 10-4 events per plant operating year. 
Implementation of all safety principles at future plants should lead to 
the achievement of an improved goal of not more than about 10-5 
such events per plant operating year. Severe accident management 
and mitigation measures should reduce the probability of large 
offsite releases requiring short-term off-site response by a factor of 
at least 10. It has to be observed that these principles, while 
indicating the need for strict control of radiation sources, do not 
preclude the external release of limited amounts of radioactive 
products nor the limited exposure of people to radiation. Similarly, 
the objectives require to decrease the likelihood and the severity of 
accidents, but they recognize that some accidents can happen. 
Measures have to be taken for the mitigation of their consequences. 
Such measures include on-site accident management systems 
(procedures, equipment, operators) and off-site intervention 
measures. The greater the potential hazard of a release, the lower 
must be its likelihood.  
1.2 The safety in the nuclear power plants 
 
The safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is based on the defence 
in depth concept. This concept, as applied to all safety activities, 
whether organizational, behavioural or design related. It ensures 
that they are subject to overlapping system provisions, so that if a 
failure were to occur, it would be detected and compensated, for or 
corrected by appropriate measures. Application of the concept of 
defence in depth in the design of a plant provides a series of 5 levels 
of defence (inherent features, equipment and procedures) aimed at 
preventing accidents and ensuring appropriate protection in the 
event that prevention fails. Every level has its own scope to cover 
[2]:  
 
• The aim of the first level of defence is to prevent deviations from 
normal operation, and to prevent system failures. This leads to 
the requirement that the plant has to be conservatively designed, 
constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with 
appropriate quality levels and engineering practices, such as the 
application of redundancy, independence and diversity. To meet 
this objective, careful attention is paid to the selection of 
appropriate design codes and materials, and to the control of 
fabrication of components and of plant construction. Design 
options that can contribute to reducing the potential for internal 
hazards, to reducing the consequences of a given postulated 
initiating event (PIE), that is, an event identified during design as 
capable of leading to anticipated operational occurrences or 
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accident conditions [3], or to reducing the likely release source 
term following an accident sequence contribute at this level of 
defence.  
• The aim of the second level of defence is to detect and intercept 
deviations from normal operational states in order to prevent 
anticipated operational occurrences from escalating to accident 
conditions. This is in recognition of the fact that some PIEs are 
likely to occur over the service lifetime of a nuclear power plant, 
despite the care taken to prevent them. This level necessitates 
the provision of specific systems as determined in the safety 
analysis and the definition of operating procedures to prevent or 
minimize damage from such PIEs. 
• For the third level of defence, it is assumed that, although very 
unlikely, the escalation of certain anticipated operational 
occurrences or PIEs may not be arrested by a preceding level 
and a more serious event may develop. These unlikely events 
are anticipated in the design basis for the plant, and inherent 
safety features, fail-safe design, additional equipment and 
procedures are provided to control their consequences and to 
achieve stable and acceptable plant states following such 
events. This leads to the requirement that engineered safety 
features be provided that are capable of leading the plant first to 
a controlled state, and subsequently to a safe shutdown state, 
and maintaining at least one barrier for the confinement of 
radioactive material. 
• The aim of the fourth level of defence is to address severe 
accidents in which the design basis may be exceeded and to 
ensure that radioactive releases are kept as low as practicable. 
The most important objective of this level is the protection of the 
confinement function. This may be achieved by complementary 
measures and procedures to prevent accident progression, and 
by mitigation of the consequences of selected severe accidents, 
in addition to accident management procedures. The protection 
provided by the confinement may be demonstrated using best 
estimate methods. 
• The fifth and final level of defence is aimed at mitigation of the 
radiological consequences of potential releases of radioactive 
materials that may result from accident conditions. This requires 
the provision of an adequately equipped emergency control 
centre, and plans for the on-site and off-site emergency 
response. 
 
A relevant aspect of the implementation of defence in depth is the 
provision in the design of a series of “protective barriers”. The 
concept of the “protective barriers” (Figure 1-1) involves placing a 
series of strong, leak-tight physical barriers between the radioactive 
materials and the environment to contain radioactivity in all 
circumstances consequences of failures. The barriers for a 
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commercial water-cooled reactor can be subdivided in : 
• first barrier: the fuel, inside which most of the radioactive 
products are already trapped, is enclosed within a metal 
cladding; 
• second barrier: the reactor coolant system is enclosed within a 
pressurized metal envelope that includes the reactor vessel 
which houses the core containing the fuel rods; 
 
• third barrier: the reactor coolant system is itself enclosed in a 
thick walled concrete containment building. 
 
Maintaining the integrity and leak tightness of just one of these 
barriers is sufficient to contain radioactive fission products  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Physical Barriers for an AP1000 reactor 
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1.3 Safety Analysis 
 
The safety analyses are analytical evaluations of physical 
phenomena occurring at nuclear power plants. It made for the 
purpose of demonstrating that safety requirements, for all postulated 
initiating events that could occur over a broad range of operational 
states, including different levels of availability of the safety systems, 
are such as to satisfy the requirement for ensuring the integrity of 
barriers against the release of radioactive material and various other 
acceptance criteria are met. The acceptance criteria are used to 
judge the acceptability of the results of safety analysis. The range 
and conditions of applicability of each specific criterion have to be 
clearly specified. The two complementary methods used to carry out 
the safety analysis are deterministic safety analysis and probabilistic 
safety assessment and analysis (PSA).These two methods are used 
jointly in evaluating the safety of an NPP.  
1.3.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis (PSA) 
The objectives of PSA are to determine all significant contributing 
factors to the radiation risks arising from a facility or activity, and to 
evaluate the extent, to which the overall design, is well balanced and 
meets the probabilistic safety criteria where these have been defined 
[4]. PSA provides a methodological approach to identifying accident 
sequences that can follow from a broad range of initiating events and 
it includes a systematic and realistic determination of accident 
frequencies and consequences.  In international practice, three 
levels of PSA are generally recognized: 
 
• In Level 1 PSA, the design and operation of the plant are 
analysed in order to identify the sequences of events that can 
lead to core damage and the core damage frequency is 
estimated. Level 1 PSA provides insights into the strengths and 
weaknesses of the safety related systems and procedures in 
place or envisaged as preventing core damage. The results of the 
Level 1 PSA should be used to identify weaknesses in the design 
or operation of the plant. Weaknesses can be identified by 
considering the contributions to the risk from groups of initiating 
events, the importance measures of the safety systems and the 
contributions of human error to the overall risk. Where the results 
of the PSA indicate that changes could be made to the design or 
operation of the plant to reduce risk, the changes should be 
incorporated where reasonably achievable, taking the relative 
costs and benefits of any modifications into account. 
 
• In Level 2 PSA, the chronological progression of core damage 
sequences identified in Level 1 PSA is evaluated, including a 
quantitative assessment of phenomena arising from severe 
damage to reactor fuel. Level 2 PSA identifies ways in which 
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associated releases of radioactive material from fuel can result in 
releases to the environment. It also estimates the frequency, 
magnitude and other relevant characteristics of the release of 
radioactive material to the environment. This analysis provides 
additional insights into the relative importance of accident 
prevention and mitigation measures and the physical barriers to 
the release of radioactive material to the environment (e.g. a 
containment building). The results of the Level 2 PSA should be 
used to determine if sufficient provision has been made to prevent 
or mitigate the effects of postulated core damage sequences. In 
Level 2 PSA, it should be considered whether the containment is 
adequately robust and whether the protection systems such as 
hydrogen mixing and recombining systems, containment sprays 
and containment venting systems provide an adequate level of 
protection to prevent a large release of radioactive material to the 
environment. Furthermore, containment bypassing events such 
as a loss of coolant accident in interfacing systems should be 
addressed. In addition, Level 2 PSA should be used to identify 
and optimize accident management measures that could be 
carried out to mitigate the effects of the damaged core. This could 
include determining additional measures, for example, measures 
that could be taken to introduce water into the reactor 
containment. 
 
•  In Level 3 PSA, public health and other societal consequences 
are estimated, such as the contamination of land or food from the 
accident sequences that lead to a release of radioactivity to the 
environment. 
  Level 1 PSA, Level 2 PSA and Level 3 PSA are sequential 
analyses, where the results of each assessment usually serve as a 
basis for the PSA at the next level. Level 1 PSA provides insights 
into design weaknesses and into ways of preventing accidents 
leading to core damage, which might be the precursor of accidents 
leading to major releases of radioactive material with potential 
consequences for human health and the environment. Level 2 PSA 
provides additional insights into the relative importance of accident 
sequences leading to core damage in terms of the severity of the 
releases of radioactive material they might cause, and insights into 
weaknesses in measures for the mitigation and management of 
severe accidents and ways of improving them. Finally, Level 3 PSA 
provides insights into the relative importance of accident prevention 
and mitigation measures, expressed in terms of adverse 
consequences for the health of both plant workers and the public, 
and the contamination of land, air, water and foodstuffs. In addition, 
Level 3 PSA provides insights into the relative effectiveness of 
aspects of accident management relating to emergency 
preparedness and response. The results of Level 2 PSA and Level 
3 PSA should be provided to civil authorities as a technical input for 
6 
 
“Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 1. Nuclear Safety 
 
off-site emergency planning. 
1.3.2 Deterministic safety analysis 
Deterministic safety analyses for a nuclear power plant predict the 
response to postulated initiating events [5]. A specific set of rules 
and acceptance criteria is applied. Typically, these should focus on 
neutronic, thermal-hydraulic, radiological, thermo-mechanical and 
structural aspects, which are often analysed with different 
computational tools. The computations are usually carried out for 
predetermined operating modes and operational states, and the 
events include anticipated transients, postulated accidents, selected 
beyond design basis accidents and severe accidents with core 
degradation. The results of computations are spatial and time 
dependences of various physical variables (e.g. neutron flux; 
thermal power of the reactor; pressure, temperature, flow rate and 
velocity of the primary coolant; stresses in structural materials; 
physical and chemical compositions; concentrations of 
radionuclides) or, in the case of an assessment of radiological 
consequences, radiation doses to workers or the public. 
Deterministic safety analyses for design purposes should be 
characterized by their conservative assumptions and bounding 
analysis. This is achieved by an iterative process in the design 
phase, when the limiting case(s) in terms of the minimum margin to 
the acceptance criteria is (are) determined for each group of 
postulated initiating events and sequences. To determine the 
limiting case for a given transient or set of transients, the 
consequential failures that are caused by the initiating event 
(internal or external) should be taken into account. A limited number 
of coincident independent failures (including operator error) should 
also be addressed. However, the frequency of occurrence will 
decrease significantly, as each coincident independent failure is 
taken into account. Only those combinations of transients whose 
frequency remains within the design basis should be analysed. The 
time span of any scenario that is analysed should extend up to the 
moment when the plant reaches a safe and stable end state. What 
is meant by a safe and stable end state should be defined. In some 
cases, it is assumed that a safe and stable end state is achieved 
when the core is covered and long-term heat removal from the core 
is achieved, and the core is subcritical by a given margin. There are 
two different methodologies for the deterministic analysis the 
conservative approach and the best-estimate approach. The 
conservative hypotheses were introduced in the early days of safety 
analysis to address the uncertainties that prevailed in the 1970s. A 
conservative approach usually means that any parameter that has 
to be specified for the analysis should be allocated a value that will 
have an unfavourable effect in relation to specific acceptance 
criteria. The concept of conservative methods was introduced in the 
early days of safety analysis to take into account the uncertainties 
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due to the limited capability of modelling and the limited knowledge 
of physical phenomena, and to simplify the analysis. In these kind 
of analyses, both the assumed plant conditions and the physical 
models used are set conservatively. The reasoning is that such an 
approach would demonstrate that the calculated safety parameters 
are within the acceptance criteria and would ensure that no other 
transient of that category would exceed the acceptance criteria. For 
the purpose of conservative calculations, the initial and boundary 
conditions should be set to values that will lead to conservative 
results for those safety parameters that are to be compared with the 
acceptance criteria. One set of conservative values for initial and 
boundary conditions does not necessarily lead to conservative 
results for every safety parameter. Therefore, the appropriate 
conservatism should be selected for each initial and boundary 
condition, depending on the specific transient and the associated 
acceptance criterion. The use of a conservative methodology may 
be so conservative that important safety issues may be masked. For 
example, the assumption of a high core power level may lead to high 
levels of steam–water mixture in the core in the case of a postulated 
small break loss of coolant accident. Consequently, the calculated 
peak cladding temperature may not be conservative. As another 
example, the assumption that reduced interfacial shear between 
water and steam may lead to higher cladding temperatures in the 
upper core region is conservative. However, this conservative 
assumption will lead to an optimistic estimate for the 
refilling/reflooding time, as it will appear that more water remains in 
the primary cooling system than is actually the case. The extensive 
experimental research in the 1980s and 1990s has resulted in a 
considerable increase of knowledge, and the development of 
computer codes has improved the ability to achieve calculated 
results from simulations that correspond more accurately to 
experimental results. Nowadays, it may be preferable to use a best 
estimate approach together with an evaluation of the uncertainties 
to compare the results of calculations with acceptance criteria. This 
type of analysis is referred to as a best estimate plus uncertainties 
approach. A best estimate approach provides a more realistic 
information about the physical behaviour of the reactor, identifies 
the most relevant safety issues and provides information about the 
existing margins between the results of calculations and the 
acceptance criteria. A best estimate approach may be used for 
accident scenarios in which the margin to the acceptance criterion 
is not very large. For scenarios with large margins to the acceptance 
criteria, it is more practical to use a conservative analysis in which 
detailed evaluation of the uncertainties is not performed. For a best 
estimate analysis, a best estimate code or other tools that 
realistically describe the behaviour of physical processes in a 
component or system should be used. This requires sufficient data 
to be able to ensure that all-important phenomena have been taken 
into account in the modelling or that their effects are bounded. 
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Establishing that all-important phenomena have been taken into 
account in the modelling or that their effects are bounded should be 
part of the validation programme. Because the results of best 
estimate codes are not designed to bound experimental data, best 
estimate codes are not intended to provide conservative results. 
Uncertainties in the results due to unavoidable approximations in 
the modelling should therefore be quantified using experimental 
results. The trend in several Countries is to use best estimate plus 
uncertainty analysis, not to be confused with the probabilistic 
method. 
 
1.4 Relation of Deterministic Safety Analysis to PSA 
 
A major part of the process of designing and licensing a nuclear 
power plant is the safety analysis. Reference [6] states that both 
deterministic methods and probabilistic methods are required to be 
applied. The objectives are to identify issues that are relevant to 
safety and to demonstrate that the plant is capable of meeting any 
authorized limits on the release of radioactive material and on the 
potential exposure to radiation for each plant state. Thus a 
deterministic safety analysis alone does not demonstrate the overall 
safety of the plant, and it should be complemented by a probabilistic 
safety analysis. While deterministic analyses may be used to verify 
that acceptance criteria are met, probabilistic safety analyses may 
be used to determine the probability of damage for each barrier. 
Probabilistic safety analysis may thus be a suitable tool for 
evaluation of the risk that arises from low frequency sequences that 
lead to barrier damage, whereas a deterministic analysis is 
adequate for events of higher frequency for which the acceptance 
criteria are set in terms of the damage allowed. To verify that 
defence in depth is adequate, certain very low frequency design 
basis accidents, such as large break loss of coolant accidents or rod 
expulsion with or without the safety systems intervention can be 
assumed as the initiating event. Thus, deterministic analysis and 
probabilistic analysis provide a comprehensive view of the overall 
safety of the plant for the entire range of the frequency–
consequence spectrum. Deterministic safety analyses have an 
important part to play in the performance of a probabilistic safety 
analysis because they provide information on whether the accident 
scenario will result in the failure of a fission product barrier. It should 
be used to identify challenges to the integrity of the physical barriers, 
to determine the failure mode of a barrier when challenged and to 
determine whether an accident scenario may challenge several 
barriers. Best estimate codes and data, should be used to be 
consistent with the objectives of probabilistic safety analysis, which 
include providing realistic results. It should be recognized that the 
results of the supporting analyses are usually bounded by the 
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results of conservative deterministic analyses. Furthermore, a 
probabilistic safety analysis fault tree is a powerful tool that can be 
used to confirm assumptions that are commonly made in the 
deterministic calculation about the availability of systems; for 
example, to determine the potential for common cause failures or 
the minimum system requirements, to identify important single 
failures and to determine the adequacy of technical specifications.  
1.5 NPP operational states and accident conditions  
 
The entire range of conditions for which an NPP is designed 
according to established design criteria, including all the national 
regulatory requirements, and for which damage to the fuel and 
release of radioactive material are kept within authorized limits, form 
the design basis of an NPP. Within the design basis, a number of 
unintended events are considered, including operating errors and 
equipment failures, whose consequences or potential 
consequences are not negligible in terms of safety. According to the 
probability of its occurrence and potential consequences, an event 
may be classified as an Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO) 
(10-2 per reactor year) or a Design Basis Accident (DBA) (>=10-5 per 
reactor year). An AOO is an operational process deviating from 
normal operation, which is expected to occur at least once during 
the operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of appropriate 
design provisions, does not cause any significant damage to items 
important to safety or lead to accident conditions. For DBA means 
accident conditions against which a facility is designed according to 
established design criteria, and for which the damage to the fuel and 
the release of radioactive material are kept within authorized limits. 
An accident occurring outside the NPP design basis is called a 
Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA) (>10-5 per reactor year). 
Such an accident may or may not involve degradation of the reactor 
core (leading to significant core damage). An accident involving core 
degradation (typically with core melting) is also called a Severe 
Accident (SA). According to the IAEA Safety Requirements, on the 
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; the severe accidents are also to be 
considered in the design and operation of NPPs. Some regulatory 
bodies prescribe that these accidents have to be taken into 
consideration in the plant design. The entire range conditions of a 
NPP according to Nuclear Safety Standard Code are illustrated in 
(Figure 1-2). As already highlighted above, the deterministic safety 
analysis predicts the response of an NPP in specific predetermined 
operational states to postulated initiating events. This type of safety 
analysis applies a specific set of rules and specific acceptance 
criteria. Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) combines the likelihood 
of an initiating event, potential scenarios in the development of the 
event and its consequences into an estimation of core damage 
frequency, source term or overall risk arising from operation of the 
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NPP. The number of event sequences can be very large. The 
method applied to realize a safety analyses for different type of 
conditions could be different. In fact, the DBA analysis and BDBA 
analysis are based on different approaches. DBA is based on a 
deterministic approach, where proof is given that the plant is safe in 
a comprehensive set of accident sequences defined on the basis of 
conceivable initiating events, conservative assumptions and the 
single failure criterion. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: NPP conditions according to Nuclear Safety Standard Code 
Acceptance criteria in the form of limits on physical parameters are 
defined that should be met in all accident sequences. In general, 
there are different acceptance criteria for different types of 
sequences. The conservative approach is used for all the input 
parameters. Another approach to DBA analyses is the use of best 
estimate analyses, involving no conservatism in the initial and 
boundary conditions, but with an uncertainty evaluation of the 
analysis. The BDBA is to a large extent based on the probabilistic 
approach, with the aim of demonstrating that the total risk to the 
environment and the public due to the plant operation is acceptably 
small. The acceptance of BDBA is based on the acceptance of the 
plant risk function that combines probability and radiological 
consequences. Generally, the selection of a limited number of 
sequences to be analysed in detail by a complex severe accident 
code is based on the results of PSA Level 1. The severe accident 
analysis methodology does not use conservative assumptions, the 
reason being that determining which assumption is conservative 
cannot be done in advance. In addition, a conservative assumption 
related to a particular phenomenon may not be conservative to 
another severe accident phenomenon. Therefore, BDBA analyses 
rely on best estimate data. However, this does not exclude the 
performance of bounding analyses for a particular analysis 
application.  
1.6 Computer codes 
 
Computer codes used for BDBA are often classified into 
mechanistic codes and parametric ones [7]. Mechanistic codes are 
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characterized by best estimate phenomenological models to enable, 
as far as possible, an accurate simulation of the behaviour of an 
NPP in the case of a severe accident. Parametric codes include a 
combination of phenomenological and user defined parametric 
models to simulate the integral behaviour of the whole plant (reactor 
coolant system, containment, fission product behaviour). In the 
recent years, the rapid increase of computer performance 
increasingly enables the replacement of parametric models by 
mechanistically based ones in the parametric codes. Therefore, the 
distinction between parametric and mechanistic codes became 
questionable. It became apparent that a classification based on 
requirements for different applications would be more appropriate. 
From the point of view of real application, existing severe accident 
codes can be classified into three classes: fast running integral 
codes, detailed codes and special (dedicated) codes.  
 
• Integral codes: These codes should be characterized by a 
well balanced combination of detailed and simplified models 
for the simulation of the relevant phenomena within an NPP 
in the case of a severe accident. ‘Fast running’ may have 
different meanings but it should be close to real time (on 
workstations or personal computers), and the analyses of 
typical scenarios should not last longer than 12 hours. These 
codes are primarily not designed to perform best estimate 
simulations; the objective is rather to allow the user to bound 
important processes or phenomena by numerous user-
defined parameters. Integral codes are usually used to 
support PSA Level 2 analyses and for the development and 
validation of accident management programmes. Their 
models are less mechanistically based but more of 
parametric character, i.e. model parameters allow the user to 
investigate the consequences of uncertainties on key results. 
These kinds of codes may also have been used for the 
design and validation of severe accident prevention and 
mitigation systems; however, to obtain realistic results, a 
deep knowledge of the involved physical phenomena as well 
as user experience in performing severe accident analysis is 
required. Benchmark exercises with mechanistic codes may 
support the justification. Simplification of the models aims to 
reduce computation time. Some examples of fast running 
integral codes are MELCOR [8], MAAP [9] and ASTEC [10]. 
• Detailed codes: The detailed codes use a different approach 
in comparison with the integral codes. The strategy for 
detailed codes is to model as far as possible all relevant 
phenomena in detail by mechanistic models. Basic 
requirements for detailed codes are that the modelling 
uncertainties are comparable with (i.e. not higher than) the 
uncertainties in the experimental data used to validate the 
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code and that user defined parameters are only necessary 
for phenomena which are not well understood due to 
insufficient experimental data (including scaling problems). 
Using detailed codes, best estimate analysis can be 
performed; however, uncertainties also exist and must be 
consequently quantified. Since, as a principle, they should 
not have user options, existing uncertainties in the simulation 
of the different phenomena must be specified to enable the 
definition of the uncertainties of the key results. The main 
disadvantage of the detailed code is due to the high demand 
on computation time; mechanistically based codes typically 
simulate only either the reactor coolant system or the 
containment. The acceptable computation time depends on 
the scope of the application but it normally does not exceed 
10 times the real time on workstations or personal computers. 
Another limitation can be deduced from the requirement that 
computation time should not be a dominant part of the overall 
project timescale: analysis of a particular scenario should not 
last longer than one week. Anyway, the high demand on 
computer time is decreasing continuously, thanks to the 
rapidly increasing performance of computers. ATHLET-CD 
[11], SCDAP/RELAP5 [12], ICARE/CATHARE [13-15], 
COCOSYS, GOTHIC [16], CONTAIN [17], are examples of 
detailed codes. In addition, ASTEC and MELCOR can be 
considered detailed codes, if the calculation is based on 
extensive nodalization and detailed model options 
• Dedicated codes: These codes dealing with single 
phenomena have become important in context with the 
requirements of the regulatory authorities to take into account 
severe accidents in the design of new NPPs and to reduce 
uncertainties of risk-relevant phenomena (more reliable 
likelihoods for the branches in an accident progression event 
tree). Depending on their task, they may be simple and 
consequently fast running, or very complex with the 
drawback of large calculation time. Typical issues for which 
special codes are required include: Lower head melt 
retention, Hydrogen distribution, Recriticality, etc. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
2. THE ASTEC INTEGRAL CODE 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The ASTEC code (Accident Source Term Evaluation Code), jointly 
developed since several years by the French Institut de Radiopro-
tection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) and the German 
Gesellschaftfür Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS), aims at 
simulating an entire severe accident (SA) sequence in a nuclear 
water-cooled reactor from the initiating event through the release of 
radioactive elements out of the containment. The main ASTEC 
applications are therefore source term determination studies, 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment level 2 (PSA2) studies including the 
determination of uncertainties, accident management studies and 
physical analyses of experiments to improve the understanding of 
the phenomenology [1]. In particular, the V2.0 version used in this 
work, includes advanced core degradation models (issued from the 
IRSN ICARE2 mechanistic code) and the ASTEC applicability has 
been extended to Gen. III reactor designs, so that the V2.0 allows to 
simulate the EPR reactor or to launch investigations about the 
mitigation strategy relying on the In-Vessel melt Retention concept 
(IVR). Besides these, two key evolutions, other physical models 
have also been improved (e.g. first account for gas chemistry 
kinetics in the Reactor Cooling System (RCS) or new modelling of 
hydrogen combustion in the containment) and ASTEC V2 is now 
coupled to the SUNSET IRSN statistical tool to make easier the 
uncertainty and sensitivity analyses. 
2.2 The ASTEC code structure 
 
The ASTEC scope of application covers most of the physical 
phenomena involved in SA, except steam explosion and mechanical 
response of the containment. For the latter phenomena, the code 
can yield initial and boundary conditions for a specific analysis using 
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detailed codes such as, respectively, Computational Fluid-
Dynamics (CFD) and Finite Element codes. For the hydrogen risk in 
containment, ASTEC provides a global evaluation of the risk; 
nevertheless, such evaluation needs to be consolidated by CFD 
approach. The ASTEC code structure is modular, each of its 
modules simulating a reactor zone or a set of physical phenomena 
(Figure 2-1). Two different running modes are possible in ASTEC 
V2.0: 
• Stand-alone mode for running each ASTEC module 
independently, which is useful for module validation and 
calculation of separate-effect tests; 
•  Coupled mode where all (or a subset of) the ASTEC modules 
are run sequentially within a macro-time step. This mode 
allows explicit feedback between modules. 
A specific tool SIGAL-ODESSA was specifically developed by IRSN 
in Fortran for managing the database associated to any transient 
calculation. The ASTEC modules communicate with each other 
through a “dynamic” memory (Figure 2-1) and data are exchanged 
between the ASTEC modules at macro-time steps through this 
dynamic database, i.e. evolving throughout the calculation and 
mirroring at each time the state of the reactor.  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Structure of the ASTEC code with its modules and related phenomena 
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The ASTEC V2 programming language is mainly Fortran (today 
mainly Fortran 95 with progressive evolution towards Fortran2003). 
The code size is about 450,000 lines, distributed in more than 2000 
routines and the ASTEC V2.0 computer targets are personal 
computers (PCs) with both Linux and Windows operating systems 
[2]. 
2.3 The ASTEC modules 
 
2.3.1 The CESAR module 
The CESAR ASTEC module simulates the thermal-hydraulics [3] in 
the primary circuit, secondary circuit and in the reactor vessel (with 
a simplified core modelling) up to the beginning of core degradation 
phase, i.e. roughly up to the start of core uncovering, and in any case 
before the start of Zr cladding oxidation process by steam interaction. 
After the onset of the core degradation phase, the CESAR module 
computes only the thermal-hydraulics in primary and secondary 
circuit as well as in the vessel upper plenum. The ICARE module 
performs the thermal-hydraulics in the reactor vessel during core 
degradation. The CESAR thermal-hydraulics modelling is based on 
a 1-D 2-fluid 5-equation approach. Up to 5 non-condensable gases 
(Hydrogen, Helium, Nitrogen, Argon, Oxygen) are available. As a 
result 5+N differential equations and 1 algebraic equation are solved:  
 
• 2+N mass differential balance equations, one for the vapour 
phase, N for the non-condensable gases and one for the liquid 
phase,  
• 2 energy differential balance equations, one for the gas mixture 
phase and one for the liquid phase,  
• 1 mixture (liquid and gas phases) differential momentum balance 
equation,  
• 1 algebraic equation which models the interfacial drag between 
the liquid phase and the gas phase. The interfacial drag is a 
complex model which has been assessed on a large number of 
experimental data.  
 
Most of the CESAR physical constitutive laws are issued from the 
correlations, which are included in the French best-estimate thermal-
hydraulics CATHARE2 code. In particular, the critical break flow rate 
is based on the Gros D’Aillon correlation whereas the heat transfer 
coefficient between the structure and the fluid is based on a boiling 
(Nukiyama) curve. Different heat transfer processes are modelled: 
forced convection to liquid, nucleate boiling, critical heat flux, 
transition boiling, film boiling, forced convection to vapour and 
radiative heat transfer. Moreover a droplet projection model is 
implemented which enables CESAR to simulate the reflooding of 
intact or slightly degraded cores (i.e. still in rod-like geometries). The 
primary pump description is done through a 0-D approach. The 
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numerical method follows the finite volume technique. The space is 
discretized using a staggered grid with the use of the donor cell 
principle. The time integration is performed using a Newton’s method 
and a fully implicit scheme is used. The Jacobian matrix inversion is 
based on a highly optimized Lower Upper (LU) algorithm, which 
makes CESAR a fast running module. 
2.3.2 The ICARE module 
The ICARE module [4] deals with the in-vessel degradation 
phenomena (both early and late degradation phases). The ICARE 
module performs the thermal-hydraulics in the RPV (core, core by-
pass, lower plenum and downcomer) during core degradation. The 
core degradation process is characterized by the high complexity of 
phenomena to be considered and geometry to be accurately 
presented, with a permanent appearance and disappearance of a 
large number of components in each control volume by e.g. melting, 
failure, relocation, and chemical reactions. This demands a dynamic 
management of these components. Besides, the geometry of a 
degraded core is very complex and heterogeneous. Therefore, as 
illustrated on Figure 2-2, ICARE allows simulating the early phase of 
core degradation with fuel rod heat-up, ballooning and burst, 
exothermic clad oxidation, control rods behaviour, fuel rod 
embrittlement.  
 
Figure 2-2: Core degradation simulation with ICARE 
During the late phase of core degradation, ICARE can simulate the 
melting, molten mixture candling and relocation, with corium 
accumulation within the core channels and formation of blockages, 
corium slump into the lower head and corium behaviour in the lower 
head until vessel failure. The main ICARE models in ASTEC V2.0 
are: 
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• Thermal-hydraulics: simplified modelling based on 0D liquid  
water components below (r–z) gas flows, i.e. quasi static swollen 
level of water in a multi-channel configuration (no equation of 
motion for the liquid phase, simply assuming pressure equilibrium 
at the channel inlet), and, in the core region above, 2D gaseous 
phase composed of steam and non-condensable gases; in 
addition, a special channel made of one single mesh models the 
lower head region (Figure 2-3); 
 
Figure 2-3 : ICARE one volume lower head model 
•  Heat transfer: axial and radial conduction between two walls, gap 
exchanges between rod and clad, convection between fluid and 
wall as well as radiation. For the latter, a general in-core heat 
transfer model (based on an equivalent radiative conductivity 
approach) allows to deal with radiative exchanges in a reactor 
core whatever the degradation level is (intact rods, moderately 
degraded rods, severely damaged core, large cavities), thus 
managing in a continuous way the heat transfers all along the 
evolution of the core geometry degradation. In addition, radiation 
from the lower core structures to the residual water in lower 
plenum is also modelled, which favours vaporization of water;  
• Power: either nuclear power generated by fission products (FPs) 
or generated in a given material, or electric power generated in 
some out-of-pile experiments;  
• Rod mechanics: ballooning, creep and burst of Zircaloy fuel rod 
claddings (including both Zry-4 and Zr1%Nb alloys), creep of 
control rod stainless steel claddings, loss of integrity of fuel 
rods(using user-criteria);  
• Chemistry: oxidation of Zr by steam (including correlations for 
both Zry-4 and Zr1%Nb alloys), oxidation of stainless steel by 
steam, dissolution of UO2 by solid and liquid Zr, dissolution of Zr 
by liquid Silver–Indium–Cadmium alloy, dissolution of Zr by solid 
steel, oxidation and degradation of B4C control rods, 
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oxidation/dissolution of relocating and relocated U–O–Zr 
magmas, oxidation of solid debris particles 
• Vessel lower head rupture: melt-through or mechanical failure 
(either instantaneous plastic rupture or creep rupture) accounting 
for the corium and water loading on the lower head wall and also 
for the possible vessel wall partial melting based on different 
approaches considering e.g. different lower head geometries; 
user-criteria such as temperature, degradation rate, stress can 
also be defined; 
The flexible description of geometry of vessel lower head allows 
simulating any type of shape such as hemispherical one for PWRs 
and ellipsoidal one for most of VVERs. Indeed, two alternative 
models are available for the vessel lower head mechanical failure: a 
general one (LOHEY model) valid for both hemispherical and 
elliptical shapes and a more sophisticated one, valid (OEUF model) 
only for hemispherical shape which peculiarity is to assume the final 
shape to look like an “egg” shell. As concerns numeric, the oxidation 
reactions obey an implicit scheme in order to manage the calculation 
of hydrogen production while reducing computing time. Moreover, as 
already noticed, there is a special coupling at the core boundaries 
between the CESAR and ICARE modules. 
2.3.3 The ELSA module 
The ELSA module aims at simulating the release of Fission Product 
(FP) and structural material (SM) from the degraded core. ELSA is 
tightly coupled with the ICARE module. The modelling allows 
describing the release from fuel rods and control rods, followed by 
the release from debris beds. The modelling is based on a semi-
empirical approach and the physical phenomena taken into account 
are the main limiting phenomena, which govern the release. For 
intact fuel rods and debris beds, the FP release is described 
according to the degree of fission product volatility. Three categories 
are distinguished with the following characteristics [5]: 
 
• Release of volatiles (such as I or Cs including noble gases) is 
described by species intra-granular diffusion through UO2 fuel 
grains, taking account of fuel oxidation (UO2 þx) and of a grain-
size distribution. The Te, Se and Sb can be partially trapped in 
the cladding depending on the temperature and on the degree of 
cladding oxidation. At fuel melting point, all the remaining 
species located in the liquid part of the fuel are supposed to be 
instantaneously released. 
• Release of semi-volatiles (Ba, Ru, Sr, La, Eu, Ce, Mo) is 
described by evaporation and mass transfer processes. 
• Release of low-volatiles (such as U or Pd) is described by fuel 
volatilization treated as the vaporization of UO3. 
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Concerning the SM, release of Ag, In, Cd, Sn, Fe, Ni and Cr is taken 
into account in ELSA as follows: 
 
• Ag, In and Cd (AIC) are released from degraded control rods. 
The same approach as for semi-volatile species is used, that is 
evaporation and mass transfer processes. 
• Fe, Ni and Cr are supposed to be released during the candling 
of steel materials, using the same approach as for the release of 
Ag, In and Cd. Tin (Sn) is supposed to be released as a 
proportion of the rate of ZrO2 formation. All mentioned SM can 
also be released from the corium molten pool. 
2.3.4 The SOPHAEROS module 
The SOPHAEROS module simulates transport of FP vapours and 
aerosols in the RCS, composed of a 1D series of control volumes, 
through gas flow to the containment, accounting for the chemical 
reactions in the vapour phase. Using five states (suspended 
vapours, suspended aerosols, vapour condensed on walls, 
deposited aerosols, sorbed vapours), SOPHAEROS uses either a 
mechanistic or a semi-empirical approach to model the main vapour-
phase and aerosol phenomena [6]. The module, calculates the 
gaseous-species masses in thermodynamic chemical equilibrium in 
each control volume from the masses of the elements, the 
temperature and the volume. The chemical equilibrium is assumed 
to be reached instantaneously within the gaseous phase and 
chemical reactions are neglected in condensed phases, i.e. aerosols 
or deposits. The energy involved in chemical reactions is neglected 
and the carrier gas mass does not change even if some of it 
participates in chemical reactions. These assumptions are 
approximations imposed by the fact that this module does not 
calculate thermal-hydraulic conditions. Concerning the aerosol 
phenomena the module describes: 
 
• Agglomeration: gravitational, Brownian diffusion, turbulent 
diffusion; 
• Deposition mechanisms: Brownian diffusion, turbulent diffusion, 
eddy impaction, sedimentation, thermophoresis, diffusion-
phoresis, impaction in bends. Deposit of aerosols in a flow 
contraction (either abrupt one with a 90◦angle or conical) can be 
simulated; 
• Remobilization of deposits: revaporisation and mechanical 
resuspension; 
• Dedicated pool-scrubbing model to deal for example with the 
retention of aerosols in the secondary side of flooded steam 
generators in case of SGTR scenario.  
 
By default, the RCS axial nodalization (set of volumes connected by 
junctions) used by SOPHAEROS is fitted on the CESAR one. 
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2.3.5 The CPA module 
The CPA module simulates thermal-hydraulics (including hydrogen 
combustion) and aerosol behaviour in the containment [7]. It 
consists of two main sub-modules, namely THY (for thermal-
hydraulics) and AFP (for aerosols and FPs). The discretisation 
through a “lumped-parameter” approach (0D zones connected by 
junctions and surrounded by walls) simulates simple or multi-
compartment containments (tunnels, pit, dome) with possible 
leakages to the environment or to normal buildings, with specified 
openings to the environment. Either several real compartments can 
be combined to become one CPA zone or large compartments can 
be divided into several zones to cover flow peculiarities more 
conditions. Peculiarities more realistically, e.g. steam or hydrogen 
plumes. Using the sources of steam, hydrogen, FP gases and 
aerosols from RCS or from corium in the cavity during Molten Core 
Concrete Interaction MCCI provided by other modules of ASTEC, 
CPA calculates gas distribution, temperature field, pressure build-
up, hydrogen combustion and FP and aerosol distribution and 
deposition.  
2.3.6 The SYSINT module 
The SYSINT module allows the user to simulate the management of 
engineered safety features, such as, for instance, safety injection 
systems, pressurizer spray and heaters, management. 
2.3.7  The RUPUICUV module 
The RUPUICUV module simulates the Direct Containment Heating 
(DCH), which may potentially develop after vessel lower head 
rupture occurrence under relatively high pressure. The corium is 
discharged at high temperature driven by primary pressure into the 
cavity (involving vessel blow-down and cavity pressurization), where 
some part of the ejected corium may be potentially oxidized and 
entrained into the containment, thus contributing to the containment 
heat-up and additional hydrogen production. The simple CORIUM 
parametric module simulates the behaviour of corium droplets 
transported by hot gases into the containment atmosphere and 
sump, heat transfer between corium and gas being modelled in each 
containment zone. 
2.3.8 The MEDICIS module 
The MEDICIS module [8] simulates Molten-Core–Concrete 
Interaction (MCCI) using a lumped-parameter 0D approach with 
averaged corium layers. Corium remaining in the cavity interacts with 
concrete walls and both bottom and lateral interfaces. This module 
assumes either a well-mixed oxide/metal pool configuration or a 
possible pool stratification into separate oxide and metal layers, with 
in both cases the possibility to account for a detailed description of 
the upper crust. It describes concrete ablation (Figure 2-4), corium 
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oxidation and release of non-condensable gases (H2, CO, CO2) into 
the containment. 
 
Figure 2-4:  Cavity ablation simulation with MEDICIS 
2.3.9 The IODE module 
The IODE module simulates iodine and ruthenium behaviour inside 
the containment, except the transport through compartments of the 
associated species, which is computed by the CPA module (i.e. as 
for transport, the IODE module is directly using the junction flow 
rates given by the CPA containment module). The module is 
validated using, for example, experiments conducted under the 
auspices of SARNET [9]. 
2.3.10 The DOSE module 
The DOSE module, which was designed for use in most of the IODE 
gas phase chemical reactions, was specifically implemented in 
ASTEC V2 to answer IRSN PSA2 requirements. This module allows 
evaluating the dose rate in bulk gas phase for each zone of the 
containment, as well as the inner wall dose rate, knowing that the, 
dose rates include and radiation contributions relative to each 
isotope. Anyway, it has however to be underlined that, up to now, 
this module was only validated by comparison with dedicated IRSN 
codes. 
2.3.11 The ISODOP module 
The ISODOP module simulates decay of FP and actinide isotopes 
in different zones of the reactor and of the containment. It starts the 
calculation using an initial isotope inventory generated by a 
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dedicated code (for instance the CEA code PEPIN) and allows 
estimating decay heat and activity in the core, in the RCS, in the 
containment and in the environment. The ISODOP module was 
based on the DOP database from CEA containing the description of 
720 isotopes while the JEFF (Joint Evaluated Fission and Fusion) 
database dealing with ∼3800 isotopes is now also available in the 
subsequent V2.0 revisions as an alternative to the original CEA 
database.  
2.4 Use and Coupling modules of ASTEC code 
To simulate an accident scenario with ASTEC code, a stationary 
input deck for CESAR has to be built, to establish the initial 
conditions of the transient. This stationary transient has to run for a 
time chosen by the user, in order to verify that the calculated 
conditions were steady and the actual initial conditions of the 
simulation were achieved. The restart file generated by this run has 
been used as initial condition for the transient simulation. When the 
transient of a severe accident starts, during the entire front-end 
phase, the CESAR module alone, calculates the thermal-hydraulics 
in the whole RCS, i.e. including the vessel (lower plenum, core, 
bypass, downcomer and upper plenum). An automatic switch to 
ICARE for simulation of in-vessel core degradation phenomena is 
then applied, depending on specific criteria e.g. void fraction in 
primary circuit loop, void in the upper plenum, void fraction at the top 
of the core, steam temperature at the top of the core, and non-
isolated accumulators mass fraction. This switch becomes effective 
around time of start of core uncovery, and in any case before the 
start of Zry cladding oxidation by steam. After the switch, CESAR 
calculates only thermal-hydraulics in the loops and the vessel upper 
plenum, while in addition to the degradation phenomena ICARE 
calculates thermal-hydraulics in the remaining part of the vessel 
(core, bypass, lower plenum and downcomer) all along the 
degradation phase. During the degradation phase (i.e. after the 
switch), a specific prediction-correction numerical coupling 
approach is used between CESAR and ICARE. At each macro time-
step, first the RCS thermal-hydraulics is predicted by ICARE using 
as inputs the CESAR outputs from the previous macro time-step. 
Then CESAR computes the two-phase thermal-hydraulics in the 
circuits using source and sink terms supplied by ICARE at the vessel 
junctions and it finally evaluates the possible waterfall back into the 
vessel at the end of the macro time-step. Both numerical schemes 
are therefore disconnected and each module is running at its own 
time-step. Meeting points occur at the end of an intermediate macro 
time-step. This macro time-step management had been 
differentiated from the other modules in order to gain CPU time. 
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3  SMALL MODULAR REACTORS 
 
3.1 Definition of Small Modular Reactors 
 
The continued development of economic and environmentally 
friendly nuclear power plants (NPPs) can play a fundamental role in 
the improvement of living standards worldwide. As the life of existing 
NPPs is extended and new plants are designed and built, public 
perceptions of the safety of these plants will continue to have an 
important impact on the future of these plants. In many cases, one 
of the most critical factors in public perception is the potential for the 
occurrence of severe accidents. Because of more than two decades 
of research in the field of severe accidents in NPPs, it has become 
increasingly clear how the consequences of such accidents can be 
reduced or even eliminated through the use of improved training, 
through the development of more realistic accident management 
strategies and, ultimately, through the development of more 
advanced reactor designs. This is the reason why, in the recent 
years, the Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) have been attracting 
considerable attention around the world. The same U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE) affirmed that the next big thing in nuclear energy 
would be a small thing: the SMR. The IAEA defines a “Small” reactor 
as one having electrical output less than 300MWe and a “Medium” 
reactor as one having output between 300 and 700MWe. More 
often, the two are combined into the commonly termed “Small and 
Medium-sized Reactors” or the same “Small Modular Reactors” 
representing those with an electrical output less than 700 MWe [1]. 
The minimum rating assures that, the reactor delivers power suitable 
for the practical industrial application of interest. The maximum 
rating constrains these designs to power levels at which the 
expected advantages of serial production and incremental 
deployment as well as the match to electric grid siting opportunities 
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and constraints can be realized. The term “Modular” refers to the unit 
assembly of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) which, when 
coupled to a power conversion system or process heat supply 
system, delivers the desired energy product. The unit assembly can 
be assembled from one or several sub-modules. The desired power 
plant can then be created from one or several modules as necessary 
to deliver the desired power rating. Currently, there are more than 
45 SMR designs under development for different application issues 
[2]. These SMRs could be broadly classified into three major groups 
according to their designs. The first group of SMRs is based on the 
design concepts of proven and widely utilized light water reactors, 
namely Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). This kind of reactors 
is considered, the most mature, having the lowest technical risk and 
will be treated in this chapter. The second group consists of gas-
cooled SMRs. The third group includes the SMRs designed from 
advanced and innovative concepts, using non-LWR coolants such 
as liquid metal, helium or liquid salt, which may offer added 
functionality and affordability. Incorporation of inherent and passive 
safety design features has become a ‘trademark’ of most of these 
SMR concepts including several evolutionary designs and nearly all 
innovative concepts. Hereafter will be described the main 
characteristics and some model of the SMR belonging to the first 
group; given that, this kind of SMR are already in a state of advanced 
development. 
 
3.2 Main Characteristics of the SMRs 
 
The current pressurized water SMR designs, mainly rooted from two 
origins, the marine-based power reactors, such as the mPower 
derived from the Otto Hahn marine reactor and the land based 
electricity generation reactor, such as WSMR from the AP1000 
reactor [3]. The design objectives of SMR are smaller power grade, 
smaller configuration size, smaller generation cost, and smaller 
operation risk. Consequently, the SMR designs absorb the 
advantages of the existing marine-based and land-based reactors, 
meeting the design objectives through progressive or significant 
innovation. In the SMR designs, the defence in depth strategy is 
used as in larger reactor designs to protect the public and 
environment from accidental releases of radiation. The main goal is 
to prevent or eliminate as many accident initiators and accident 
consequences as possible. Certain common measures of SMR lead 
themselves to safety are the relatively smaller core sizes enabling 
integral coolant system layouts, the larger reactor surface-to-volume 
ratios, and the lower core power densities. The intended outcome is 
greater plant simplicity with high safety levels and possibly reduced 
emergency response requirements. Most of this kind of reactors 
adopts an Integral Pressurized Water Reactor designs (iPWR), in 
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which most of the primary system components are contained within 
a single vessel. The integral design reduces the number and size of 
penetrations and welding links through the reactor pressure vessel, 
eliminating the high-consequence accident scenario of a large pipe-
break Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). In a PWR the maximum 
size pipe penetrating the reactor vessel is on average 5-7 cm in 
diameter, while in a large PWR pipes that connect the reactor vessel 
to the external steam generator vessels are 80-90 cm diameter. The 
SMRs focus them safety functions on proper cooling of reactor core 
in case of accidents through this following approach [4]:  
• The adoption of an increased relative coolant inventory.  
An enlarged vessel yields a larger inventory of water per unit of 
power than in the loop type plant, which increases the relative 
thermal inertia within the reactor vessel (Figure 3-1). This result in a 
reduction in the rate at which the system temperature increases 
during a loss of forced flow transient, providing the operators with 
more time to respond to an upset condition. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: IRIS and AP1000 vessel comparison (Rhinoceros 5) 
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• An increased relative heat transfer area.  
A simple calculation could reveal that relative surface area of the 
iPWR vessel per unit power is increased. Roughly speaking, if a 
diameter of a SMR reactor core is 1/n of a large reactor, then the 
relative surface area of reactor vessel per unit power could be at 
least n times of a large reactor. 
• An increased passive cooling capability.  
The vessel height-to diameter ratio of a SMR is 2-3 times larger than 
that of a large reactor since more equipment are incorporated 
vertically inside the vessel. This increases gravity-driven natural 
convection circulation capability.  
Concerning the prevention of radiation release, SMRs have 
following measures: 
• Smaller radionuclide inventory.  
The radionuclide inventory in a reactor core is roughly proportional 
to power level. In addition to the intrinsically smaller radionuclide 
inventory of an SMR, some SMR designs add additional barriers to 
fission-product release to achieve a dramatically smaller accident 
source term. 
• Under-ground construction.  
The smaller plant footprint of an SMR makes it more economically 
viable to construct the primary reactor system fully below ground 
level, which significantly hardens it against external impacts such as 
aircraft or natural disasters. As an example, the WSMR design has 
a containment vessel volume that is more than 23 times smaller than 
the Westinghouse AP-1000 containment. Below-grade construction 
of the reactor and containment vessels also provides the potential 
for additional seismic resistance and helps reduce the number of 
paths for fission-product release in the event of an accident.  
3.3 Main design features of the SMRs 
 
Currently, four integral pressurized water SMRs are under 
development in the USA: Babcock & Wilcox’s mPower, NuScale, 
SMR-160 and the Westinghouse SMR. The mPower design consists 
of two 180 MWe modules and its design certification application is 
expected to be submitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) in the short term. NuScale Power envisages a nuclear power 
plant made up of twelve modules producing more than 45 MWe and 
has a target commercial operation in 2023 for the first plant that is 
to be built in Idaho. The design certification application of NuScale 
to the NRC is expected in the second half of 2016. The 
Westinghouse SMR is a conceptual design with an electrical output 
of 225 MWe, incorporating passive safety systems and proven 
components of the AP1000. The SMR-160 design generates power 
of 160 MWe adopting passive safety features and its conceptual 
design is to be completed in 2015. In academic domain, the 
Politecnico di Milano (POLIMI) in Italy and universities in Croatia and 
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Japan performs one of the research and development activities on 
SMRs, that are continuing the development of the International 
Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS), previously lead by the 
Westinghouse consortium. IRIS is an integral PWR design with an 
electrical capacity of 335 MWe. 
3.3.1 The mPower reactor 
Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) unveiled the mPower reactor in June 2009 
[5]. The reactor had a planned capacity of 125 MWe when originally 
announced, and the reactor’s rated capacity was raised to 530 MWt 
of thermal power and 180 MWe of electrical power after its pre-
application design certification interaction to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) [6]. The mPower reactor is a direct 
descendent of the B&W maritime reactor program, which was used 
in the nuclear powered merchant ship Otto Hahn that had been 
successfully launched in 1964 [7]. Key features of the Otto Hahn 
reactor design are incorporated in the B&W mPower reactor design, 
which includes the placement of NSSS components within a single 
pressure vessel. The control rod drives do not penetrate the integral 
reactor vessel (IRV), but are instead wholly enclosed within the IRV 
Figure 3-2. The pressurizer is at the top of reactor vessel. The 
integral once-through steam generator (IOTSGs) surround the 
central riser, below the pressurizer. These IOTSGs are an advanced 
derivative of the steam generators used in older B&W designs. The 
mPower is designed to produce superheated steam and does not 
require steam separators and dryers prior to admitting steam into 
the high-pressure turbine. The reactor coolant pumps are located in 
the downcomer annulus, just below the steam generator. The core 
is located at the bottom of the reactor vessel. The B&W mPower has 
a “conventional core and standard fuel” (< 20 t) enriched to about 
3.5÷5 %, with burnable poisons, to give a four/five-year operating 
cycle between refuelling, 60-year service life is envisaged, as 
sufficient used fuel storage would be built on site for this. The safety 
feature profits from the integral design of the reactor vessel. As it 
contains the entire primary coolant loop within the reactor pressure 
vessel with automatic primary loop depressurization, the integral 
reactor vessel does not have large cold or hot leg piping thus the 
potential of large break loss of coolant accidents is eliminated. As 
no electrically driven pumps are required, heat removal can be used 
in the event that these systems are exhausted by flooding the 
containment and establishing natural circulation. Passive safety 
concept is adequately utilized since the heat power is much smaller 
and the relative cooling ability could be enhanced. There are water 
supplies located above and within the containment that can cool the 
vessel with gravity driven-cooling if secondary cooling is lost. The 
Figure 3-3 shows the safety systems adopted by the mPower 
reactor.  
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Figure 3-2: mPower Integral Reactor Vessel (IRV) 
 
The inherent safety features of the reactor design include: 
 
• a low core linear heat rate which reduces fuel and cladding 
temperatures during accidents; 
• a large reactor coolant system volume which allows more 
time for safety system responses in the event of an accident; 
• small penetrations at high elevations, increasing the amount 
of coolant available to mitigate a small break loss of coolant 
accident (LOCA).  
 
The emergency core cooling system is connected with the reactor 
coolant inventory purification system and removes heat from the 
reactor core after anticipated transients in a passive manner, while 
also passively reducing containment pressure and temperature. The 
plant is designed without taking any safety credit for standby diesel 
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generators, and a design objective is no core uncovery occurs 
during any credible design basis accident. As statement before the 
large pipe break LOCA is not possible, because the primary 
components are located inside the pressure vessel and the 
maximum diameter of the connected piping is less than 7.6 cm [2]. 
The mPower SMR has decay heat removal systems that consist of 
a passive heat exchanger connected with the atmosphere (as the 
ultimate heat sink), an auxiliary steam condenser on the secondary 
system, water injection or cavity flooding using the reactor water 
storage tank, and passive containment cooling.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 : mPower reactor safety systems 
The philosophy implemented in B&W mPower for coping with an 
accident does not rely on the plant-containment coupling. Figure 
3-4 shows a layout of a two-unit site and a cutaway view of the 
containment building, which is a low-leakage, reinforced concrete, 
steel-lined seismic category-I structure. The containment building 
and other critical structures are located below ground level. Normal 
access is via two personnel hatches, and a removable equipment 
hatch on the top of the building provides access for large 
component replacement. The other buildings are situated below 
grade level, except for the reactor service building, which is located 
partially below grade level, and the turbine building, which is 
located above the ground level. 
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Figure 3-4: Two-Unit plant layout Figure and Containment building 
3.3.2 The NuScale reator 
The NuScale SMR plant is an innovative design that builds on 50 
years of worldwide experience with the commercial application of 
pressurized, light-water-cooled reactor (LWR) technology.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 : NuScale power module (L) and cutaway of 12-modules plant (R). 
The design incorporates several features that reduce complexity, 
improve safety and enhance operability. From the outset, the top-
level design goals for the NuScale plant have been to achieve a high 
level of safety and asset protection while providing an affordable 
approach to nuclear power that gives the plant owner the maximum 
flexibility in construction, operation and application of the plant. The 
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fundamental building block of the NuScale plant is the NuScale 
power module. The power module consists of a small 160 MWt 
reactor core housed with other primary system components in an 
integral reactor pressure vessel and surrounded by a steel 
containment vessel, which is immersed in a large pool of water. 
Several power modules – as many as 12 modules – are co-located 
in the same pool. Models of a single power module and a multi-
modules plant are shown in Figure 3-5. The reactor vessel is 
approximately 20 m tall and 2.7 m in diameter. The integral vessel 
contains the nuclear core consisting of 37 fuel assemblies and 16 
control rod clusters. The fuel assemblies are shorter than traditional 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies but use the same 
17x17 pin array geometry, same materials, and same fuel type. 
Above the core is a central hot riser tube, a helical coil steam 
generator surrounding the hot riser tube, and a pressurizer. The 
helical coil steam generator consists of two independent sets of tube 
bundles with separate feedwater inlet and steam outlet lines. A set 
of pressurizer heaters and sprays is located in the upper head of the 
vessel to provide pressure control. Primary reactor coolant is 
circulated upward through the reactor core and the heated water is 
transported upward through the hot riser tube. The coolant flow is 
turned downward at the pressurizer plate and flows over the shell 
side of the steam generator, where it is cooled by conduction of heat 
to the secondary coolant and continues to flow downward until its 
direction is again reversed at the lower reactor vessel head and 
turned upward back into the core. The coolant circulation is 
maintained entirely by natural buoyancy forces of the lower density 
heated water exiting the reactor core and the higher density cooled 
water exiting the steam generator [8]. On the secondary side, 
feedwater is pumped into the tubes where it boils to generate 
superheated steam, which is circulated to a dedicated turbine–
generator system. Low-pressure steam exiting the turbine is 
condensed and recirculated to the feedwater system. The entire 
nuclear steam supply system is enclosed in a steel containment that 
is 24.6 m tall and 4.6 m in diameter. The small volume, high design 
pressure containment vessel is a unique feature of the NuScale 
design and contributes significantly to the large safety margins and 
overall resilience of the plant design. The reactor building is a 
Seismic Category 1 reinforced concrete structure designed to 
withstand the effects of aircraft impact, environmental conditions, 
natural phenomena, postulated design basis accidents, and design 
basis threats and houses all the systems and components required 
for plant operation and shutdown. Portions of the reactor building 
are located above and below grade, The NuScale Power Modules, 
reactor pool, and the spent fuel pool are located at or below nominal 
plant grade level, while the hoisting and handling equipment is 
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located above grade. The surface of the reactor pool water is located 
at approximately ground level. At a 12-module facility, the NuScale 
Power Modules are installed in a vertical position and are arranged 
into two rows of 6 modules along the reactor pool walls. Concrete 
walls separate the modules in individual reactor bays. An extra 
reactor bay is located adjacent to the units for either module 
maintenance or storage of a possible spare module. A central 
channel is provided between the rows of modules to allow for 
moving of the modules between the reactor pool and the connected 
refueling pool. Pipes interfacing with the NuScale Power Module 
(i.e., feed water piping, steam piping, the chemical and volume 
control system, containment evacuation system, instrumentation, 
and power connections) are located above the water level. 
Pipefittings are provided in this area to permit manual connection 
and disconnection during module installation, refueling outages, and 
during replacement or removal of modules. The reactor pool 
consists of a large, below-grade concrete pool with a stainless steel 
liner that provides stable cooling for the NuScale Power Modules for 
an unlimited period of time following any actuation of the Emergency 
Core Cooling System (ECCS). Furthermore, this unique design of 
the NuScale containment vessel and its immersion in the ultimate 
heat sink allows the ECCS to be simplified considerably compared 
to other reactor designs. The ECCS consists of just two independent 
Reactor Vent Valves (RVVs) and two independent Reactor 
Recirculation Valves (RRVs) and the Decay Heat Removal System 
(DHRS). The ECCS provides a means of long-term decay heat 
removal in the event of a LOCA. The ECCS removes heat and limits 
containment pressure by steam condensation on the inside surface 
of the cold containment vessel. It also allows heat conduction 
through the containment vessel walls to the water in the reactor pool. 
The DHRS provides secondary side reactor cooling for non-Loss of 
Coolant Accident (LOCA) events when normal feed water is not 
available (Figure 3-6). The system is a closed loop, two-phase 
natural circulation cooling system. Redundant trains of decay heat 
removal equipment are provided, one attached to each steam 
generator loop. Each train is capable of removing 100 % of the 
decay heat load to cool the reactor coolant system [8]. Each train 
has a passive condenser submerged in the reactor pool. The 
condensers are maintained with sufficient water inventory for stable 
operation. Long-term cooling of the reactor core is established via 
recirculation of steam condensate back into the reactor pressure 
vessel via the RRVs. Following a LOCA or other condition resulting 
in an actuation of the ECCS, heat removal through the containment 
vessel rapidly reduces heat  removal through the containment 
vessel rapidly reduces the containment pressure and temperature 
and maintains them at acceptably low levels for extended periods of 
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time. Steam is condensed on the inside surface of the containment 
vessel, which is passively cooled by conduction and convection of 
heat to the reactor pool water. 
 
Figure 3-6: DHRS through the steam and DHRS through the containment 
In the event of a complete station blackout (SBO), as experienced at 
the Fukushima Daiichi plants, heat is removed from the reactor 
modules by fail-safe actuation of the ECCS and allowing the reactor 
building pool to heat up and boil. Water inventory in the reactor pool 
is sufficiently large to cool all of the reactors and prevent fuel damage 
for at least 30 days without any source of power, operator action, or 
makeup water. After 30 days, water boil-off and passive air cooling 
of the containment vessel provide adequate cooling for an unlimited 
period of time. The stages of passive removal of the reactor decay 
heat for a long-term cool-down of the reactor module is illustrated in 
Figure 3-7. The key to ensuring the transition from water cooling to 
air cooling is the very small decay heat and the large containment 
surface area. After reactor shutdown, the power has decayed to 10 
MWt and after one day, the power has decayed down to 1.1 MWt. 
After 30 days, the decay heat being generated per module is less 
than 400 kW equivalent to about 250 hair dryers. This extremely 
robust safety feature is a direct consequence of the unique design of 
the compact containment vessel, the assured supply of long-term 
cooling afforded by the reactor pool, and the relatively low power 
output of each module. 
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Figure 3-7: NuScale power module heat removal during a prolonged SBO event 
3.3.3 The SMR 160 reactor 
The SMR-160 conceptual design has been developed by Holtec 
International as an advanced PWR-type, small modular reactor, 
producing power of 525 MWth or 160 MWe adopting passive safety 
features. Simplification in the design is achieved by using fewer 
valves, pumps, heat exchangers, instrumentation, and control loops 
than conventional plants, simplifying operator actions during all plant 
modes, including diagnosing and managing off-normal and accident 
conditions. The SMR-160 uses fuel very similar to existing 
commercial LWR product lines, includes no reactor coolant pumps 
and utilizes a large vertical steam generator. The SMR-160 uses 
natural circulation for all power and accident modes and states. The 
reactor coolant system (RCS) continues to circulate by thermo-
siphon action during accident scenarios [9]. The RCS is comprised 
of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and a steam generator (SG) in 
an offset configuration with an integrated pressurizer flanged to the 
top of the steam generator. The RPV and the SG are connected by 
a single connection (Figure 3-8), which houses both the hot leg and 
the cold leg. The hot leg is the inner pipe and the cold leg is the 
annular region of this single connection. Unique among integrated 
PWRs, the offset configuration allows easy access to the core 
without moving the RPV or SG during refuelling. The SG has a 
superheating feature, which eliminates the need for a Moisture 
Separator Reheater (MSR) and trains of feedwater heaters while not 
compromising the thermodynamic efficiency of the plant [2]. The 
secondary side has only one feedwater heater simplifying plant 
operations and maintenance. The RPV is located in a free standing 
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steel containment vessel called the Containment Structure (CS), 
supported within a reinforced concrete reactor building called the 
Containment Enclosure Structure (CES) which also provides missile 
protection. The annular region between the CS and the CES also 
called the Coolant Reservoir (CR) is filled with water and serves as 
the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) for SMR-160. The control rod drive 
mechanism (CRDM) based on existing technology is located outside 
the reactor coolant system on the RPV top head. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-8: SMR-160 Reactor pressure Vessel RPV and Containment Structure 
(CS) and Containment enclosure structure (CES) 
 
The pressurizer uses heaters and cold-water injection nozzles to 
perform the same functions of a typical pressurizer. Integrating the 
pressurizer with the steam generator eliminates the typical primary 
cold- and hot-legs along with their supporting structures normally 
connecting the primary external loop of a PWR to an external 
pressurizer and reactor coolant pumps. All of the electrical 
connections required to run the CRDMs and the pressurizer’s 
heaters are external resulting in a highly simplified design. All of the 
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electrical connections required to run the CRDMs and the 
pressurizer’s heaters are external the resulting design is highly 
simplified. The underground containment vessel part of the SMR-
160 design houses the RPV and sections of the unitized integral 
steam generator unit, and the above ground part houses the top 
sections of the integral steam generator and pressurizer unit.  
3.3.4 The SMR Westinghouse 
The Westinghouse SMR is a modular pressurized water reactor with 
an integral configuration that improves on the concepts of simplicity 
and advanced passive safety demonstrated in the AP1000 plant.  
 
 
Figure 3-9 : Westinghouse SMR Vessel (RV) and Containment Vessel (CV) 
 
The plant conceptual design was completed in 2011 and the 
preliminary design is currently underway. The plant is not reliant on 
AC power or other support systems to perform its safety functions. 
The seven day minimum coping time following loss of offsite power 
is a fundamental advancement over the three day coping time of the 
best, currently licensed plants. The integral reactor design 
40 
 
“Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 3. Small Modular Reactor 
 
eliminates large loop piping and potential large break LOCA, and 
significantly reduces the flow area of postulated small break LOCAs. 
The below grade locations of the reactor vessel, containment vessel, 
and spent fuel pool provide protection against external threats and 
natural phenomena hazards. The small size and low power density 
of the reactor limits the potential consequences of an accident 
relative to a large plant. The plant is designed to be “stand-alone” 
with no shared systems, eliminating susceptibility to failures that 
cascade from one unit to another in a multi-unit station. The result is 
a plant capable of withstanding natural phenomena hazards and 
beyond-design-basis accident scenarios, including long-term SBO. 
The fully modular constructed Westinghouse SMR containment 
vessel has a height of 28.5 m and an outer diameter of 9.75 m. The 
reactor vessel has a height of 28 m and an outer diameter of 3.7 m. 
The core is based on the licensed Westinghouse robust fuel 
assembly (RFA) design, and uses 89 standard 17 x 17 fuel 
assemblies, the same of AP1000 reactor, but with an 2.4 m active 
fuel height, and Optimized ZIRLO cladding for corrosion resistance. 
A metallic radial reflector is used to achieve better neutron economy 
in the core while reducing enrichment requirements to less than the 
existing statutory limit of 5.0 wt% 235U. Approximately 40% of the 
core is replaced every two years, resulting in an efficient and 
economical operating cycle of 700 Effective Full Power Days 
(EFPD) that coincides with existing regulatory surveillance intervals 
[10]. Further based on the AP1000 plant design, the reactor vessel 
internals are modified for the smaller core and to provide support for 
the internal control rod drive mechanisms. Eight proven, horizontally 
mounted axial-flow pumps provide the driving head for the reactor 
coolant system while eliminating the need for pump seal injection. 
The recirculating, once-through, straight tube steam generator 
design, achieves a compact physical envelope with an innovative 
approach to steam separation. Finally, the pressurizer is integrated 
into the reactor vessel head to eliminate the need for a separate 
component. The power station delivers a thermal output of 800 
MWth and an electric output of greater than 225 MWe. Three diverse 
decay heat removal methods are provided in the Westinghouse 
SMR (Figure 3-8). The first method of decay heat removal uses 
gravity feed from the steam drum through the steam generator for 
approximately 80 minutes of natural circulation cooling. In this 
scenario, steam is released to the atmosphere through two 
redundant power-operated relief valves (PORV). The second decay 
heat removal method can be achieved by cooling the RCS with a 
passive decay heat removal heat exchanger, one of which is located 
in each of four core makeup tanks (CMT). Heat from the CMTs is 
then rejected to four heat exchangers located in two Ultimate Heat 
Sink System (UHS) tanks. The UHS tanks are sized to provide a 
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minimum of seven days of decay heat removal, with additional 
options to replenish lost inventory and cool the plant indefinitely. A 
third diverse method of decay heat removal capability is available by 
cooling the RCS with diverse bleed and feed methods. This method 
includes a two-stage automatic depressurization system (ADS) that 
vents the RCS to the containment through Direct Vessel Injection 
(DVI) pathways, water injection from the four CMTs and in-
containment pool (ICP) tank paths, and gravity-feed boric acid tank 
water makeup to the DVI paths. The steam vented from the RCS to 
the containment is cooled and condensed by the containment shell. 
The containment shell is cooled by the water, in the outside 
containment pool (OCP), which surrounds the containment. When 
the OCP water eventually boils, makeup water is provided by gravity 
from each of the two redundant UHS tanks that maintain the OCP 
full of water. The water condensed on the containment shell flows 
back into the RCS through two sump injection flow paths. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Westinghouse SMR safety Systems 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
4  THE IRIS REACTOR  
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
This chapter is devoted to the description of the IRIS reactor, the 
nuclear system selected to develop the ASTEC SMR model. The 
IRIS reactor has been developed for about ten years by an 
international consortium led by Westinghouse Electric Co, reaching 
an advanced design status. The IRIS consortium included a number 
of US and international companies, universities and national 
laboratories and organizations. The contribution of the universities 
to the IRIS program was very important. Innovative design solutions 
have been proposed and developed by the universities, and IRIS 
was perhaps the first and only commercial reactor project where 
academia and industry was in a partnership equally co-responsible 
for the design. The leading principle imposed on the IRIS design was 
that safety is based on eliminating as many systems as possible, 
using a few simple passive systems rather than a multitude of 
complex active systems. Although firmly based on the proven LWR 
technology, the IRIS project has developed many engineering and 
project innovations. In some cases, IRIS has developed and 
introduced novel solutions; in other, it has advanced a known feature 
to a new level [1]. The IRIS concept reactor can be classified as a 
pressurized medium size, modular reactor, with a thermal power of 
1000 MWt. Its main technical characteristic that distinguish it from 
the current commercial nuclear plant are that, every primary system 
component is integrated in the vessel and the containment is 
designed to be thermodynamically coupled with the integrated 
primary system during accident conditions. The IRIS reactor 
rendering figures has been realized using the program Rhinoceros 
5. 
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4.2 SPES3-IRIS integral facility 
 
The licensing process required by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) foresees a series of experimental tests on 
properly built facilities suitable to verify the behaviour of the new 
plant and its safety system capabilities to cope with postulated 
accidents. This is the reason why, an integral test facility, 
denominated SPES3-IRIS, has been designed to study this kind of 
phenomena that take place during a LOCA. The SPES3-IRIS facility 
is an integral simulator of the IRIS reactor under construction at SIET 
laboratories in Piacenza (Italy), suitable to test the plant response to 
postulated DBAs and to provide experimental data for code 
validation and IRIS plant safety analyses.  
 
 
 Figure 4-1: SPES3-IRIS facility layout 
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The facility reproducing with 1:100 volume scale and 1:1 height 
scale (Figure 4-1), the IRIS reactor [2], and in particular: 
• the primary circuit including the reactor pressure vessel with 
power channel and fuel box, lower riser, upper riser, pressurizer, 
upper downcomer, steam generators (SG), riser-to-downcomer 
connection check valves, lower downcomer, lower plenum, 
circulation pump; 
• the secondary circuit up to the Main Isolation Valves, including 
SG, Feedwater lines and Steam Lines; 
• the safety system including the Emergency Boration Tanks 
(EBT), the Emergency Heat Removal System Heat Exchangers 
(EHRS-HX) located in the Refuelling Water Storage Tank 
(RWST) and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS); 
• the containment system including the Dry Well, the Quench Tank 
(QT), the Pressure Suppression System (PSS), the Reactor 
cavity and DVI room, the Long Term Gravity Make-up System 
(LGMS), and the DVI lines. 
A nodalization of SPES3 has been developed at SIET, for the 
RELAP5 thermal-hydraulic code to simulate the facility and compare 
the results with the IRIS simulations performed by the University of 
Zagreb (FER), making use of the RELAP5 and GHOTIC coupled 
codes: the former for the primary and secondary systems, the latter 
for the containment system. A design-simulation feedback process 
has led, step by step, to understand and reduce the differences 
between the SPES3 and IRIS behaviour up to obtain a nodalization 
suitable to simulate all the tests foreseen in the test matrix, in 
compliance with IRIS performances. In particular, the DVI SBLOCA 
(Direct Vessel Injection Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident), 
which provides the database for the Fractional Scaling Analysis 
(FSA), has been carefully analyzed. Such analysis, provided a 
quantitative evaluation of the discrepancies of the most important 
thermal-hydraulic parameters of the transient evolution, and 
confirmed that SPES3 simulates IRIS adequately [3].  
4.3 The IRIS reactor 
4.3.1 IRIS general description  
The IRIS design still relies on the proven technology provided by 40 
years of operating PWR experience, and on the established use of 
passive safety features pioneered by Westinghouse in the NRC 
certified AP1000 plant design [4]. Like the AP1000 designs, the IRIS 
safety features, once actuated, rely on natural driving forces such 
as gravity and natural circulation flow for their continued function. 
These safety systems do not use active components (such as 
pumps, fans or diesel generators) and are designed to function 
without safety-grade support systems (such as AC power, 
component cooling water, service water, or HVAC). Because of the 
safety by design approach, the number and complexity of the safety 
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systems and required operator actions are further minimized in IRIS. 
The net result is a design with significantly reduced complexity and 
improved operability, and extensive plant simplifications to enhance 
construction. All the main primary system components are located 
inside the reactor pressure vessel. In Figure 4-2 is shown the IRIS 
integral vessel and the primary coolant flow path. Water flows 
upwards through the core and upward through the riser region 
(defined by the extended core barrel). At the top of the riser, the 
coolant is directed into the upper annular plenum where the suction 
of the reactor coolant pumps is located. Eight pumps are employed, 
and the flow of each pump is directed downward through its 
associated helical coil steam generator module. The flow path 
continues down through the annular downcomer region outside the 
core to the lower plenum and then back to the core completing the 
primary coolant flow path. 
 
Figure 4-2: IRIS Integral vessel 
 
The integral reactor vessel configuration allows the use of a small, 
high design pressure, spherical steel containment resulting in a high 
level of safety and economic attractiveness. The IRIS containment 
vessel (CV) (Figure 4-3) is a spherical steel structure, 25 m in 
diameter, designed to sustain high pressure in transient, with two 
steam suppression pools that combines the best characteristics of 
PWR and BWR containments. The size reduction, combined with 
the spherical geometry, results in a capability of sustaining a design 
pressure of 13E5 Pa.  
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Figure 4-3: IRIS containment (Rhinoceros 5) 
The IRIS core and fuel characteristics are approximately the same 
of those of a conventional Westinghouse PWR design. However, 
several features have been modified to enhance performance as 
compared to conventional plants, while retaining existing 
technology. The FA consists of 264 fuel rods in a 17x17 square 
array. Low-power density is achieved by employing a core 
configuration consisting of 89 FAs with a 4,267 mm active fuel 
height, and a nominal thermal power of 1,000 MWt. The average 
linear power density is reduced by about 46% as compared to 
AP1000 (9.974/18.76 kW/m) [6-7]. The IRIS FA design is similar to 
the Westinghouse 17x17 XL Robust FA design used by AP1000 [5], 
but can operate over a three to four years long fuel cycle. To longer 
the fuel cycle, the fission gas plenum volume in the upper and lower 
part of the fuel rod was increased, rising the FA height of 41 cm. 
This technical solution is due to allow achieving higher fuel burnup 
in the future. Anyway, given the integral vessel layout, where the 
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vessel height is mostly determined, by the steam generators, this 
plenum increase is possible with no corresponding increase in 
vessel height. In order to take advantage of the extended IRIS fuel 
cycle and to improve the overall plant availability, an optimized 
maintenance approach for all major components is being developed, 
which will also extend  the interval between maintenance shutdowns 
to as long as 48 months. 
4.3.2  IRIS design approach  
The IRIS design provides for multiple levels of defense for accident 
mitigation (defense-in-depth), resulting in extremely low core 
damage probabilities while minimizing the occurrences of 
containment flooding, pressurization and heat-up situations. The 
first line of defense in the defense in depth approach is to eliminate 
initiators that could convincibly lead to core damage. In IRIS, this 
concept is implemented through the “safety by design” approach, 
which can be simply described as “design the plant in such a way to 
eliminate the accidents from occurring, rather than coping with their 
consequences”. If it is not possible to eliminate the accidents 
altogether, then the design should be such to inherently reduce their 
consequences and/or decrease their probability of occurring [8]. The 
key difference from previous practice is that the integral reactor 
design is intrinsically conducive to eliminating accidents, to a degree 
impossible in conventional loop-type reactors. The elimination of the 
large LOCAs, since no large primary penetrations of the reactor 
vessel or large loop piping exist, is only the most easily visible of the 
safety potential characteristics of integral reactors. Many others are 
possible, but they must be carefully exploited through an appropriate 
design that is kept focused on selecting design characteristics that 
are most amenable to eliminate accident-initiating events. Defense-
in-depth is built into the IRIS design, where the design goal is to 
always maintain the core covered with water and avoid fuel damage, 
with a multitude of individual plant features capable of providing 
some degree of defense of plant safety. After the safety by design, 
five additional aspects of the IRIS design contribute to defense in-
depth: 
Stable Operation. In normal operation, the most fundamental level 
of defense-in-depth ensures that the plant can be operated stably 
and reliably. This is achieved by the selection of materials, by quality 
assurance during design and construction, by well-trained 
operators, and by an advanced control system and plant design that 
provide substantial margins for plant operation before approaching 
safety limits. 
Physical Plant Boundaries. One of the most recognizable aspects of 
defense-in-depth is the protection of public safety through the 
physical plant boundaries. The fuel cladding, the reactor pressure 
boundary, and the containment pressure boundary directly prevent 
releases of radiation. For the fuel cladding boundary, the reactor 
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protection system is designed to actuate a reactor trip whenever 
necessary to prevent exceeding the fuel design limits. The core 
design, together with defense-in-depth process and decay heat 
removal systems, provides this capability under expected conditions 
of normal operation, with appropriate margin for uncertainties and 
anticipated transient situations. The reactor coolant pressure 
boundary is designed with complete overpressure protection and 
appropriate materials to provide and maintain the boundary during 
all modes of plant operation. The containment vessel, in conjunction 
with the defense-in-depth heat removal systems, is designed so 
that: its design pressure is not exceeded following postulated DBAs; 
a large margin to the design basis pressure is maintained during 
postulated design basis accidents to minimize leakage probability; 
and, containment failure does not occur even under severe accident 
conditions. 
Non-safety Systems. The next design level of defense-in-depth is 
the availability of certain non-safety systems for reducing the 
potential for events leading to core damage. For more probable 
events, these defense-in-depth, non-safety systems automatically 
actuate to provide a first level of defense to reduce the likelihood of 
unnecessary actuation and operation of the safety-related systems. 
These non-safety-related systems establish and maintain safe 
shutdown conditions for the plant following design basis events, 
provided that at least one of the non-safety related AC power 
sources is available. In addition, to minimize core damage 
probability, diverse, non-safety systems are provided to back up the 
main functions of the passive safety related systems. These 
systems are being defined on the basis of PSA considerations so to 
minimize the core damage and the radioactivity release 
probabilities. This diversity exists, for example, in the residual heat 
removal function. The emergency heat removal system (EHRS) is 
the passive safety-related feature for removing decay heat during a 
transient. In case of multiple failures in the EHRS, defense-in-depth 
is provided by a simple, non-safety, passive containment cooling 
system and by the gravity driven injection from the pressure 
suppression system tanks and automatic depressurization (passive 
feed and bleed) functions. The introduction of these diverse features 
in the design is made amenable by the intrinsic characteristics of the 
integral layout, as exploited in the safety by design approach.  
Containing Core Damage. The IRIS is designed so that the reactor 
cavity floods following any severe accident event that may have the 
potential for core uncovery and melting. The objective of this cavity 
flooding action is to prevent reactor vessel failure and subsequent 
relocation of molten core debris into the containment. Retention of 
the debris in the vessel significantly reduces the uncertainty in the 
assessment of containment failure and radioactive release to the 
environment due to ex-vessel severe accident phenomena. Again, 
it must be emphasized that IRIS is designed to avoid core uncovery 
and consequently melting, under all accident conditions. The 
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capability of in vessel core retention is an added feature. 
4.3.3 Safety systems and features  
The use of passive safety systems provides improvements in plant 
simplification, safety, reliability, and investment protection over 
conventional plant designs. The IRIS follows the AP1000 approach 
and uses passive safety systems to improve the safety of the plant 
and to satisfy safety criteria of regulatory authorities. The passive 
safety systems require no operator actions to mitigate design basis 
accidents. Once actuated, these systems rely only natural forces 
such as gravity and natural circulation for continued operation. No 
pumps, fans, diesels, chillers, or other active machinery are used. A 
few simple valves align and automatically actuate the passive safety 
systems. To provide high reliability, these valves are designed to 
actuate to their safeguards positions upon loss of power or upon 
receipt of a safeguards actuation signal. However, they are also 
supported by multiple, reliable power sources to avoid unnecessary 
actuations. The IRIS passive systems design, takes full advantage 
of the safety by design approach. Thus, the consequent elimination 
of some postulated design basis events (large LOCAs) and the 
inherent mitigation of several other (steam generator tube rupture, 
steam line break, locked rotor) through the definition of a safety 
strategy that is specifically tailored to respond to those remaining 
accident initiators, that are the more important contributors to core 
damage frequencies. This design approach allows the licensing 
safety criteria to be satisfied with a greatly simplified plant design. 
The passive safety systems provide a major enhancement in plant 
safety and investment protection as compared with conventional 
plants. They establish and maintain core cooling and containment 
integrity indefinitely, with no operator or AC power support 
requirements. The passive systems are designed to meet the single-
failure criteria, and the PSAs are used to verify their reliability [8]. 
The IRIS passive safety systems are even simpler than previous 
passive safety designs since they contain significantly fewer 
components, reducing the required tests, inspections, and 
maintenance, require no active support systems, and their readiness 
is easily monitored. 
4.3.4 Passive core and containment cooling 
The IRIS passive systems configuration is presented in and includes 
[9]: 
• Two compact (12.8 m3) full-system pressure emergency 
boration tanks (EBTs) which deliver emergency borated water 
through the Direct Vessel Injection (DVI) lines for transient 
events. By their operation these tanks also provide a limited 
gravity feed makeup water (at high pressure) to the primary 
system; 
• An Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) from the 
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pressurizer steam space, which assists the EHRS in 
depressurizing the reactor vessel when/if the reactor vessel 
coolant inventory drops below a specific setpoint. This ADS has 
two stage and consist of two set composed by three parallel 4 
inches lines ADS stage-1, and three parallel 6 inches lines ADS 
stage-2. The ADS stage-1 line discharges into the quench tank 
through a sparger, while the ADS stage-2 line discharges 
directly into the drywell. This ADS function ensures that the 
reactor vessel and containment pressures are equalized in a 
timely manner limiting the loss of coolant and thus preventing 
core uncovery following postulated LOCAs (Figure 4-4); 
 
 
Figure 4-4: EBT and ADS system (Rhinoceros 5) 
• Two Long Term Makeup Gravity Tanks  (LGMS) which provide 
an elevated source of water that is available for gravity injection 
into the reactor vessel through the DVI lines in the event of a 
loss of coolant accident (LOCA); 
• A containment Pressure Suppression System (PSS) which 
consists of 2 suppression pools. Each suppression pool is 
connected to the containment atmosphere through a vent pipe, 
connected to a submerged sparger to condense steam released 
in the containment following a LOCA or steam/feed line break 
accident. The suppression system limits the peak containment 
pressure following a blowdown event to less than the 
containment design pressure. The suppression system water 
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tanks are connected to LGMS tanks, pressurizing the system 
(Figure 4-5). 
 
 
Figure 4-5: LGMS and PSS system (Rhinoceros 5) 
• A passive emergency heat removal system (EHRS) made of four 
independent trains; each includes a vertical heat exchanger 
located in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) located 
outside the containment structure that is connected to a separate 
SG feed/steam line, which includes 2 SGs. The RWST provides 
the heat sink for the EHRS heat exchangers. The EHRS is sized 
so that a single train can provide decay heat removal in the case 
of a loss of secondary system heat removal capability. The EHRS 
operates by natural circulation removing heat from the primary 
system through the steam generators heat transfer surface, 
condensing the steam produced in the EHRS heat exchanger, 
and transferring the heat to the RWST, and returning the 
condensate back to the SGs. The EHRS provides the main post-
LOCA depressurization (depressurization without loss of mass) 
and coolant makeup function for IRIS because it condenses the 
steam produced by the core directly inside the reactor vessel 
minimizing the break flow, while transferring the decay heat to the 
environment, thus performing the functions of both core cooling 
and containment depressurization (Figure 4-6);  
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Figure 4-6: EHRS and RWST system (Rhinoceros 5) 
• A specially constructed lower containment volume that collects 
the liquid break flow as well as any condensate from the 
containment in a cavity where the reactor vessel is located. 
During a LOCA, the cavity floods above the core level, creating 
a gravity head of water sufficient to provide coolant makeup to 
the reactor vessel through the DVI lines (Figure 4-7). 
 
 
Figure 4-7: Reactor cavity (Rhinoceros 5) 
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• Eight internal by-pass valves connecting the riser line with 
the eight SGs to ensure natural circulation in accident condition 
 
Thus, the IRIS passive systems provides the same safety functions 
as the active systems in current reactors and as the AP1000 passive 
systems. The safety strategy of IRIS provides a diverse means of 
core shutdown by makeup of borated water from the EBT and core 
cooling and heat removal to the environment through the EHRS in 
the event that normally available active systems are not available. 
In the event of a significant loss of primary-side water inventory. The 
primary line of defence for IRIS is represented by the large coolant 
inventory in the reactor vessel, and the fact that in IRIS 
depressurization is attained with very limited loss of mass, thus 
maintaining a sufficient inventory in the primary system and 
guaranteeing that the core will remain covered for all postulated 
LOCAs. The IRIS strategy relies on “maintaining” coolant inventory, 
rather than “injecting” makeup water. This strategy is sufficient to 
ensure that the core remains covered with water for an extended 
period (days and possibly weeks) [10]. Of course, when the reactor 
vessel is depressurized to near containment pressure, gravity flow 
from the LGMS and then from the cavity will maintain the coolant 
inventory for an unlimited period. However, this function would not 
be strictly necessary for any reasonable recovery period since the 
core decay heat is removed directly by condensing steam inside the 
pressure vessel, thus preventing any primary water from leaving the 
pressure vessel 
4.3.5 Severe accidents (Beyond design basis accidents) 
  The IRIS is designed to provide in-vessel retention (IVR) of core 
debris by depressurizing and cooling the outside of the reactor 
vessel following severe accidents. With the reactor vessel intact and 
debris retained in the lower head, phenomena that may occur as a 
result of core debris being relocated to the reactor cavity are 
prevented. The IRIS has reactor vessel insulation that promotes in-
vessel retention and surface treatment that promotes wettability of 
the external surface. The design features of the containment ensure 
flooding of the vessel cavity region during accidents and submerging 
the reactor vessel lower head in water. Liquid effluent released 
through the break during a LOCA event is directed to the reactor 
cavity. The IRIS design also includes a provision for draining part of 
the PSS water tanks water, into the reactor cavity. The IRIS design 
also includes a second means of containment cooling should cooling 
via the EHRS be defeated. In this event, direct cooling of the 
containment outer surface is provided and containment 
pressurization is limited to less than its design pressure. This cooling 
plus multiple means of providing gravity driven makeup to the core 
provides a diverse means of preventing core damage and ensuring 
containment integrity and heat removal to the environment [11]. 
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5  SMR ASTEC MODEL 
 
5.1  Introduction 
  
In this chapter will be illustrated, the modelling of the IRIS reactor 
developed with ASTEC code v2.0r2p2. The SPES3-IRIS facility 
data, appropriately scaled for reproducing the IRIS real dimension, 
[1-6] along with the IRIS plant description document [7-9] was used 
to produce the meshing scheme of primary loop, secondary loop 
passive core cooling system and containment for the ASTEC code. 
Concerning the core modelling, it has been used, the same fuel 
assemblies adopted by the AP1000 reactor [10-11]. The meshing 
scheme of the modelled system was established using the ASTEC 
code guidelines given in the code user’s manual. This requires 
knowledge in depth of both the capabilities of the code and the 
specifics of the system modelled. Development of the nodalization 
scheme is typically an essential part of the preparation of the input 
data, since in most codes the quantification of the nodes plays an 
important part in the modelling of certain phenomena or specific 
effects in the system. However, refined nodalization does not always 
produce more precise analysis results. The adequacy of the 
nodalization needs to be confirmed by spatial convergence studies 
or on the basis of previous experience. The IRIS ASTEC input-deck 
consists of 17808 lines, with the addition of the file for the decay heat 
description (time dependence, FP's transmutation processes). In the 
case of the IRIS reactor, the main difficulties encountered have been 
the simulation of the IRIS strategy to mitigate LOCA consequences. 
Because the IRIS strategy is based on “maintaining water inventory” 
rather than on the principle of safety injection [4]. This new safety 
approach poses significant issues for computational and analysis 
methods since the IRIS vessel and containment are strongly 
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coupled, and the system response is based on the interaction 
between the two. Thus, to simulate correctly the main phenomena 
involved during an accident scenario, the coupling between primary 
circuit and containment had to be accurate. Three ASTEC modules 
have been used to model the IRIS reactor, ICARE for in-vessel 
phenomena, CESAR for the thermal-hydraulic of the primary and 
secondary circuit and CPA for the thermal-hydraulic in the 
containment. 
5.2 ICARE model 
 
The core and the vessel was modelled by ICARE module. The main 
characteristics of the IRIS vessel that, differentiate it from a 
commercial PWR are the larger volume of the downcomer and the 
lower plenum whilst, the internals and the FAs are similar to those 
adopted by the standard reactors (Figure 5-1). 
 
Figure 5-1 : IRIS core configuration and vessel 
The radial discretization used to simulate the IRIS vessel with 
ICARE module, subdivides the core active zone in five concentric 
rings, a sixth ring for the reflector, a seventh and eighth ring for the 
barrel and for the downcomer region. Between the ring sixth and 
seventh is included the bypass area. In the core region (ring 1 to 
ring 5), two kinds of representative rods are modelled in each ring, 
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one fuel rod and one instrumentation tube, (the control rods was not 
modelled); two nozzle (bottom and top), and also the lower support 
plate. Each modelled element was associated to a “weight”, i.e. to a 
fixed number of identical rods, nozzles or part of lower support plate. 
For instance, the “ring 1” is composed of “NF1 fuel rods” which are 
identical to the representative fuel rod in this ring, and of “NN1 
nozzles” which are identical to the representative nozzles (bottom 
and top). 
5.2.1 Core discretization scheme 
The IRIS core parameters are reported in Table 5-1 [7] 
Table 5-1: IRIS Core data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 5-2, are shown the radial rings meshes adopted for the 
model. The scheme chosen aims to reproduce in the better way the 
cylindrical geometry, requested by ICARE. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Core Radial rings scheme 
IRIS Core design 
Power plant output (MWe) 335 
Core thermal output (MWt) 1000 
Fuel assemblies 89 
Equivalent core diameter (m) 2.413 
Active core height (m) 4.267 
Heat transfer surface (m²) 2992 
Thermal heat flux peak factor Fq 2.6 
Average core power density (Vol) 51.26 kW/l 
Fuel inventory [tons U] 48.5 
Fuel inventory [tons   UO2 ] 55021 
Zircaloy clad weight  (kg) 12077 
Number CR blocks 37 
CR per control assemblies 24 
Adsorber material 1 Ag-In-Cd (black) 
Adsorber material 2 Ag-In-Cd steel (gray) 
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Table 5-2 shows in detail the geometrical parameter and the number 
of fuel pin, guide tube and instrumentation tube for each ring. 
Table 5-2: Number of fuel pin, guide tube, instrumentation tube for each ring 
 
 
 
 
 
Being the IRIS Fuel Assembly (FA) design similar to the 
Westinghouse 17x17 XL Robust Fuel Assembly design. The ICARE 
FAs model was developed using the data of AP1000 FAs, except for 
the greater cladding length, due to the increase in volume of the gas 
plenum (upper and lower). In Table 5-3 are illustrated the Fas data. 
Table 5-3: IRIS Fuel Assemblies data 
Core  radial ring 
Eq. diam. 
[m] 
Section 
[m²] n° FAs 
n° 
Fuel 
pin 
n° 
Guide 
tube 
n° 
Instr.  
tube 
1°Ring (red) 0.76 0.457 9 2376 225 225 
2° Ring (yellow) 1.27 1.270 16 4224 400 400 
3° Ring (violet) 1.70 2.286 20 5280 500 500 
4° Ring (green) 2.11 3.506 24 6336 600 600 
5° Ring (blue) 2.41 4.573 20 5280 500 500 
IRIS Fuel assemblies 
Rod Array Square Lattice 17x17 
Rod per assembly 264 
Rod pitch (cm) 1.26 
Overall transverse dimensions (cm) 21.4 x 21.4 
Tot. FA lenght (cm) 520.7 
Tot. Active height (cm) 426.7 
Fuel weight, as UO2 (kg) 611 
Zircaloy clad weight (kg) 136 
Number of grids per assembly 15 
Top and bottom - (Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy 718) 2 
Intermediate - ZIRLO 8 
Intermediate flow mixing (IFM) - ZIRLO 4 
Protective -  (Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy 718) 1 
Number of guide tube per FA - ZIRLO 24 
Diameter of guide thimbles  (cm) 0.442 ID x 0.482 OD 
Fuel rods per FAs 264 
Outside diameter (cm) 0.95 
Diameter gap   (cm) 0.0165 
Clad thickness  (cm) 0.057 
Clad material  ZIRLO 
Fuel  pellets  
Material  UO2   sintered 
Density (% of theoretical)  95.5 
Diameter (cm) 0.3225 
Length (cm) 0.387 
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In the ICARE, input deck, the cylindrical structures, as the cladding, 
the fuel, etc. are called “macro-component”, and are defined 
independently from the space meshing. They are characterised by a 
geometry (internal and external diameter, axial extension) and an 
axially dependent chemical composition. In Table 5.4 are illustrated 
the parameters used to model the fuel cladding. As it is possible to 
see the thickness of the clad, varies at different elevation. 
 
Table 5-4: Fuel cladding geometrical parameters 
 
In the same way for the fuel, for the grids, the top and bottom nozzle, 
it is necessary to provide the initial and final elevation and the internal 
 
 
Clad level  IDclad ODclad  
Thick 
clad  
 [m]  [mm]  [mm]  [mm] 
5.0549 0 0.95 0.94996 
5.0465+eps 0 0.95 0.94996 
5.0465 0.8357 0.95 0.1143 
  
UPPER 
PLENUM 
  
  
    0.1143 
    0.1143 
    0.1143 
    0.1143 
4.6738+eps 0.8357 0.95 0.05715 
4.6738 0.8357 0.95 0.05715 
  
  
  
FUEL 
ZONE 
  
  
  
    0.05715 
    0.05715 
    0.05715 
    0.05715 
    0.05715 
    0.05715 
    0.05715 
0.4066+eps 0.8357 0.95 0.05715 
0.4066 0.7214 0.95 0.1143 
  
LOWER 
PLENUM 
 
    0.1143 
    0.1143 
    0.1143 
0.0838+eps 0.7214 0.95 0.1143 
0.0838 0 0.95 0.94996 
0.0635 0 0.95 0.94996 
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and external equivalent diameter, (when necessary). The Figure 5-3 
illustrates the modelization of the nozzles as a hollow cylinder. The 
weight of this macro-component is equal to the number of the FAs, 
one on the bottom and one on the top (Figure 5-3). 
 
Figure 5-3: Bottom and top nozzle modelling 
5.2.2 Internals 
The ICARE model takes into account all the internals of the vessel. 
The lower support plate was simulated always using cylindrical 
elements (Figure 5-4).  
 
Figure 5-4: IRIS lower support plate and equivalent hollow cylindrical elements 
The perforated surface of the plate has been subdivided in five rings 
(Figure 5-5 and Table 5-5). Actually, with this approach, the lower 
support plate total mass is not reproduced correctly. In order to fix this 
discrepancy the more external ring of the plate, that one without the 
holes, it was considered as, the bottom part of the reflector. In this 
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manner, the mass of the reflector has been increased of the missed 
mass of the lower support plate. In every lower support plate radial 
ring, the number of the cylindrical elements is the same of the FAs 
ones.  
 
Figure 5-5: Radial meshing Lower support plate 
Table 5-5: Parameters lower support plate rings 
Cylindrical 
elements 
n° 
elements 
Holes 
Surface [m²] 
No_Holes 
surf.  [m²]   
Total 
surface. 
[m²] 
 H_s /Tot_s. 
[%] 
1 element   0.01142 0.0348 0.04624 0.247 
1° Ring 9 0.10280 0.3133  0.41615 0.247 
2° Ring 16 0.18276 0.5570 0.73983 0.247 
3° Ring 20 0.22846 0.6963 0.92479 0.247 
4° Ring 24 0.27415 0.835 1.10975 0.247 
5° Ring 20 0.22846 0.6963 0.92479 0.247 
TOTAL 89 1.01665 3.0986 4.11533 0.247 
 
A heavy reflector and a cylindrical barrel surround the IRIS core. 
The reflector has been modeled as one equivalent hollow cylinder. 
The model conserve the total mass, and as just stated before its 
lower part include the external part of the lower support plate as 
illustrated in Figure 5-6 along with the original IRIS reflector. The 
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Figure 5-7 shows a z-view of the IRIS reflector and the model. The 
Table 5.6 shows the reflector geometrical parameters for both. 
 
  Figure 5-6: IRIS reflector and ICARE model reflector (cutaway view) 
 
Figure 5-7: IRIS reflector and ICARE model reflector (z view) 
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Table 5-6: IRIS reflector and ICARE model reflector parameters 
 
          
   
 
            
The total height of the IRIS barrel is 16 m, only the part that housed 
the core, it is taken into for the ICARE model. Thus, the total height 
of the ICARE barrel model is equal to the total length of the FA plus 
the height of the lower plate support. The remainder part was taken 
into account as wall structure in the CESAR input deck. The Table 
5-7 reports the IRIS barrel and ICARE barrel model data.  
 
 
 
Figure 5-8: ICARE barrel model and Iris barrel  
 
Reflector IRIS ICARE 
 active height [m] 5.26 5.56 
 total height [m] 6 5.56 
material  316L SS  316L SS 
outer diameter  [m] 2.72 2.62 
 inner diameter  [m]  2.365 2.3 
total mass (ton) 50000 50000+(2745) 
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 Table 5-7: IRIS barrel and ICARE model barrel parameters 
 
 
Using this nodalization approach for the reflector and the barrel, 
these two concentric cylinders produce a space between them. This 
space in the model simulated the by-pass area. The by-pass area 
generated has a width of 0.178 m. As shown in Figure 5-9. 
 
 
Figure 5-9: By pass area gerated by the nodalization 
The by-pass area along with the reflector are included inside the sixth 
ring of the ICARE model. The last ring of the ICARE model contains 
the barrel, the downcomer area, and the vessel. In Table 5-8 are 
displayed the main parameters of the IRIS vessel [7].  
BARREL IRIS ICARE 
 total height [m] 16 5.56 
material  316L SS  316L SS 
outer diameter  [m] 2.85 2.85 
 inner diameter  [m] 2.75 2.75 
total mass (ton) 54890 19075 
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Table 5-8: IRIS vessel main parameters 
 
The values of the vessel parameters, which can possible to find in 
the literature can vary of some cm, respect those used in this model. 
The total radial meshing of the IRIS core is illustrated in Figure 5-10, 
while in the Table 5-9 are reported the radi of the seven radial rings. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: ICARE model radial meshing  
 
 
IRIS Core design 
Reactor vessel I.D., [m] 6.223 
Reactor vessel O.D.,[m] 6.783 
Nominal base metal thickness [m] 0.28 
Reactor vessel lenght,[m] 22.214 
Dowcomer annulus width, [m] 1.68 
Reactor vessel design temperature, [K] 626.46 
Vessel material  
Carbon steel SA 508, 
Gr.3,Cl.2 
Cladding material (inner vessel surfaces) Stainless Steel 
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Table 5-9: Radial rings data 
RADIAL 
CORE 
MESH [m] 
ICARE MESH 
GENERATED CHANNEL [m] 
0° Radial 
mesh 
R00 0 0       
  1° ring   channel 1 0.1907 
1° Radial 
mesh R01 0.3815 0.3815      
  2° ring   channel 2 0.5087 
2° Radial 
mesh R02 0.6359 0.6359      
  3° ring   channel 3 0.7445 
3° Radial 
mesh R03 0.8531 0.8531      
  4° ring   channel 4 0.9548 
4° Radial 
mesh R04 1.0564 1.0564      
  5° ring Radius in 
Reflector 
1.15095 
channel 5 1.1315 
 1.2065 1.206    
  REFLECTOR      
5° Radius 
out 
Reflector 1.355 1.3567      
  6°ring Radius out 
Barrel 
1.375 
By-pass 1.3658 
  1.3817 
By_pass 
vol. 0.9470 
  BARREL   
D_h by-
pass 0.0183 
6° Radius 
out  Barrel 1.425 1.4321      
  7° ring Radius in 
Vessel 
3.1115 
Downcomer 2.38325 
  3.1266 
Downcomer 
vol.[m3 ] 133.686 
7° Radial 
mesh  R07 3.3915        
 
Terminated the radial nodalization; it was chosen the axial meshing. 
The core meshing must be fine enough to have a sufficient 
resolution of temperature. In ICARE the intersection between the 
axial and radial space grids on one hand and all the macro-
components on the other hand, leads to divide each macro-
component in several parts called components. The only constrain 
of ICARE is that, one mesh cannot contain more than one grid 
component. Thus given than in the model are represented 10 grids, 
it was paid attention to produce a homogenous meshing able to 
satisfy this imposition. The resulting scheme obtained, subdivide the 
IRIS core model in 22 axial mesh, of 26 cm each one. The axial 
meshing is schematically illustrated in the Table 5-10 with the 
relative elevation. Using this nodalization scheme, the mesh’s total 
68 
 
  “Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 5. SMR ASTEC model 
 
number of the ICARE core model is 148.  
Table 5-10: Schematic axial meshing of the ICARE model 
 
 
Height [m] Level [m] Grid  n°  Levels [m] 
  5.207     
0.26035       
  4.94665 Upper height 4.900175 
0.26035   grid10(inconel) 4.8716 
  4.6863 Lower height 4.843025 
0.26035       
  4.42595 Upper height 4.38875 
0.26035   grid9(ZIRLO) 4.356 
  4.1656 Lower height 4.32325 
0.26035       
  3.90525 Upper height 3.87315 
0.26035   grid8(ZIRLO) 3.8404 
  3.6449 Lower height 3.80765 
0.26035       
  3.38455 Upper height 3.35745 
0.26035   grid7(ZIRLO) 3.3247 
  3.1242 Lower height 3.29195 
0.26035       
  2.86385 Upper height 2.84185 
0.26035   grid6(ZIRLO) 2.8091 
  2.6035 Lower height 2.77635 
0.26035       
  2.34315 Upper height 2.32625 
0.26035   grid5(ZIRLO) 2.2935 
  2.0828 Lower height 2.26075 
0.26035       
  1.82245 Upper height 1.81065 
0.26035   grid4(ZIRLO) 1.7779 
  1.5621 Lower height 1.74515 
0.26035       
  1.30175 Upper height 1.29505 
0.26035   grid3(ZIRLO) 1.2623 
  1.0414 Lower height 1.22955 
0.26035       
  0.78105 Upper height 0.77945 
0.26035   grid2(ZIRLO) 0.7467 
  0.5207 Lower height 0.71395 
0.26035      
  0.26035 Upper height 0.25965 
0   grid1(inconel) 0.231075 
  0 Lower height 0.2025 
0.355   
Lower support plate   -0.355 
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5.2.3 Lower head and vessel 
The ICARE module simulates the lower head using only one 
volume. The position of lower support plate in the IRIS reactor is 
inside the lower plenum. The ICARE module can not place the 
Lower Support Plate (LSP) inside the lower plenum, the LSP can be 
placed only inside the cylindrical part of the vessel. Thus, there are 
only two solution to approach this problem. The Figure 5-11 shows 
the actual IRIS lower vessel and the two vessel configurations. 
 
 
Figure 5-11: IRIS lower part vessel and the two lower part vessel models  
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The first one is to reproduce the exact geometry of the lower head, 
but placed the LSP in the cylindrical part of the vessel. The second 
one is to place the LSP at the actual IRIS elevation, but in this case, 
the shape of the lower head does not match the real shape of the 
IRIS reactor one. In the first case, the volume of the vessel 
undergoes a substantial increase. Table 5-11 shows the different 
parameters between the two vessel configurations and the actual 
IRIS vessel. 
 
Table 5-11: Vessel parameters 
 
 
As just stated the model 1 reproduces the correct shape and volume 
of the lower head but placing the LSP at the beginning of the 
cylindrical part of the vessel, the total volume of the ICARE model 
vessel increases of 55 m3. In case of a severe accident the time of 
emptying is an important parameter for the exact computation of the 
core degradation transient. The model 2 reproduces the correct 
position and height of the lower part of the vessel, but the volume of 
the lower plenum is decreased of more than 50 %, but in 
compensation the vessel volume is increased of only 18 m3. 
 
Table 5-12: Lower plenum model 1 meshes 
GEOMETRICAL DATA IRIS MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Low. Plenum height [m] 3.105 3.105 1.27 
Cylindrical part Vessel  height [m] 3.727 5.562 5.562 
Total height [m] 6.832 8.667 6.832 
Vessel ID [m] 6.223 6.223 6.223 
Cylindrical part Vessel Vol.  [m³] 113.357 169.168 169.168 
Lower plenum volume  [m³] 62.959 62.959 25.751 
Total volume   [m³] 176.31 232.128 194.920 
Δ volume   [m³] 0 55.811 18.6039 
Surf. lower plenum [m²] 60.830 60.830 39.057 
LOWER HEAD MODEL 1 : EMISPHERICAL FORM 
material Steel SA533B 
minimum thickness [m]      0.19 maximum thickness [m]   0.28 
Number of radial mesh (mesr.)   10 
 Number of axial  mesh  (mesas) 10 
axial  mesh  positions 
degree level [m] radius [m] 
0 -0.355 3.115 
9.1 -0.8429 3.0463 
16.8 -1.2505 2.966 
24.7 -1.6439 2.8023 
33.5 -2.0508 2.5722 
42 -2.4138 2.2923 
50.8 -2.7408 1.9474 
59.5 -3.0283 1.5747 
69.5 -3.2407 1.0789 
79.2 -3.3849 0.578 
90 -3.46 0 
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Figure 5-12: Lower head type 1 meshes 
In the Table 5-12 and Figure 5-12 are illustrated, the axial meshes 
of the lower head model 1; the same data are reported for the model 
2 in Table 5-13 and Figure 5-13. In both the model was utilized 10 
radial meshes. In order to evaluate the effect of the lower plenum 
shape, a series of ICARE stand-alone computation was done, using 
different vessel rupture models. The comparison results are 
reported in Appendix A. 
 
Table 5-13: Lower plenum model 2 meshes 
 
 
 
 
LOWER HEAD MODEL 2  
material Steel SA533B 
minimum thickness [m]      0.19 maximum thickness [m]   0.28 
Number of radial mesh (mesr.)  10 
 Number of axial  mesh  (mesas) 8 
axial  mesh  positions 
degree level [m] radius [m] 
0 -0.355 3.115 
5.7 -0.6315 2.7987 
11.5 -0.8605 2.5006 
18 -1.0687 2.1944 
25.7 -1.2374 1.8351 
35.3 -1.3761 1.4421 
48.8 -1.5041 1.004 
66.2 -1.59 0.5452 
90 -1.625 0 
72 
 
  “Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 5. SMR ASTEC model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Lower head type 2 meshes 
5.2.4 Decay heat 
A fundamental data is the power decay. Decay heat power may be 
used directly as a heat source inside ASTEC modelling, however 
such a model does not enable to take into account FP release from 
the core and transport and retention phenomena inside the upper 
plenum, containment, primary circuit or environment for which an 
initial FP inventory should obviously be provided. In the other way, 
if a FP initial inventory is provided, the ISODOP module of ASTEC 
computes the decay heat at each time step directly from the 
inventory. As these phenomena are of high importance for core 
degradation kinetics and evaluation of the source term, a provisional 
solution was devised using a scaled French 1300 MWe PWR FP 
inventory. In the input deck the user has to provide a radial 
distribution and an axial profile of the decay heat generated from the 
component fuel, because at the beginning of the transient before the 
core degradation, the ICARE module relates the decay heat to UO2 
material. 
5.2.5 ICARE core degradation parameters 
The main In-vessel core degradation parameters and modelling 
options used in the input-deck of IRIS reactor, to evaluate the core 
melt progression during early and late degradation phases of the 
transient are illustrated in Table 5-14. The parameters and model 
options were mainly selected on the basis of specific code user 
guidelines and engineering judgment. Different empirical 
correlations can be used in ASTEC to compute the zircaloy clad 
oxidation (BEST-FIT, URBANIC-HEIDRICK). The cladding failure 
criteria are based on oxide layer thickness and clad temperature. 
These parameters mainly determine the capability of the oxidized 
cladding to retain the metallic zircaloy and dissolved fuel during the 
early degradation phase following oxidation runaway and fuel rod 
73 
 
  “Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 5. SMR ASTEC model 
 
temperature escalation above the melting point of clad material. The 
melting point of pure ceramic material UO2 is lowered by several 
hundreds of degrees in the ASTEC calculation, according to the 
results of severe fuel damage Phébus FP tests [12]. Different corium 
relocation flow paths into the lower plenum of the vessel are 
considered in ASTEC thanks to the use of the MAGMA model: 
laterally through the core bypass after baffle melting and/or through 
the lower core support plate after fuel rod melting or pool relocation 
above it. The failure lower head criteria used is the LOHEY model. 
This model utilizes the mechanical properties of vessel steel, based 
on experimental results for SA533B1 [13]. 
 
Table 5-14: ICARE In-vessel core degradation parameters and modelling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Parameter ICARE 
Zircaloy oxidation kinetics 1 BEST-FIT correlation: 
Cathcart-Pawel in the low 
temperature range and 
Prater-Courtright in the high 
temperature range 
 
2 Urbanic-Heidrick correlation 
Cladding failure  criteria Tclad > 2300 K and 
ZrO2 thickness < 0.3 mm; 
or T > 2500 K 
Melting point of  UO2-ZrO2 ceramic 
material 
2550 K 
(PHEBUS FP tests) 
Molten core relocation into the 
Lower plenum 
Baffle melting (relocation 
through core by-pass) or 
melting at core bottom (relocation 
through core support plate) 
Reactor pressure vessel failure LOHEY model 
plastic strain intensity > the ultimate 
failure strain 
creep deformation limit 
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5.3 The CESAR model  
 
The part of the integral vessel above the core forms the primary 
circuit of the IRIS reactor. The eight helical steam generators 
housed in the zone above the downcomer form the secondary circuit 
(Figure 5-14). In the IRIS reactor CESAR model, the RWST and EBT 
passive safety systems, were modelling as control volumes of the 
primary circuit; while the EHRS were taken into account as control 
volumes belonging to the secondary circuit. The cavity and the 
LGMS, which carry out the safety system functions, were modelled 
as zones of the CPA module. 
 
Figure 5-14: ICARE and CESAR domain 
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The IRIS primary circuit consists of two concentric cylinder. The 
inner cylinder is the rising line, which starts from the top of the core 
and arrive until the base of the pressurizer, wrapped by the barrel 
structure. The outer cylinder is a sort of high downcomer, which 
encloses the inner cylinder for its complete height. As just state 
before this dowcomer houses the 8 pumps and the 8 SGs which 
form the secondary circuit.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-15: IRIS schematic layout of the Primary and secondary circuit 
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The Figure 5-15 shows the schematic layout of the IRIS reactor and 
the layout of the CESAR model. The CESAR primary circuit model 
reproduces the 8 internal loops using a lumping based on a 1-1-3-3 
approach that was considered sufficient to take into account 
different transient and accident sequences. The safety systems, 
Emergency Boration System (EBS) (2 units) and (1+3 units) 
Refueling Water Storage Tanks (RWSTs), belong to the primary 
circuit. The secondary circuit model, reproduces (1+1+3+3) steam 
generators and the Emergency Heat Removal Systems (1+3). It was 
used this approach to limit the nodes number and given the 
symmetry of the system; moreover, this lumped approach does 
neglect the main thermal-hydraulic phenomena.  
5.3.1 Primary circuit nodalization 
The primary circuit model is a coarse node representation of the 
hydraulic system and structures comprising 104 hydraulic control 
volumes. Most of the control volumes have a linear size in the range 
of 0.7 to 0.9 m except the pressurizer. The Figure 5-16 illustrates 
the nodalization of the vessel high part of the primary circuit.  
 
 
Figure 5-16: Vessel high part nodalization 
The rising line has been subdivided in 10 control volumes, while the 
dowcomer in 13 volumes each one (Figure 5-17). The pressurizer 
is represented by one only volume, swollen type. All the internal 
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walls are taken into account. The top control volume of the riser line 
is connected to all the top downcomer volumes and the pressurizer. 
Eleven downcomer volumes, share the same wall structures along 
with the 11 nodes that model the tubes of the SGs in the secondary 
circuit. The ADS valves were represented using valve system type 
‘SEBIM’ [14], the ADS stage-1 discharging directly inside the Q-tank 
zone in the CPA model, while the ADS stage-2 directly to the 
drywell. The two EBTs are modelled with one swollen volume each 
one, and are double connected to the downcomer in the high part 
for the pressurization and in the lower part for the water discharging.  
 
Figure 5-17: Dowcomers and rising line nodalization 
The RWST in the model simulates the ultimate heat sink (UHS) of 
the EHRS systems and is represented by a two-slice approach using 
15 control volumes. This kind of approach is because inside the 
RWST are located the EHRS heat exchanger (HX). The size of the 
volumes that exchange heat with the EHRS-HX have to be smaller 
than the volumes do not, in order to taken into account the larger 
increase of temperature in the zones surrounding the EHRS-HXs. As 
for the downcomers control volumes in contact with the SGs, even 
the RWST ones share the same walls with the EHRS-HXs nodes. In 
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Figure 5-18 are illustrated the complete nodalization of the primary 
(white) and the secondary circuit (blue). 
 
Figure 5-18: IRIS primary and secondary circuit nodalization 
 
Figure 5-19: RWST nodalization (two-slice approach) 
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In the CESAR model are also reproduced the (1+1+3+3) check 
valves, between the rising line and the downcomer. The aim of this 
valve is to ensure natural circulation in accident condition. The 
Reactor Coolant Pumps are modelled using ‘DPPOWER’ type pump, 
imposing a coastdown time of 100s after the pumps turn off. 
5.3.2 Secondary circuit nodalization  
The IRIS secondary circuit is composed by the 8 helical coil SG, 
represented as 1+1+3+3, 4 EHRS systems simulated as (1+3), the 
feedwater line, the main steam line and the condenser (Figure 5-20). 
The condenser is simulated with a big volume, which draws a 
constant quantity of steam by means of a structure “CONNECTI” 
from the main steam lines.  
 
Figure 5-20: IRIS secondary circuit layout simplified 
The CESAR module cannot reproduce the helical shape of the tube 
of the SGs. The SGs are modelled as once through straightforward 
SGs. In order to reproduce in the better way the thermal-hydraulic 
characteristics of the helical coil SGs; the SG model conserves the 
total head losses (primary and secondary side) but the number of 
tubes was increased of 4.3 times (Figure 5-21), in order to have the 
same total heat exchange surface, maintaining the same SG 
height. In the Table 5-15 are reported the IRIS SGs parameters. 
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Figure 5-21: Number of straight tubes to reproduce an elical shape tube 
Table 5-15: IRIS helical coil steam generators parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRIS Steam Generator parameters (1 of 8) 
Rated power [MW] 125 
Tube  O.D. [mm] 17.46 
Tube  I.D. [mm] 13.24 
N°helical row 21 
Tubes N° 656 
Tubes Av Lenght [m] 32 
SG overall height [m] 8.5 
Primary side inlet temperature [°C] 328.4 
Primary side outlet temperature [°C] 292 
Feedwater temperature 223.9 
Steam temperature 317 
Primary side pressure [Mpa] 15.5 
Steam outlet pressure [Mpa] 5.8 
Primary flow rate [kg/s] 589 
Secondary  flow rate  [kg/s] 62.5 
Primary side head losses  [kPa] 72 
Secondary side head losses |kPa] 296 
Total heat exchange surface [m²] 1150 
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Table 5-16: IRIS and model SGs parameters 
 
As it is possible to see in the Table 5-16 the total cross section of the 
SG model has been equalized to IRIS SGs one; in this manner the 
velocity of the water remains the same. However, it is not possible to 
reproduce the residence time of the water or steam, inside the SG with 
this kind of modelization. An EHRS train consists of a heat exchanger, 
connected to the steam line and the feed line, which rejects the primary 
side heat to a pool (RWST) through the steam generators. The EHRS 
is suitable to remove the reactor decay heat in case of accident and 
secondary loop isolation. Each couple of SGs forms a closed loop with 
an EHRS-HX. Inside this closed loop, the fluid is in natural circulation, 
boiling in the SG and condensing in the EHRS-HX tubes. The IRIS 
EHRS-HX consists of two twin vertical modules of 120 Inconel-600 
pipes connected to horizontal cylindrical headers (240 tubes per 
EHRS-HX) located inside the two RWSTs. In order to reproduce the 
correct quantity of heat removed by the EHRS, the heat transfer 
coefficients (HTC), left side (condensation) and right side (boiling) of 
the EHRS-HX tubes calculated by CESAR, were compared with the 
literature values, evidencing great differences, both in the 
condensation and boiling HTC [15]. The EHRS CESAR model tends 
to underestimate the HTC on the right side (boiling), while 
overestimates the HTC on the tube side (condensing). Using the 
CESAR HTC computed values; the EHRS-HX total heat removed 
predicted, is underestimated on the long term, and overestimated in 
the first phase of the transient. To fix this discrepancy, it was decided 
to use the HTC values find in literature for the EHRS-HX walls. The 
HTC values selected were 8000 W/m²K for the left side (condensing) 
and 28000 W/m²K for the right side (boiling) (Table 5-17).  
Table 5-17: HTC used in the IRIS model 
 Pressure = 40 Mpa ASTEC Literature [16]  
HTC boiling side (Pool) W/(m²K) 28000 26000-30000 
HTC condensation side (tube) W/(m²K)  8000 8100-11000 
HTC global W/(m2K)  3480 3400-3600 
SGs IRIS MODEL Assumption 
Type 
Helical coil l 
tubes Straight tubes Straight tubes 
tube ID [m] 0.01324 0.01324 0.01324 
tube OD [m] 0.01746 0.01746 0.01746 
thick wall [m] 0.00211 0.00211 0.00211 
N° tubes 655 2806 2806 
Total Cross section [m²] 0.090179361 0.386325627 0.090179361 
L. tube[m] 32 7.47 7.47 
Surf. Ex. [m²] 1149.702274 1149.747253 1149.747253 
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This is a strong constraint for the model, because for the entire 
transient the HTC values remain constant, and independent by the 
thermal-hydraulic of the EHRS loop.  
5.4 CPA model 
  
The IRIS containment as stated before, is thermodynamically coupled 
with the vessel, it has to be considered as a safety system. The layout 
consists of a spherical steel containment vessel. The containment can 
be roughly subdivided in seven zone: the Drywell, the cavity, the two 
Long Term Gravity Makeup System (LGMS), the quench tank (Q-
TANK) and the two Pool Suppression System (PSS), as illustrated in 
Figure 5-22.  
 
 
Figure 5-22: IRIS containment simplified layout (Rhinoceros 5) 
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The CPA steam condensation on walls correlation used is based on 
the Stephan’s law [18]. In the DBA model, only the drywell steel wall 
surfaces, the drywell concrete floor and the cavity walls were taken 
into account, for the steam condensation. The two suppression pools 
were reduced in one pool. In order to reproduce the reverse flow 
between the PSS and the drywell during the accidental transient a 
virtual connection with a pump was reproduced. Furthermore, in the 
containment model, used for the severe accident simulation one 
volume, which belongs to the nuclear building, a tank and a connection 
have been added. These supplement elements aim to simulates the 
Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS). The PCCS is a non-
safety grade, ultimate heat sink, for the removal of the core decay heat 
from the containment that is diverse from EHRS. The PCCS provide 
the possibility to flooding the entire IRIS containment, by means of fire 
protection pumps or alternative water supplies. The containment main 
parameters are illustrated in Table 5-18. 
 
Table 5-18: IRIS containment parameters 
 
The containment nodalization scheme is illustrated in Figure 5-23. The 
containment has been subdivided in 13 volumes, plus the external 
environment. Double parallel junctions were realized in horizontal 
direction in order to simulate counter current flows. The pressure 
suppression pool was simulated using the “INSERTION INJECTION” 
model. A reverse line flow has been introduced because; the CPA pool 
suppression model cannot reproduce the water reverse flow through 
the vent lines. This fundamental phenomenon cannot be neglected, in 
order to predict the correct pressure trend inside the containment. In 
IRIS Containment Parameters [17-5] 
Containment diameter/height [m] 25/32 
Design pressure 13e5Par 
Drywell volume [m3] 3226 
Drywell height [m] 11.5 
LGMS  volume [m3] 150 (x2)/100 water(x2) 
PSS   volume [m3] 459 (x2)/150 water(x2) 
Q-Tank volume [m3] 33.6 
Cavity volume [m3] 450 
Cavity height [m] 11.75 
Containment liner material Steel 
Containment liner thickness [m] 0.0445 
Containment liner surface [m²] 1055 
Containment floor material concrete 
Containment floor thickness [m] 0.30 
Containment floor surface [m²] 256 
Initial gas composition 100% N2 
Initial temperature [K] 322.05 
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red are marked the connections at the points of hydraulic contact (the 
break, ADS, and gravity makeup flow paths) between the vessel and 
the containment. The two connections between the LGMS and the 
vessel that simulate the injection of water by gravity head and PSS 
pressurization to the vessel through the DVI line, were reproduced 
using two pumps. The pump flows are calculated at each time step by 
means of a special structures “EVENT”, which take into account the 
level of the water inside the LGMS, the head losses, the volumes 
elevation, and the pressures. Similar connections but with different 
parameters are also applied to reproduce the water injection from the 
cavity (when it is full) to the DVI lines. Another structure ‘EVENT’ was 
used to take into account the counter pressure at the break. This 
structure computes the change of pressure at the break due to the 
water level inside the cavity.  
 
Figure 5-23: CPA IRIS containment model 
5.5 Reactor Protection System 
 
The ASTEC model also includes a preliminary version of the basic 
reactor protection system (RPS). The RPS is managed by means of 
132 sensors and 70 structures ‘EVENT’. The setpoints and the 
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systems time delay were found in [5], while for the ADS-stage1 system 
were assumed the data in [9].The main safety system setpoint and 
time delay utilized are illustrated in Table 5-19. 
 Table 5-19: Set point and time delay assumed in the accident analyses 
  
  
Functions Setpoint safety system Time 
delay (s) 
Reactor 
SCRAM 
High containment pressure >1.7 E5 Pa 
HCP signal 
0.2 
Reactor 
SCRAM 
Low pressurizer pressure < 1.172E5 Pa 
LPP signal 
0.2 
Reactor 
SCRAM 
Low pressurizer water level < 0.4 m 
LPL signal 
0.2 
CVCS 
isolation 
SCRAM signal 1.0 
Turbine isolation SCRAM signal 5 
Feed-water pumps 
stop 
SCRAM signal 5 
EHRS train-1 
starts 
SCRAM signal 19 
RCPs stop Low pressurizer water level < 0.4 m 
LPL 
25 
Check valves 
open 
Low pressurizer pressure < 1.172E7 Pa & 
High containment pressure >1.7E5 Pa  
LM signal 
15 
EBT lines open Low pressurizer pressure < 1.172E7 Pa & 
High containment pressure >1.7E5 Pa  
LM signal 
15 
ADS stage-1 
opens 
Low pressurizer pressure < 1.172E7 Pa & 
High containment pressure >1.7E5 Pa  
LM signal 
30 
EHRS train-2 
starts 
Low pressurizer pressure < 1.172E7 Pa & 
High containment pressure >1.7E5 Pa  
LM signal 
19 
LGMS lines open 
valve 
Low differential pressure vessel containment 
< 5.0E4 Pa 
LDPC signal 
10 
Start reverse  
flow PSS-drywell 
PSS pressure > drywell pressure + 
hydrostatic head vent line 
HDPP signal 
0 
Stop reverse flow  
PSS-drywell 
PSS pressure < drywell pressure + 
hydrostatic head vent line 
LDPP signal 
0 
ADS stage-2 
opens 
LGMS water level < 0.65 m 
LLLG signal 
0 
DVI-Cavity valve 
open 
Cavity water level 6.6 m 
HLC signal 
0 
Counter pressure 
connection open 
Cavity water level 6.6 m l 
HLC signal 
0 
PCC system 
starts 
Containment pressure >1.05E6 Pa 
HHCP signal 
 0 
PCC system 
stops 
Tank water level < 1.0 m 
LTL signal 
 0 
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6 SMR MODEL VALIDATION 
 
6.1  Introduction 
  
The creation of a plant model for computer codes is an interactive 
procedure, that includes the selection of a nodalization scheme and 
preparation of the code input deck, and the documentation of these 
activities as previously done. Depending on the objectives of the 
analysis, the plant model, or the code input deck, could be accident 
dependent. Thus, to evaluate the validity of an integral code model, 
a benchmark with a best-estimate code or a more detailed code, 
should be compulsory. The purpose of the validation of the input 
model is to demonstrate that the input model adequately represents 
the behaviour and the functions of the modelled system. A 
preliminary assessment has led to the conclusion that in order to 
develop an appropriate evaluation model for the IRIS reactor, the 
coupling between the vessel modules (CESAR) and the 
containment module (CPA) has to be correctly captured. This is the 
reason why, before conducting, a severe accident analysis, in order 
to test the SMR ASTEC input deck, a BDBA reference accident was 
performed. The BDBA scenario simulated was a Direct Vessel 
Injection (DVI) line double-ended guillotine (DEG) break. The 
calculated results, was compared with those obtained by the 
University of Zagreb (FER) in cooperation with Westinghouse using 
the well-established best-estimate coupled codes RELAP5 and 
GOTHIC [1]. The comparison of the code simulation results, allowed 
investigating specific phenomena evidenced by the codes, 
according to the related modelling approach of components with 
detailed nodalization and coarse mesh nodalization. 
89 
 
“Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 6. SMR model validation 
 
6.2 RELAP code and RCS model 
  
The RELAP5 code has been developed for best-estimate transient 
simulation of light water reactor coolant system during postulated 
accidents. The code was developed at the Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). The code uses include analyses required to 
support rulemaking, licensing audit calculations, evaluation of 
accident mitigation strategies, evaluation of operator guidelines, and 
experiment planning analysis. The RELAP5 code is based on a 
nonhomogeneous and non-equilibrium model for the two-phase 
system that is solved by a fast, partially implicit numerical scheme 
to permit economical calculation of system transients [1]. The 
RELAP5 IRIS reactor coolant system input-deck, has been 
developed at the University of Zagreb (FER) in collaboration with 
Westinghouse and the Polytechnic of Milan [2].The nodalization 
includes 1845 volumes, and 1940 junction, 1015 heat structures with 
8600 mesh points [3]. All the main flow paths are modeled with 
sufficient detail, with almost all of the minor flow paths. Sliced 
approach was used in the discretization of the reactor vessel taking 
into account importance of natural circulation in chosen safety 
concept. Most of the calculation nodes have linear size in range 0.2 
to 0.5 m. The nodalization was prepared so to maintain free volume 
of the system and elevation differences (due to importance of natural 
circulation) as well as core and SG heat exchange areas. The IRIS 
RCS model with RELAP5mod3 is provided in Figure 6-1. The model 
can be divided in the following main regions: 
 
• Lower downcomer  
• Lower plenum, 
• Core and bypass region , 
• Riser, 
• Pressurizer, 
• Upper downcomer and Reactor Coolant Pump Suction Plenum, 
• Reactor coolant pumps (RCP), 
• Primary side of the Steam Generator (SG) modules, 
• Inactive volume around the SG modules and, inactive volume 
inside the SG module central support column. 
• Steam Generator Shroud check-valves.  
• Each of the eight RCP/SG modules is explicitly modeled: this 
detailed nodalization of the coupled RCP and SG modules was 
selected in order to better address potential asymmetrical 
effects in the coolant system.  
• Two SG modules are connected to each feed/steam line, so 
that the system features four steam and four feed lines. 
• The Secondary Side of the SG 
• The secondary system and the balance of plant are only 
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modeled in detail up to the main feed and steam isolation 
valves. A simplified turbine and feedwater system is also 
provided  
 
 
Figure 6-6-1: IRIS primary and secondary circuit nodalization for RELAP5 code 
Finally, the Engineered Safeguards Features of the plant are also 
modelled. Among these, the ones included in the RELAP5 model 
are the emergency heat removal system (EHRS) and the 
emergency boration system (EBS). In addition, the refueling water 
storage tank (RWST) is modeled as the ultimate heat sink for the 
EHRS heat exchangers. These systems are sufficient for the 
analysis of all IRIS NON-LOCA transients and accidents. Since the 
remaining IRIS safety features, (automatic depressurization system, 
ADS; pressure suppression system; long-term core makeup 
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system) establish an interaction between the integral reactor coolant 
system and the containment. The main differences between the 
RELAP and CESAR RCS model are: 
• RELAP model takes into account the two SG non-active 
zone (inside and outside SG); 
• RELAP reproduces the total length of the SG tubes (32 m), 
and the geometry; 
• No lumping approach. Every system is simulated. 
• RELAP considers the ADS discharge line, while in the 
CESAR model, the ADS system is simulated as a break. 
6.3 GOTHIC code and containment model 
  
GOTHIC is a CFD-like code that predicts compartment thermal-
hydraulic behaviour using conservation of mass, momentum, and 
energy equations for multiphase (vapour phase, continuous liquid 
phase, droplet phase) multicomponent (water, air, H2, noble gases) 
compressible flow. Phases can be in thermodynamic equilibrium or 
constitutive relations can be used to predict interaction between 
phases for non-homogenous non-equilibrium flow. Hydraulic 
volumes are analysed using 1D, 2D, 3D or lumped approach and 
can have any number of 1D-heat structures. In addition, models for 
all engineering devices (pumps, fans, valves, heat exchangers, etc), 
usually found in NPP containments, are available [4]. The GOTHIC 
input-deck has been developed at the University of Zagreb (FER) in 
collaboration with Westinghouse, and reproduces the IRIS 
containment by means of 85 volumes, 28 junctions, and 57-heat 
structure (Figure 6-2). The IRIS drywell model developed with 
GOTHIC code is based on a subdivided volume approach. GOTHIC 
drywell volume is comprised thus of 64 subvolumes (4 axial levels, 
provided with a square matrix 4x4 each one). The GOTHIC heat 
structure modelling are represented by means of a multi-node 
concept. The heat structures are obtained following a distributed 
scheme, where the external spanned conductor modelling 
containment liner is subdivided in more conductors, surrounding the 
subdivided drywell volume. Boundary related information with side 
heat transfer could be hence properly accounted, reproducing local 
effects and distinguishing between how steam condensation is 
provided at the top of the drywell and on its lateral walls. Natural 
convection is handled in different ways for vertical and horizontal 
part of the structures too. Break terms are employed as boundary 
conditions, linked to drywell volume with the respective flow paths. 
Break pressure, temperature, flow and liquid fraction (both for 
reactor vessel side and for DVI side of the break) dependence with 
time is provided with suitable forcing functions. 
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Figure 6-2: IRIS containment nodalization for GOTHIC code 
6.4 DBA accident analysis  
6.4.1 Steady state calculation 
Before to simulate the DBA accident scenario a stationary input 
deck for CESAR was built to establish the initial conditions of the 
transient. The restart file generated by this run was used as initial 
condition for the transient simulation. This input deck was 
constrained by introducing different controllers by means of 
structures ‘REGU’ [6] (Controlled Steady State Phase). The task of 
the structures ‘REGU’ is to adjust the different parameters in order 
to fit the computed response with the expected one. In this way, they 
were set to the desired physical values for PZR level and pressure, 
SG flow rate, SG steam produced, SG water level, water flow across 
the core, just to name a few. This stationary transient was run for 
30000 s to verify that the calculated conditions were steady and the 
actual initial conditions of the simulation were achieved. After the 
desired steady-state conditions were achieved, all the structures 
‘REGU’ were removed to verify the stability of the modelling (Free 
Steady State Phase). As further, confirm of the parameters 
steadiness, a “null transient” was performed for another 20000 s. 
The comparison between the steady-state calculated results 
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obtained by the ASTEC code and those computed by RELAP5-
GOTHIC coupled codes is summarized in Table 6-1. All the selected 
RELAP code steady state calculated values have been found in [7]. 
As it can be seen, the calculated values were in good agreement 
with each other.  
Table 6-1: IRIS Steady state predicted result 
 
6.4.2 The DBA scenario 
The DBA scenario considered in this analysis is the guillotine 
rupture of the direct vessel injection (DVI) line Figure 6-3 
Parameters ASTEC RELAP5/GOTHIC 
 TIME(s) TIME(s) 
Pressurizer Pressure  (Pa) 1.556E7 1.555E7 
Core inlet Temperature (K) 566.15 564.15 
Core outlet Temperature (K) 602.14 602.15 
Core mass flow/(by pass) (kg/s) 4707/(203) 4517/(213) 
Core power (MW) 1000 1000 
SG inlet temperature  (K) 497.15 497.15 
SG outlet temperature (K) 588.2 590.40 
SG steam pressure (Pa) 5.86E6 5.80E6 
SG collapsed level (m) 1.84 1.95 
Feedwater flow (kg/s) 64.22 62.85 
RCS water mass 324580 324500 
Primary to secondary 
heat transfer 
998.24 1000 
EBT A/B  water mass (kg) 12795 12400 (x2) 
EBT A/B water Temp. (K) 303.05 322.05 
RWST A/B water mass (kg) 625000 (x4) 1194200 (x2) 
RWST A/B water Temp. (K) 290.05 293.15 
RWST A/B water level. (m) 8.6 9.1 
PSS A/B water mass (kg) 300000 (x1) 145300(x2) 
PSS A/B water Temp. (K) 322.05 322.05 
PSS water level (m) 2.06 3.00 
LGMS A/B water mass(kg) 100000 9890 (x2) 
LGMS A/B water Temp. (K) 322.05 322.05 
Containment atm. Temp (K) 322.05 322.05 
Environment atm. Temp (K) 308.15 308.15 
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Figure 6-3: DVI DEG LOCA schematic description 
Although this is the smaller line connected to the vessel, it requires 
a particular analysis due to its position nearer to the top of the active 
core (TAF). The DVI line is connected to the reactor coolant system 
in the annular region near the bottom of the steam generators. 
Another important feature of this line is that, it is the discharge line 
of the LGMS, EBS and reactor cavity (when completely flooded). 
The double-ended break can be considered conservative from the 
point of view of liquid level and containment pressurization. A 
SBLOCA transient for IRIS reactor can be divided in three distinct 
phases (Figure 6-4). The first one, denominated the blow-down 
phase is defined as the period during which the reactor coolant 
system pressure is reduced and the containment pressure 
increases until the reactor coolant system and containment 
pressures equalize. The containment pressure in this phase is 
limited by the PSS and the reduced break flow due to the EHRS 
heat removal from the vessel. This phase, due to the relatively small 
dimensions of the break and of the ADS stage-1 lines, can be long 
for IRIS, in the order of 2000 seconds for the considered case. The 
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blow-down phase is considered concluded when the pressures in 
the vessel and in the containment are in equilibrium with a 
containment vessel peak lesser than 10E5 Pa. The break flow stops 
and the gravity makeup from the LGMS becomes available. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Overview of IRIS response to SBLOCA sequence 
The blow down phase is followed by a depressurization phase. This 
phase can be further divided in two portions, before and after the 
opening of the ADS-stage2 lines. In the first one the pressure in the 
vessel remains lower than the pressure in the containment and the 
break flow reverses since heat is removed not from the containment, 
but directly from inside the vessel. During this phase the drywell 
pressure is reduced following the steam condensation on the 
containment walls and by the cool water discharged from the LGMS 
through the DVI break line. As the drywell pressure is reduced faster 
than the PSS pressure, a portion of suppression pool water is 
pushed out through the vent lines and assist in flooding the vessel 
cavity. After the opening of the ADS stage-2 lines the drywell and 
reactor vessel pressures are coupled and the coupled system is 
depressurized by the EHRS. The depressurization phase is 
followed by the long-term cooling phase, where the containment and 
vessel pressure is slowly reduced as the core decay heat 
decreases. During this phase of the accident recovery, gravity 
makeup from reactor cavity is available as required. Since decay, 
heat is directly removed from within the vessel and the vessel and 
containment are thermodynamically coupled, the long-term break 
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flow does not depend on the core decay heat, but it is in fact limited 
to only the containment heat loss. 
6.4.3 Transient analysis 
The transient starts after 30000 s of steady state. Break opening is 
initiated at t=0 s transient time. The first 86400 s (1 day) of accident 
are calculated and the main parameters are compared. All times of 
the events are given with respect to the break time assumed as time 
0 s. The comparison of the main event during the DBA DEG 
transient is illustrated in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2: Main event cronologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAIN EVENT ASTEC RELAP5/GOTHIC 
 TIME(s) TIME(s) 
Double guillotine Break opens on 
DVI-2 line 
0.0 0.0 
High Containment pressure signal  
HCP signal 
28.6 30.0 
Reactor SCRAM 28.8 30.0 
CVCS isolation 30.0  
Secondary system isolation on 
SCRAM signal 
30.0 30.0 
EHRS-train1 starts  
on SCRAM signal 
49.7 40.0 
Low Pressurizer level signal 
LPL signal 
94.2 130.0 
Shroud valves open 
 (HCP + LPL) 
105.0 140.0 
RCPs stops on LPL signal 119.2 143 
Low Pressurizer pressure signal 
LPP signal 
173.3 174.0 
EBT line opening 
On LM signal (HCP + LPP) 
188.3 174.0 
ADS stage-1 opening 
On LM signal (HCP + LPP) 
191.0 174.0 
EHRS-train2 starts 
On LM signal (HCP + LPP) 
193.0 174.0 
Low differential pressure vessel 
containment LDPC signal 
1825.0 1585.0 
LGMS starts to inject 
On LDPC signal 
1840.0 1585.0 
Pressure equalization DW-Vessel 2130.0 1730.0 
Reverse flow starts PSS-DW 2310.0 2504.0 
HLC signal 4114.0 1585.0 
Cavity-DVI valves open 
On HLC signal 
4114.0 open on LDPC 
 signal 
LGMS water level signal 
LLLG signal 
16874.0 14110.0 
ADS stage-2 opening 16874.0 14120.0 
Flow from cavity to vessel 70000.0 65414.0 
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The breaks, the EBS and the check valves 
The break opening at 0 s, causes the vessel depressurization and 
containment pressurization. The containment pressure reaches the 
1.7E5 Pa around 30 s and a SCRAM signal is generated for both 
the simulation. After the SCRAM signal, the EHRS train-1 starts to 
work (RELAP-GOTHIC (R-G), 40 s ASTEC 49.7 s).Figure 6-6 
illustrates the breaks mass discharge flow. The vessel side break 
mass flow peaks and trends, are quite similar in ASTEC and R-G in 
the first 1000 s then, until the containment and vessel pressure 
equalization (1936 s R-G, 2127 s ASTEC), the mass discharge flow 
predicted by ASTEC is greater than RELAP one, driven by the high 
primary side pressure. After 4000 s, ASTEC predicts a negative 
flow, while the R-G results, swing between negative and positive, 
and tend to positive values after 7000 s. The reason why of this 
difference is that, the RCS CESAR model does not reproduce the 
not active zone inside and around the SGs; this latter is the actual 
zone in where the break occurs. In the CESAR model, all the 
downcomer volumes exchanges heat with SGs, affecting the vessel 
pressure and generating this continuous reverse flow. In the RELAP 
model the SG not active zone maintain a higher pressure then the 
active SG zone. Concerning the break mass flow, containment side, 
it is related to the safety injection of the EBT (174 s R-G, 208.3 
ASTEC) actuated by the LLP signal. The EBT2 injection into the 
broken DVI line is initially about 16 times larger than EBT1 injection 
into the intact DVI line, due to the presence of the break (Figure 
6-7). On the long term, the break containment side is related to the 
LGMS injection triggers on LDPC signal. Inside the vessel, the 
natural circulation is guaranteed through the check valves, 
connecting riser and downcomer at one-third of the SG height 
(Figure 6-8). The actual configuration of the check valves systems 
connects the rising line to the SGs internal cylinder, and the 
recirculation water is not in contact with the SGs tubes. In the 
ASTEC model, the rising line is directly connected to the 
downcomer volumes. However, this approximation does not 
completely explain the difference observed in the first 10000 s. 
The ADS stage-1  
Figure 6-9 shows the R-G and ASTEC predicted pressurizer 
pressures. The depressurization rate is similar until the ADS 
intervention (191 s for ASTEC and 174 s for RELAP), activated by 
the LM signal, after that the ASTEC code calculates an abruptly 
pressure decreases between 200 and 400 s, before resuming values 
higher than RELAP ones. This is due to the modelling of the ADS-
stage1 system, which is simulated as a simple break in the pressurizer 
in the ASTEC model, and it does not reproduce the actual 
configuration, of the ADS stage-1. The ADS is composed by two three 
parallel train and a 15 m long discharge line for ADS stage-1. In Figure 
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6-10 and Figure 6-11, are shown the ADS-stage1 release (divided in 
double train (DT) and single train (ST) for R-G) and cumulative 
release, respectively. Concerning the ADS-stage-1 release, the 
calculated results are quite similar until the pressure equalization; 
when R-G predicts a greater reverse flow, which is not reproduce by 
ASTEC. Consequently, the ASTEC cumulative release computed is 
higher than R-G one. This difference is due to the faster vessel 
depressurization calculated by R-G, after the pressure equalization (at 
2130 s for ASTEC and at 1730 s for R-G) (Figure 6-20). 
The EHRS and SGs 
After the secondary system isolation, the SGs pressure increases due 
to the heat transfer from the primary side that makes evaporate the 
water contained in the SG tubes. The secondary side pressures are 
shown in Figure 6-12. The SG pressure peaks are reached around 
57 s for both calculations, then the pressure decreases after some 
oscillations lasting until water stored in EHRS–HX is poured into the 
loops and power begins to be removed and the SGs tube level 
increases (Figure 6-13 and Figure 6-14). The signal of low 
pressurizer pressure triggers the second train of EHRS and a natural 
circulation flow establishes. The EHRS loop Filling Ratio defined as 
the ratio between the total mass in the closed loop and the total mass 
of cold water that could be stored into the loop is 0.34 in ASTEC and 
0.4 in R-G. The Figure 6-15 and Figure 6-16 show the EHRS-HX 
power removed and the water temperature inside the RWST 
calculated by the two codes. The curves shows a very similar trend 
throughout the transient.  
The LGMS 
The signal of low differential pressure (LDPC) between the vessel and 
the drywell triggers the LGMS injection into the DVI line. LGMS 
injection is related both to gravity and to LGMS air space 
pressurization (through PSS to LGMS balance lines) by non-
condensable gas entering the PSS from the drywell. On contrary of 
the EBS, the predicted LGMS1 and LGMS2 mass discharged flow are 
similar, for both the codes. The difference between the break and the 
intact line is not so marked Figure 6-17. The ASTEC code as stated 
before, calculates the LGMS mass flow using a structure pump, for 
each LGMS. Therefore, the LDPC signal in the ASTEC model triggers 
the pumps, for which, the flows are calculated at each time step by 
means of two structure “EVENT" in order to reproduce the gravity flow. 
The same approach was utilized to simulate the water injection from 
the reactor cavity to the DVI intact line.  
The containment (Drywell and PSS) 
The Figure 6-18 shows the calculated drywell pressure. The increase 
observed around 200 s is due to the ADS stage-1 intervention. The 
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containment space drywell and cavity pressurization causes the 
transfer of a steam-gas mixture from the drywell to the PSS through 
the vent lines lasting until mass flow exits the ADS-Stage-1. The 
Figure 6-19 show the non-condensable gas quality inside the drywell 
and the way steam sweeps away gas from the drywell seems similar 
between the two codes. A part of the steam released condenses on 
the drywell walls, transferring power to the drywell structures. The 
power transfer occurs until a thermal equilibrium is reached on the 
walls (Figure 6-20). At the peak, the ASTEC calculated power (75 
MW) is about 7 times the RELAP-GOTHIC (R-G) power (11.2 MW). 
During this phase the DW and cavity pressure increases up to reach 
a peak of 0.957 MPa in ASTEC at 1850 s and 0.936 MPa in R-G at 
1405 s. Once, the vessel and drywell pressures equalize (Figure 
6-21), the ADS Stage-1 and the break mass flow stop, and the drywell 
pressure decreases thanks to the LGMS injection into the vessel 
(intact loop) and into the cavity (broken loop). When the differential 
pressure between PSS and drywell (Figure 6-22) is sufficient to 
overcome the hydrostatic head of the PSS vent pipes, a reverse flow 
starts from the PSS to the DW through the vent lines, lasting between 
2310 s and 4050 s for R-G and 2504-4094 s for ASTEC (Figure 6-23). 
This event, explains the faster DW depressurization, which occurs 
after 2000 s. These phenomenon is reproduced by ASTEC as a 
containment spray system in recirculation mode, where the 
suppression pool is the source of the water. The pump of this system 
starts to work when the pressure difference greater than the 
hydrostatic head and stops when is lower. The mass flow was 
imposed by means of the pump characteristics. Following the PSS 
injection, the reactor cavity level, initially increased for break and ADS 
mass flow collection, rapidly increases up to the complete fill-up 
(Figure 6-24) at 14891 s in R-G and around 30000 s in ASTEC (12 m 
level from bottom in ASTEC and 11.75 m in RELAP). The ASTEC 
delay is due to the lower LGMS2 mass flow calculated. ). In the R-G 
model, the PSS and drywell volumes remain separated, from the 
pressure point of view, as the PSS to drywell vent pipes remain full of 
water after the PSS injection to drywell is over, and non-condensable 
gas cannot flow from PSS to drywell and equalize pressure. In the 
ASTEC model, this event was re-create imposing a high value to the 
connection flow resistance coefficient in negative direction, between 
the PSS and the vent line volumes. When the reactor cavity level is 
above the DVI connection (around 8000 s in ASTEC and 5000 s in R-
G) and the containment pressure overcomes the vessel pressure, 
water can enter the vessel through the cavity to DVI connections. The 
mass injected from cavity to DVI is shown in Figure 6-25. The injection 
occurs around 70000 s for ASTEC and for R-G. In the ASTEC 
simulation taking into account the effect of the cavity water level on 
the outside pressure at the break, when the cavity water level exceed 
the DVI line elevation is activated a structure ‘EVENT’ which 
calculates the counter pressure at the break at each time step, due to 
the water gravity head. The reaching of both LGMS low mass signals 
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actuates the ADS Stage-2 valves, (16874 s for ASTEC and 14120 for 
R-G), to allow steam circulation between the vessel and the drywell in 
the upper part of the plant and enhance condensation on the SG tubes 
in the long term of the transient. The opening of the ADS stage-2 re-
equalize the pressure between the containment and the drywell, and 
the vessel inventory starts to decrease (Figure 6-26) until to reaches 
the equilibrium and stabilize around 25000 s. After that, the differential 
pressure between the vessel and containment and the amount of 
water in one or the other side of the plant drives the broken DVI line 
mass flow, and the vessel water inventory remains constant. 
6.5 Discussion 
Most of the main parameters calculated by the ASTEC code has 
shown a good agreement with those computed by R-G coupled codes 
from the qualitative and quantitative point of view. The main 
discrepancies are due to the coarse meshing approach in the ASTEC 
model. Some points to remark are: 
• ASTEC computes a DW walls deposited power 7.5 times 
greater than R-G one. The reasons of this difference are not 
clear. The drywell surface and the thickness data, adopted in 
the simulation are the same used in different scientific works 
in the literature. The boundary condition are the same for 
both the codes. The discrepancy should affect the drywell 
pressure rise, but the calculated ASTEC drywell pressure 
rise is very similar to R-G one; 
• The drywell pressurization and vessel depressurization trend 
are similar, even if slightly delayed in ASTEC until 3000 s. After 
the reverse flow stopped, the ASTEC calculated drywell 
pressure is higher while the vessel pressure is lower than 
RELAP ones. The drywell pressure discrepancy is probably 
due to the PSS modelling; indeed the suppression pool zone 
is simulated as an adiabatic volume without walls to exchange 
heat and the water expulsion is simulated with a pump system 
so, the ASTEC code do not reproduce the depressurization 
following this phenomenon. This kind of approach tends to 
overestimate the PSS water temperature of about 50 K (Figure 
6-27). Thus, the reverse flow is less effectiveness due to the 
higher temperature of the PSS water pushed out. Furthermore, 
the high water temperature could be also the cause of the 
calculated higher peak pressure inside the PSS than in the 
drywell. 
• ASTEC predicts a lower pressure of the vessel than R-G 
coupled codes after 10000 s. The discrepancy could be due to 
the temperature at which the EHRS-HX exchange heat. In the 
ASTEC model, the calculated flow steam quality, enters 
EHRS-HX is lower than R-G one, because of the different 
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length of the SGs tubes (32 and 7.40 m). Furthermore, having 
imposed a constant steam condensation heat transfer 
coefficient, in the EHRS-HX tube side, the model tends to 
overestimate the water subcooling on EHRS-HX outlet flow, 
(sensible heat is removed instead of latent heat). This also 
explain why the ASTEC calculated drywell pressure is lower 
than R-G one, at the end of the transient given the system 
characteristics (thermodynamically coupled). Anyway, the final 
difference is around 5E4Pa, and given the simplification 
adopted, the result could be considered satisfactory. 
Overall, the analysis of the DBA transient by the comparison between 
the ASTEC code and R-G coupled codes has provided comforting 
answers. The interaction of the IRIS vessel with the containment 
following the accident scenario and the behaviour of the passive 
safety systems are well reproduced by the ASTEC code. This 
preliminary testing of the model has showed that the discretization 
approach is acceptable and that the model produces reasonable 
steady state, and transient results. After this test, the model can be 
used to simulate a severe accident scenario. 
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Figure 6-5: Break mass flow containment and vessel side (0-2000 s) 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Break mass flow vessel side (0-10000 s) 
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Figure 6-7: EBS discharge mass flow  
 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Check valves total mass flow 
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Figure 6-9: Pressurizer pressure 
 
 
 
Figure 6-10: ADS-STAGE1 discharge mass flow 
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Figure 6-11: ADS-STAGE1 cumulative mass 
 
 
 
Figure 6-12: Steam generator pressure 
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Figure 6-13: Steam generator collapsed level 
 
 
 
Figure 6-14: Steam generator power 
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Figure 6-15: EHRS total heat removed 
 
 
 
Figure 6-16: RWST water temperature 
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Figure 6-17: LGMS discharge mass flow 
 
 
 
Figure 6-18: Drywell pressure 
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Figure 6-19: Drywell non condensable gas quality 
 
 
 
Figure 6-20: Total drywell walls power 
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Figure 6-21: Drywell and pressurizer pressure 
 
 
 
Figure 6-22: PSS-drywell pressure 
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Figure 6-23 PSS-drywell reverse flow 
 
  
 
Figure 6-24: Reactor cavity water level 
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Figure 6-25: Reactor cavity-DVI line mass flow 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-26: RCS water mass inventory 
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Figure 6-27: PSS water temperature 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
 
7  ASTEC SEVERE ACCIDENT 
SIMULATION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A severe accident analysis, as compared to a DBA analysis, 
requires a fundamental understanding of severe accident 
phenomena. The user has to select additional modelling parameters 
because of the large number of physical models required to 
represent severe accident behaviour. This is particularly true for the 
use of the integral codes, which rely extensively on user, defined 
modelling parameters to control the calculations. The input data 
have to be extended by the severe accident models. The thermal-
hydraulic input model can be adapted to the needs of specific severe 
accident analysis, that is, time-consuming nodalizations can be 
simplified and the modelling of certain thermal-hydraulic 
phenomena can be suppressed if they are not necessary for the 
analysis. The availability of some safety systems may be neglected 
given that, it is necessary to assume the failure of one or several 
safety systems for the reactor analysed, in order that a DBA 
develops to a severe accident, modelling of the failed systems may 
be unnecessary. The choice of a bounding scenario of a severe 
accident is plant specific and, therefore, a unique bounding scenario 
for a particular plant design does not exist. It depends on the 
purpose of the analysis. The idea is to obtain the most severe 
response of the system related to a specific criterion. In the case of 
IRIS reactor, there is not a specific criterion. The aim of this work is 
to carry out an exploratory study on the behaviour of a SMR plant 
during a severe accident.  
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7.2  Severe accident scenario 
 
Once, verified the capability of the ASTEC code on reproducing the 
thermal-hydraulic phenomena occurring during a DBA transient, a 
severe accident scenario was supposed. As well known, the IRIS 
integral configuration eliminates the large primary penetration or 
large loop-piping makes impossible the possibility that, a large break 
LOCA occurs. In order to have a SA event, it was assumed a 
multiple failures of the safety systems leading to significant core 
degradation. The scenario selected, starting with the break of both, 
the DVI lines thus, the loss of the capability to provide water to the 
vessel by means of the LGMS and the EBS. All the EHRS 
unavailable and the PCC as the only device suitable to remove the 
decay heat. The ADS stage-1 trigger with a 1000 s delay on LM 
signal. The PCC in the ASTEC model consists of the possibility to 
flood the containment external surface with water at the temperature 
of 298 K, to limit the peak pressure into the system; in order to avoid 
the venting to the outside environment. Given the characteristics of 
the chosen scenario, the EHRS, the EBS and the RWSTs, have 
been removed by the ASTEC model. This simplification permits to 
decrease the calculation time, and carry out this SA analysis without 
neglecting the main thermal hydraulic phenomena. Moreover, 
further walls structures were added to the CPA model as the cavity 
bottom wall and the LGMS walls. These further structures were 
taken into account because in these SA analysis was activated the 
SOPHAEROS module. This module predicts the behaviour of the 
FPs inside the primary and secondary circuit; its output becomes 
the input of the CPA AFP module, to compute the FP behaviour 
inside the containment as the deposition and suspension. It was 
notice in some SA simulation that, the lack of these added heat 
structures affects the quality of the CPA AFP results. One simulation 
was run also using the ISODOP module. The ISODOP module can 
calculate the FP and actinide isotopes masses and activity in core, 
primary circuit, containment, and environment taking into account 
the FPs transmutation and energy released. 
7.2.1 Severe accident analysis 
The simulated SA event foresees the failure of the EHRS train-1 
actuation on SCRAM signal and the failure of EHRS-train-2 on LM 
signal. The ADS stage-1 triggers with a 1000 s delay on the LM 
signal. The transient starts from the break occurrence and runs for 
200000s (2.3 days), when the trend of the main parameters settles 
on quasi-stationary values. All times of the events are given with 
respect to the break time assumed as time 0 s. The main events are 
reported in Table 7-1. 
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Table 7-1: Main events chronologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAIN EVENT ASTEC 
 TIME(s) 
Double guillotine Break open on 
DVI-1 and DVI-2 lines 
0.0 
Scram Signal : High 
Containment pressure (HCP) 
7.8 
Reactor SCRAM 8.0 
CVCS Isolation  13.0 
Turbine isolation 13.0 
Feedwater pumps stop 24.3 
Low Pressurizer level signal 
LPL signal( LPL) 
20.6 
EHRS-train1 fails 
on SCRAM signal 
29.0 
Shroud valves open 
 (HCP + LPL) 
30.8 
RCPs stop 45.6 
Low Pressurizer pressurel signal 
LPP signal (LPP) 
45.8 
EBT line opening 
On LM signal (HCP + LPP) 
60.8 
ADS stage-1 fails 
On LM signal (HCP + LPP) 
73.8 
EHRS-train2 fails 
On LM signal (HCP + LPP) 
75.8 
ADS stage-1 opening  1100.0 
High High containment pressure 
signal (HHCP) 
1150.0 
PCCS system starts 1160.0 
Water flow (from SP to DW) 1884.1 
Low differential pressure vessel 
containment LDPC signal 
2559.0 
LGMS starts to inject 
On LDPC signal 
2559.0 
Zr oxidation begins 2565.0 
Cavity completely flooded 
(IVR strategy starts) 
2941.0 
ADS stage-2 opening 4171.0 
Pressure equalization DW-Vessel 4220.0 
Melting pool formation in the 
core 
4901.0 
First material slump into lower 
plenum 
31211.0 
First slump of corium with FPs 
in lower plenum  
57531.1 
First total core uncovery 100791.0 
Massive corium relocation into the 
lower plenum 
101566.2 
Transient over 2000000.0 
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The reactor vessel 
The double breaks opening at 0 s, causes the vessel 
depressurization and containment pressurization. The containment 
pressure reaches the 1.7E5 Pa around 7.8 s and a SCRAM signal 
is generated. The SCRAM triggers the closure of the main steam 
valve and the CVCS valves; at 13 s, the vessel is isolated. The 
EHRS train-1 actuation fails 20 s after the SCRAM signal. The low 
pressurizer water level signal triggers the primary pumps coastdown 
and the natural circulation inside the reactor is ensured until the 
vessel water level is above the check valves connecting riser and 
downcomer. The pressurizer pressure is illustrated in Figure 7-1. 
After an abrupt depressurization until 1.0E7 Pa, the vessel pressure 
stabilizes around this value until 1100 s. This is due to the location 
and dimension of the breaks and to the characteristics of the SGs. 
The breaks location is under the water level, and as it is possible to 
see in Figure 7-2; the ASTEC code predicts that, only water is 
discharged from the breaks during the first 1000s of the transient. 
Moreover, the helical coil once through steam generators (OTSGs) 
do not have a sufficient thermal inertial, which is able to settle the 
pressure of the primary circuit at the same pressure of the 
secondary circuit. The IRIS OTSGs water inventory is around 1000 
kg, during normal operation. In Figure 7-3 is illustrated the 
calculated trend of the SGs pressure. The IRIS secondary circuit is 
designed to withstand the same pressure of the vessel; indeed, after 
the LOCA the SGs pressure reaches peaks of 1.2E7 Pa, following 
assumes the same value of the reactor vessel. The ADS stage-I, 
the system for the fast depressurization of the vessel, failed 
following the LM signal, starts to work at 1100 s. The ADS stage-1 
intervention causes an abruptly reactor vessel pressure decreases, 
passing from 1.0E7 Pa to 2.0E6 Pa, in 2000 s, whilst the SGs 
pressure remains constant around 8.0e6 Pa. An interesting result 
predicted by ASTEC is the reverse flow at the DVI line breaks after 
100000s until the end of the transient. 
The drywell and the PSS 
The drywell pressure (Figure 7-4) increases following the breaks 
occurrence, when the ADS stage-1 opens the code computes a 
sudden increase at 1100 s, reaching a peak of 1.26E6 Pa (1884 s) 
very closed to the containment design pressure fixed to 1.3E6 Pa. 
The intervention of the PCCS at 1151 s on HHCP signal, along with 
the water reverse flow from the PSS at 1836 s, due to the differential 
pressure generated between the two containment zones (Figure 7-5 
and Figure 7-6), can reduce quite quickly the drywell pressure. The 
LDP signal at 2559 s triggers the injection of the LGMS, which 
provides an additional support to the drywell depressurization, 
discharging water on the break DVI lines, and flooding the reactor 
cavity. After that, the drywell pressure tends to settle around 5.0E5 
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Pa. The ASTEC calculated results predict the same value of 
pressure for the coupled system vessel/drywellt and the same 
trends throughout the entire transient after the equalization pressure 
that occurs around 4000 s. The modelling of the PCC system as 
stated before, consist of the injection of water on the external 
surface of the DW, the aim of this system is to increase the heat 
removed by steam condensation on the drywell walls (Figure 7-7). 
On the long term, the power removed by the drywell walls surfaces 
thanks to the PCCS is around 3 MW. Once the cavity is completely 
flooded, in order to simulate the IVR strategies, two structure 
‘CONNECTI’ were activated, which impose new boundary 
conditions on the lower plenum and on the vessel external surface. 
These boundary conditions consist of the HTC 10 kW/m2 K-1, and 
the actual external temperature 423 K, which corresponds to the 
reactor cavity water temperature. The external HTC values are set 
to values known from the literature [1] [2] [3] [4].  
Core degradation 
The core starts to uncover at 1846 s (Figure 7-8 and Figure 7-9) as 
a consequence of the breaks, while core heatup starts at 2000 s at 
the core top, because the core decay power is no more removed. 
Core level is predicted to reach the bottom of the active fuel after 
34000 s since the beginning of the transient and then it shows a 
lengthy decrease to the lower support plate level, at 100000 s. 
Because of the slow emptying phase, the core degradation 
progression is delayed. The Figure 7-10, 7-11, 7-12 and 7-13, 
illustrate the core degradation chronologies. The ASTEC code 
predicts the first cladding perforation by grid at 4590 s, and the first 
melting pool formation in the core at 4900s. The first structural 
material relocation into the lower head occurs at 31211 s. As it is 
possible to see in the figures, the core degradation occurs with the 
lower head full of water, and the reactor cavity zone totally flooded. 
The corium starts gradually forming above the water level. The 
ASTEC predicts a continuous melt pool formation (black volumes), 
which tend to solidify, little by little descending towards the colder 
zone, close to the water level. This process goes on until 100000 s, 
when above the water level is formed a corium material mass of 63 
t , then the code computes a massive corium material slump into the 
lower head of 54 t in mass. This material relocation generates an 
extreme and sudden water vaporization; the produced steam 
increases the vessel pressure up to 1.8E6 Pa and the containment 
pressure up to 11E5 Pa (Figure 7-14). The corium material massive 
relocation seems to be due to a creep failure of the metal structures 
below the degraded material caused by high mechanical load of the 
huge mass along with the high temperatures. After that, the ASTEC 
code calculates only a little corium mass relocation into the lower 
head, which falls down around 120000 s (Figure 7-15). The very 
slow core degradation depends on the boundary condition imposed 
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to the vessel and lower head external surfaces when the cavity is 
completely flooded. Changing or delaying the actuation of the 
boundary conditions; the core degradation time decreases. In other 
simulations varying these two parameters, was observed an earlier 
and lesser corium material relocation. It was chosen to analyze this 
sequence because was the transient generating the worst possible 
accident conditions. 
The Oxidation phase 
The main oxidation phase takes place (Figure 7-16) between 3200 
s and 7600 s since the beginning of the transient. During this phase 
almost 360 kg of hydrogen are generate, with a maximum rate of 
about 0.18 kg/s around 5000 s. The cumulative hydrogen mass 
predicted is 616 kg; this high value is due to the large quantity of 
water in the lower head and consequently high steam availability in 
the core during the entire transient. Furthermore, the slow 
degradation process favours the hydrogen production, because the 
original core geometry remain intact for a long time. During the main 
oxidation phase, the power released by means the chemical 
reactions is about 25 MW versus only 12.5 MW due to the decay 
heat. The calculated results predict that almost 90 % of the total 
mass of zirconium reacts with the steam to form ZrO2 and in minor 
part in ZrO (Figure 7-18). The hydrogen released from the cladding 
affects the containment pressure, in Figure 7-19 is shown the partial 
pressures inside the drywell. As it is possible to see, the H2 partial 
pressure is around 3E5 Pa on a total pressure of about 5E5 Pa, this 
means a H2 concentration of about 10-11%, due to the small volume 
of the drywell (3227 m3). Nevertheless, the drywell nitrogen 
atmosphere can limit the risk of a hydrogen explosion.  
 
IVR analysis 
The combination of low decay power of IRIS reactor in comparison 
with a standard 1000 MWe PWR, the large lower plenum that allows 
reducing the heat flux on the surfaces and the huge thermal inertia 
of the water sink (500 m3) make the IRIS IVR management 
strategies very effectiveness. The IVR modelization depending on 
the HTC value selected; using a HTC equal to 8000 W/m2 K rather 
then 10000 W/m2 K, the massive core relocation occurs at 83000 s 
instead of 100000 s (Figure 7-20). The peak pressure calculated is 
lower, because is minor the corium material mass relocated (33 t 
and 54 t), and even the final mass collapsed inside lower head is 
lesser in the IVR 8000 case than in the studied case (Figure 7-21). 
However, the other parameters show the same trend even if slightly 
shifted. During the analyzed transient, the lower plenum external 
surface remains always around the boiling temperature of the water 
and the peak flux computed is around 80 kW/m2 (Figure 7-22). It is 
interesting to note that until the last massive core relocation around 
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100000 s the code computes negligible values of the heat flux on 
the lower plenum surface. Notably that, not all the decay heat inside 
the lower head is removed by means of the IVR strategies; part of 
the decay heat is exchanged by means of the corium material upper 
surface, as radiative heat (Figure 7-23). Taking into account that, 
the critical heat flux (CHF) computed by the empirical formula 
developed for the AP1000 and AP600 reactor [5], provide values, 
according to the type and configuration of the lower head surface 
and reactor cavity includes between 0.8 and 1.2 MW/m2. It is 
possible to say that, in this scenario the risk of the lower head failure 
is very unlikely. This statement is further confirmed by the lower 
head maximum temperature calculated during the transient, which 
is 400 K below the steel melting temperature. Indeed the ASTEC 
code does not predict ablation phenomena on the lower head 
internal surfaces during the entire transient. If the IVR is not taken 
into account, the ASTEC code predicts the lower head failure after 
83590 s, at the elevation of -1.39 m, in the bottom part of the 
structure. The Figure 7-23 and Figure 7-24 illustrate the temperature 
distribution in corium pool inside the lower head at different instants. 
Fission product release and transport 
The calculated fission product release from the fuel has a strong 
impact on the transport through the circuit and the source to the 
containment. In the IRIS reactor SA analysis, given the breaks 
location on the DVI lines all the fission products are released 
through the ADS-stage-1 and ADS-stage-2. The ASTEC core initial 
inventory is illustrated in Table 7-2. Because the period between the 
onset of core degradation and the collapsed of corium material 
inside the lower head, is longer, there is ample opportunity for 
volatile radionuclides to escape the fuel. Indeed, the degrading core 
materials become hot enough to sustain the continued release of 
volatile radionuclides, starting around 2700s until 37000 s. The 
analysis here considers the release from volatile, semi-volatile, and 
low volatile species (Figure 7-27 and Figure 7-28). The ASTEC code 
computes the same trend for all volatile fission products and noble 
gas, with a final cumulative release of about 90 % of the initial 
inventory. Concerning the semi-volatile as Mo only the 20% of the 
initial inventory is released as the low volatile Ru. It is possible to 
note a little anomaly concerning Ba; the code predicts a release of 
the 90% (very high if compared with the Phébus tests results), with 
a trend similar to that of the high volatile fission products but shifted 
of 2000 s. Regarding La, the release computed is around 8 %. In 
Figure 7-29 to Figure 7-34 are illustrated the total mass of I, Cs, Te, 
Ru, Ba, Mo released from the reactor core to the vessel, compared 
with the release from the vessel to the containment, furthermore, for 
these latter the dot curves also show the radionuclide forms 
(aerosol, gas/vapor). To underline that the absence of the control 
rods material in the model affects the form of the FP releases. 
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Indeed, the predicted Cs and I gas/vapour release fraction seems 
to be very high. The differences between the straight curves 
represent the FP depositions inside the vessel. Almost the 90% of 
Iodine, Barium released from the fuel reaches the containment. 
Caesium, Ruthenium and Tellurium show a different behavior; the 
deposition inside the vessel is higher, notably for Te;. ASTEC 
computes that, more of the 75 % of the Te released from the core is 
deposited on the vessel internal surfaces.  
FPs behaviour inside the Containment  
In Figure 7-35 and Figure 7-36 are illustrated the behavior of the 
aerosol released from the vessel to the containment. The CPA AFP 
module carries out this computation. The CPA AFP module 
considers all the FPs entering the containment in aerosol form. The 
aerosol deposition is mainly concentrated in the lower part of the 
drywell (zones D3 and D4) and especially inside the cavity (zone 
CAV). The water inside the cavity and on the drywell floor supports 
the deposition of the aerosol. Concerning the suspended aerosol 
behavior, the results are more complex to understand. During the 
oxidation phase the aerosol concentration changes continuously 
due to the small dimension of the containment, the strong natural 
circulation and the elevated concentration of aerosol. As it was 
possible to see, every change occurring inside the vessel reflects 
immediately on the containment. Therefore, the aerosol depletion 
rate is slower in comparison with that predicted for a standard PWR 
containment. From the safety point of view, the aerosol deposition 
on internal surface can reduce the release of radioactivity, while the 
high-suspended aerosol mass predicted inside the IRIS 
containment could make easy a possible radioactive release (for 
example following a containment venting). In the Figure 7-37 is 
illustrated the radioactivity distribution inside the plant. The ISODOP 
module performs this computation. The initial core radioactivity 
inventory computed is 3.79E20 Bq, in agreement with reference [7] 
(6.3E6 GBq/kg HM;), while at the end of the transient the predicted 
radioactivity inside the vessel and the containment are respectively 
4.88E19 and 1.25E19 Bq.  
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Table 7-2: ASTEC total initial FP and uranium inventory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASTEC IRIS total initial FP inventory Burnup = 32000 MWd/tU 
 kg  kg   
Ac 0.000 Am 5.699 Se 43.5208 
Ba 67.111 Cd 3.662 Tb 0.000 
Cm 2.150 Cu 0.000 Tl 244.503 
Er 0.007 Ga 0.00 Y 169.165 
Ge 0.0246 I 10.1542 Ag 0.000 
Kr 17.28 Mo 152.234 Br 67.111 
Nd 171.922 Pa 0.00 Cs 2.150 
Pm 9.132 Pu 439.255 U 46414.28 
Rb 13.6210 Rh 19.274 Zn 0.000 
Sb 1.172 Sm 29.7910 As 0.005 
Sr 43.520 Tc 37.1862 Ce 130.018 
Th 0.0 Tm 0.003 Np 9.132 
Xe 244.503 Yb 0.000 Pr 13.621 
Zr 169.165 As 0.0055 Re 1.1724 
Ac 0.000 Ce 130.018 Ru 111.847 
Ag 67.111 Dy 0.1178 Sn 3.144 
Br 2.152 Gd 4.0879 Te 22.345 
Cs 0.007 In 0.0837 La 171.920 
Eu 0.024 Nb 2.096 Ra 0.000 
Ho 17.280 Pd 52.525   
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7.3 Discussion  
 
One of the worst and more unlikely accident scenario was 
selected to analyse the IRIS reactor behaviour, in this extreme 
condition [8]. The ASTEC calculated results confirmed the 
effectiveness of the IRIS safety design solution adopted. The 
integral layout, the lack of large primary penetration along with 
the huge vessel water inventory, can face even this type of 
scenario, ensuring no radioactive release outside the plant to the 
environment. The pool suppression without vacuum breakers 
guarantees the flooding of the cavity in every situation. Moreover, 
the IVR management strategies in this kind of reactor is able to 
cool the lower head for long time, given the combination of a 
great heat transfer surface and a low decay heat. The low decay 
heat does not depend only on the lesser power than a standard 
PWR, but also to the reactor vessel water inventory. The integral 
vessel ensures a long emptying time and in this period the decay 
heat further decreases. The heat flux on the lower head are ten 
times less than the critical heat flux calculated for the commercial 
reactors. The major risk is connected to the corium relocation 
inside the lower head and the consequently steam explosion. In 
spite of the small containment can resist to very high pressure, 
during the corium material relocation, the ASTEC code predicted 
the generation of a peak pressure following the intense lower 
head water vaporization which could reach the containment 
design pressure. This is a complicated situation to manage, 
because the pressure wave generated could damage seriously 
the integrity of the containment. Even a containment venting 
could not be sufficient to engage this event. The predicted 
duration of the FP release phase of the transient is long because 
of the slow core degradation (around 35000 s) this allows for 
more an extensive release of volatile radionuclides. Release 
fractions after 100000s are very low, because the ASTEC code 
does not take into account the possible revaporization of 
radionuclides that were released from fuel during the release 
phase, but deposited in the vessel surfaces and did not reach 
containment. Concerning the Hydrogen production, it is 
commonly agreed that the hydrogen average source rate, 
typically about 0.2 kg/s for a 1000 MWe PWR, and that this value 
is sufficiently accurate as long as the core geometry remains 
intact [6]. The Zr oxidation Urbanic-Heidrick correlation was used 
in this simulation because it gives better results when compared 
to integral tests such as Phébus; indeed the ASTEC code 
predicts a H2 maximum rate equal to 0.18 kg/s. The cumulative 
hydrogen produced and released to the containment is 616 kg. 
This is an issue pointed out by the SA analysis because; it is very 
unlikely, that the containment can ensure, that no hydrogen 
release, from the containment to the nuclear building occurs, for 
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an extended period of time. The risk associated to a H2 release 
to the nuclear building is an explosion. The blast could cause 
extensive damage to the containment. Another important aspect 
to underline is the predicted behaviour of the aerosol inside the 
containment. Because, the principal mechanism by which source 
terms of gaseous and particulate radionuclides to the 
containment can emerge into the environment is by leakage of 
the containment atmosphere. The concentrations of 
radionuclides in the leaking atmosphere of containment depend 
on both the rates at which radionuclides reach the containment 
and the rates at which they are removed from the atmosphere. 
The simulation results predict an elevated aerosol concentration 
in the containment atmosphere for long periods; this is probably 
due to the intense natural circulation inside the containment, 
given to the limited free volume of this latter. The vessel retention 
factor calculated the ratio of activity released to the vessel to the 
activity released to the containment is 3.9. Anyway, in order to 
improve the reliability of these results, a sensitivity or uncertainty 
analysis on key parameters (those that are influenced by 
sensitivities or uncertainties in the plant data, the plant model and 
the physical models) is compulsory, to show that there is no large 
increase in risk if one of these parameters is changed within its 
uncertainty band. Concerning the computational tool, the ASTEC 
code has shown a good flexibility and capability to simulate 
almost all the phenomena occurs during the transient. The 
computational time for this SA scenario was around 12 hours, 
using a standard notebook. 
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Figure 7-1: Pressurizer pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Breaks mass flow 
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Figure 7-3: SGs pressure 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Drywell pressure 
 
128 
 
“Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 7. ASTEC severe accident analysis 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5: PSS-Drywell reverse flow 
 
 
 
Figure 7-6: Drywell, PSS, PRZ pressure 
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Figure 7-7: Drywell walls power removed 
 
 
Figure 7-8: Core water level 
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Figure 7-9: Core water level (0-2000s) 
 
Figure 7-10: First pool formation in the core 
131 
 
“Severe Accident Simulation in Small Modular Reactor” 
 
Chapter 7. ASTEC severe accident analysis 
 
 
Figure 7-11: First structural material relocation into the lower head 
 
Figure 7-12: Core state before the slump into the lower head 
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Figure 7-13: Core state after the corium slump into the lower head 
 
 
Figure 7-14: PRZ, DW, PSS pressure 
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Figure 7-15: Corium material mass evolution 
 
 
 
Figure 7-16: H2 cumulative and instantaneous release 
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Figure 7-17: Decay heat and total oxidation power 
 
 
 
Figure 7-18: Zr speciation mass 
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Figure 7-19: Drywell partial pressures 
 
 
 
Figure 7-20: Pressure evolution comparison with different IVR HTC values 
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Figure 7-21: Corium material relocation comparison 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-22: Heat flux on the lower head external surface at different levels 
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Figure 7-23: Decay heat into the lower head and heat removed by IVR strategies 
 
 
 
Figure 7-24: Maximum lower head temperature 
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Figure 7-25: Structural material relocation and corium material massive relocation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-26: Evolution of the corium material inside the lower head 
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Figure 7-27: Noble gases and high volatile FPs fraction release 
 
 
 
Figure 7-28: Semi and low volatile FPs fraction release 
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Figure 7-29: Iodine release from the core and to the containment 
 
 
 
Figure 7-30: Caesium release to the vessel and to the containment 
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Figure 7-31: Tellurium release to the vessel and to the containment 
 
 
 
Figure 7-32: Molybdenum release to the vessel and to the containment 
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Figure 7-33:  Ruthenium release to the vessel and to the containment 
 
 
 
Figure 7-34: Barium release to the vessel and to the containment 
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Figure 7-35: Aerosol deposition inside the containment 
 
 
 
Figure 7-36: Suspended aerosol inside the containment 
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Figure 7-37: Total activity in the different zone of the plant 
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The continued reduction in the potential for, and the 
consequences of, severe accidents will play an important role in 
the operation and development of NPPs and the associated 
improvements in standards of living worldwide. Improved 
training, effective accident management strategies and, 
ultimately, the development of more advanced reactor designs 
as the SMRs will continue to be the cornerstone of such a 
reduction. Fortunately, these activities can benefit from more 
than two decades of severe accident research and, in particular, 
the extensive suite of severe accident codes that embody the 
lessons learned from that research. However, the successful 
application of these codes requires that the end-user have a firm 
understanding of the important trends and phenomena 
associated with severe accidents. As illustrated in the last 
chapter the behaviour of a plant during a severe accident is 
affected by a complex range of thermal, mechanical and physical 
processes. The integral code calculation results obtained 
concerning the SA scenario more than the DBA scenario are 
affected by approximations that are unpredictable without the 
use of computational tools that account for the various sources 
of uncertainty. The uncertainties in predicting the early phases 
of a severe accident are relatively small, in comparison with the 
uncertainties for the later stages, which are still relatively large. 
In addition, the uncertainties associated, to prototypical systems 
are also still relatively large. Sensitivities and uncertainties 
analyses are compulsory in this kind of calculation and not only 
to evaluate the likelihood of all the possible results, which can 
provided, but also to search the weakness in the reactor model 
developed. For example, the consequences of reflooding the 
reactor cavity and implementation of the IVR management 
strategies, depends on the boundary conditions imposed. The 
heat transfer coefficient selected, affects the behaviour of the 
corium material inside the vessel. The actual heat exchanged 
depends on the collapsed corium material configuration inside 
the lower head. The design of the reactor core is also obviously 
important in determining the impact of different severe accident 
phenomena. For example, in IRIS the mass of the reflector is 
very high in comparison a standard PWR. The presence of this 
heavy reflector could affect the lateral movement of the melting 
material inside the core; the corium material will find more easy 
to collapse towards the core centre. The IRIS design of the 
reactor cooling system can also hidden critical aspects in the 
overall performances of the plant during a severe accident, that 
could not be foreseen a priori. The ability in accurately predict 
the response of a new type of reactor as the SMRs during a 
severe accident using a severe accident code depends on the 
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type of computer code used, the accuracy of the modelling 
options used. In general, integrated codes allow the user to 
model both the reactor coolant system and the containment but 
have more parametric models that must be tuned by the user. 
Because these codes were intended to be fast running, 
modelling accuracy was of less concern than speed. In addition, 
the users of integrated codes can have much more impact on 
the overall predicted response of the plant, because of the large 
number of modelling parameters that must be set. Overall, the 
SMR accident analyses carried out have provided interesting 
information about the capability of the ASTEC integral code to 
simulate the DBA transient and the phenomena associated. The 
strong interaction between the containment and the integral 
vessel has been adequately reproduced and furthermore, .the 
results comparison between the ASTEC code and the RELAP-
GOTHIC coupled code has shown a good agreement for the 
most of parameters analysed. The few discrepancies observed 
are mainly due to the coarse mesh and simplified model adopted 
by the ASTEC code. Regarding the SA scenario, the results 
seem to provide a credible sequence of events quite similar to 
that seen in currents commercial water reactor designs, taking 
into account the strong coupling between integral vessel and 
containment. Obviously only one SA event simulated, using only 
one code, cannot provide a high level of certainty on the quality 
of the results. However, the calculated results can permit us, to 
understand, which could be a possible response of these not 
prototypical systems to a SA event, and what might be the best 
counter-measures to be taken to limit the accident 
consequences. Certainly, further code benchmarking, on 
reference scenarios and reference SMR, could be useful, to 
estimate properly the impact of some assumptions, and to point 
out some phenomenon, which could not been captured in this 
simulation. Overall, the creation of this new input deck has 
requested the application of all the potential of the integral 
ASTEC code, and the support of the ASTEC development team, 
also in order to use new tools combination, never used before 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
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A. APPENDIX A 
 
 
A.1 Lower head 
 
In this appendix will be compared the behavior of the two different 
lower head configurations developed for the IRIS reactor with 
ICARE module. The reason why two different lower plenum 
configurations have been developed is that, in ICARE module is not 
possible arrange the lower support plate or any macro-component 
inside the elliptical part of the vessel, but only in the cylindrical part 
of the vessel. This is a strong limitation because some kind of reactor 
in order to enhance the natural convection regime placed the lower 
support plate inside the lower plenum as in the AP 1000 reactor. 
This lack of the code affects also the core degradation. For example, 
if during the core degradation the corium material relocated inside 
the lower head reach the lower support plate level the ICARE 
module does not take into account the possible contact between the 
two. On the contrary, to avoid this situation when the corium material 
volume exceed the lower head volume, the ICARE module reduces 
automatically the corium material volume maintaining the same 
decay power. This means that the power density of the corium 
material increase and consequently, the flux on the lower plenum 
surfaces is not correctly computed. In the IRIS case there is not this 
issue because it is impossible that the corium material can fill up the 
lower plenum, given its dimension, but anyway it is no possible 
reproduce the correct geometry of the IRIS lower plenum. 
A.2 The lower head configuration 
 
The actual lower head IRIS configuration along with the two different 
configurations are illustrated in Figure A-1 .The configuration 1 
reproduce the exact geometry of the IRIS lower head but not the 
lower support plate position. The vessel configuration 1 volume is 
25% greater than the IRIS one. The configuration 2 underestimates 
the lower head volume and surface but arranges the support plate at 
the exact elevation, and overestimate the IRIS vessel volume of 
10%. 
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Figure A-1: IRIS lower head vessel and the two lower part vessel configuration 
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The Table A.1 reports the IRIS vessel geometrical data and the 
volume of the two different ICARE vessel configuration. The data are 
referred to the vessel part that houses the core. 
  
Table A.1: Vessel parameters 
 
Table A. 2: Lower head model 1 axial meshes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEOMETRICAL DATA IRIS MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Low. Plenum height [m] 3.105 3.105 1.27 
Cylindrical part Vessel  height [m] 3.727 5.562 5.562 
Total height [m] 6.832 8.667 6.832 
Vessel ID [m] 6.223 6.223 6.223 
Cylindrical part Vessel Vol.  [m³] 113.357 169.168 169.168 
Lower plenum volume  [m³] 62.959 62.959 25.751 
Total volume   [m³] 176.31 232.128 194.920 
Δ volume   [m³] 0 55.811 18.6039 
EXT Surf. lower plenum [m²] 60.830 60.830 39.057 
LOWER PLENUM CONFIGURATION 1 : EMISPHERICAL FORM 
material Steel SA533B 
minimum thickness [m]      0.19 maximum thickness [m]   0.28 
Number of radial mesh (mesr.)   10 
 Number of axial  mesh  (mesas) 10 
axial  mesh  positions 
degree level [m] radius [m] 
0 -0.355 3.115 
9.1 -0.8429 3.0463 
16.8 -1.2505 2.966 
24.7 -1.6439 2.8023 
33.5 -2.0508 2.5722 
42 -2.4138 2.2923 
50.8 -2.7408 1.9474 
59.5 -3.0283 1.5747 
69.5 -3.2407 1.0789 
79.2 -3.3849 0.578 
90 -3.46 0 
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Figure A-2: Lower head configuration 1 radial meshes 
Table A.3: Lower plenum configuration 2 meshing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Table A. 2 and Table A.3 and Figure A-2 Figure A-3are 
illustrated the lower head meshing of the model 1 and model 2. 
LOWER PLENUM CONFIGURATION  2  
material Steel SA533B 
minimum thickness [m]      0.19 maximum thickness [m]   0.28 
Number of radial mesh (mesr.)  10 
 Number of axial  mesh  (mesas) 8 
axial  mesh  positions 
degree level [m] radius [m] 
0 -0.355 3.115 
5.7 -0.6315 2.7987 
11.5 -0.8605 2.5006 
18 -1.0687 2.1944 
25.7 -1.2374 1.8351 
35.3 -1.3761 1.4421 
48.8 -1.5041 1.004 
66.2 -1.59 0.5452 
90 -1.625 0 
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Figure A-3: Lower head type 2 meshes 
A.3 The ICARE stand-alone test 
 
The tests included a series of ICARE stand-alone calculations of the 
same transient. For each transient has been adopted different failure 
model for both the configurations and the results were compared. 
The transient starts at 0 s with the core at full power and the vessel 
full of water, the shut-down occurs after 1 s. After that, no water 
makeup occurs until the lower plenum failure. The boundary 
condition imposed on the lower head external surface are HTC 25 
kW/m2 and 50 °C. The failure model applied are: 
• ŒUF using the first four criteria. At each criteria is associated a 
type of rupture for the criteria 1 the type of rupture is fragile failure, 
for the criteria 2 is ductile failure, for the criteria 3 is too small 
thickness and for criteria 4 is excessive displacement. The default 
values were used for each criteria. The Oeuf model is applicable 
to a perfect half spherical lower head, thus only to the 
configuration 1. 
• COMBESCURE model: In this model at each axial level of the 
vessel lower head, the applied stress σ is compared to the ultimate 
steel stress. It is applicable to half-spherical or half-ellipsoidal 
lower heads. It is possible chosen two criteria: Criteria 1 plastic 
rupture, Criteria 2 creep rupture.  
• USER PARAMETER: The user can impose a condition on 
temperature, mechanical stress or molten fraction. The model can 
be used for both the configurations. 
• LOHEY : Two failure criteria are included in the considered model. 
According to the first criterion the layer fails if the plastic strain 
intensity exceeds the ultimate failure strain Ɛ (T). The second 
criterion is based on the analysis of material damage induced by 
creep strains. Using the correlation for time to rupture at the given 
stress and temperature, provided by the user the current damage 
of each layer is determined. 
In the Table A. 4 and Table A. 5 are presented the ICARE stand-
alone calculated results for the configurations 1 and 2, for each 
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failure model adopted, each criteria chosen, the related type of 
rupture and the ICARE default values.  
Table A. 4: Model 1 ICARE stand-alone result 
Table A. 5: Model 1 ICARE stand-alone result 
 
MODEL 1 Type of rupture Criteria Time [s] position Default value ° [m] 
ŒUF model 
CRIT 0 All criteria         
CRIT 1 Fragile failure Damage = 1 18824 50°-60° 
-
2.96647 
CRIT 2 Ductile failure Ultimate stress of the material 17683 50°-60° 
-
2.96647 
CRIT 3 Too small thickness 0.001 m (total fusion) 19304 50°-60° 
-
2.96647 
CRIT 4 Excessive displacement 10
20 m (total fusion) 19304 50°-60° -2.96647 
COMBESCURE model 
CRIT 'ALL' Ultimate stress of the material 16489 50°-60° 
-
2.96647 
CRIT 'PLASTIC' Ultimate stress of the material 16489 50°-60° 
-
2.96647 
CRIT 'CREEP' Creep velocity 18049 50°-60° -2.96647 
LOHEY model 
  melting failure 14840 60°-70° -3.2239 
USER parameter 
Maximum Temperature 1473 K 15332 60°-70° -3.2239 
MODEL 2 Criteria Time [s] Location   
Default value ° [m] 
COMBESCURE model 
CRIT 'ALL' Ultimate stress of the material 10303 48°-66° -1.5324 
CRIT 'PLASTIC' Ultimate stress of the material 10303 48°-66° -1.5324 
CRIT 'CREEP' Creep velocity 12600 35°-48° -1.3971 
LOHEY model 
  melting failure 7791 90° -1.6413 
USER parameter 
Maximum Temperature 1473 K  8469 90° -1.6413 
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The observed discrepancies between the two models concerning the 
failure time are mainly due to the different water inventory inside the 
lower head at the beginning of the transient : 44585 kg for 
configuration 1 and 18252 kg for configuration 2. In the configuration 
1 the ŒUF and the COMBESCURE model for each criteria chosen, 
predict, the lower head failure at the same point, while in the LOHEY 
and the USER model the failure occurs at a lower level. The maximum 
failure time not taking into account the ŒUF model is 18049 s for 
COMBESCURE CREEP criteria whilst the minimum is 15332 s for 
USER parameter (maximum temperature 1473 K). In the Figure A-4 
Figure A-5 are illustrated the initial and the final state of the 
configuration 1 using the model COMBESCURE CREEP, and the 
lower head external walls heat flux. 
  
Figure A-4: Configuration 1 initial and final state COMBESCURE+CREEP 
 
Figure A-5: Lower head external surface heat flux (configuration 1) 
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Regarding the configuration 2, the maximum failure time is 12600 s 
for COMBESCURE CREEP criteria and 8469 for USER parameter 
(maximum temperature 1473 K). The different failure position 
computed by the LOHEY and PARAMETER USER model is due only 
to the more restrict failure criteria imposed. These conditions are 
achieved earlier than the other ones in the bottom part of the lower 
head. In the Figure A-4 Figure A-5 are illustrated the initial and the 
final state of the configuration 1 using the model COMBESCURE 
CREEP, and the lower head external walls heat flux. 
  
Figure A-6: Configuration 1 initial and final state COMBESCURE+CREEP 
 
 
Figure A-7: Lower head external surface heat flux (configuration 2) 
Both the configurations fail when the heat flux reaches the value of 
30 kW/m2. In the configuration 2 are involved more meshes in the 
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heat exchange with the corium material; indeed as illustrated in 
Figure A-7 at least 5 meshes reaches the higher heat flux value, 
while in the configuration 1 only two meshes reach the higher heat 
flux value. 
 
Figure A-8: Lower head external surface heat flux (configuration 1) 
 
Figure A-9: Lower head external surface heat flux (configuration 2) 
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The Figure A-8 and Figure A-9 illustrate the heat flux calculated 
using the LOHEY model, the lower head fails when the heat flux 
reaches the value of 25 kW/m2 in both the configurations. Imposing 
more restrictive failure conditions, the ratio between the failure time 
increases, as illustrated in Table A. 6.  
Table A. 6: Failure time ratio 
MODEL 
 Failure time configuration 1/ 
Failure time configuration 2 
COMBESCURE-CREEP 1.63 
COMBESCURE PLASTIC 1.43 
LOHEY 1.90 
USER PARAMETER   
Tmax = 1473 K 
1.81 
 
Table A. 7: Mesh data (in blue the failed mesh with COMBESCURE model in yellow 
that ones with the LOHEY model) 
 Configuration 1 Configuration 2 
 Elevation 
(m) 
Surface 
(m2)) 
Elevation 
(m) 
Surface 
(m2)) 
Mesh 1 -0.355 1.20 -0.355 1.01 
Mesh2 -0.8429 3.00 -0.6315 2.47 
Mesh 3 -1.2505 5.08 -0.8605 3.77 
Mesh 4 -1.6439 5.93 -1.0687 4.61 
Mesh 5 -2.0508 7.07 -1.2374 5.55 
Mesh 6 -2.4138 7.89 -1.3761 6.01 
Mesh 7 -2.7408 8.82 -1.5041 6.74 
Mesh 8 -3.0283 8.77 -1.59 12.56 
Mesh 9 -3.2407 8.82   
Mesh 10 -3.3849 11.28   
 
The Table A.7 reports the mesh geometrical data of the two 
configurations. Analysing all the available data is possible to deduce that 
the failure time depends on (in order of importance): 
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• The initial lower head water inventory; 
• The failure model selected; 
• The shape of the lower head; 
• The mesh surface; 
In the IRIS reactor model, it has been chosen the more conservative 
assumption, selecting the configuration 2 and the LOHEY model 
.
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B.  APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
B.1 Summary 
 
In this appendix will be presented the work performed for the paper 
on the development of the AP1000 ASTEC model [1]. 
B.2 Introduction 
 
A new trend in reactor technology is the implementation of passive 
safety features for enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants. The 
AP1000 reactor includes passive safety systems to provide 
emergency core cooling following postulated design basis events [2]. 
These kind of safety systems are significantly simpler than typical 
PWR safety systems [3] eliminating many safety-related components 
including pumps, valves, pipes and their associated buildings. The 
AP1000 PCCS require no operator actions to mitigate design-basis 
accidents. Once actuated, they rely only on the natural forces of 
gravity, compressed gas, natural circulation and evaporation to 
perform their safety-related functions. The only exception is a few 
simple valves that automatically align and actuate the passive safety 
systems [4]. In support of the AP1000 design, a series of thermal-
hydraulic analysis codes were developed by Westinghouse, 
including LOFTRAN/LOFTTR2 for non-LOCA transients, NOTRUMP 
for small-break LOCAs, WCOBRA/TRAC for large-break LOCAs and 
long-term cooling analysis and WGOTHIC for containment systems 
performance analysis [5]. However, all the codes mentioned above 
are proprietary and the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of AP1000 
under steady state and transient accident conditions have not been 
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described in detail in open literature and further studies are still 
required. In the present work, modeling of the primary circuit, the 
secondary circuit and the PCCS of AP1000 was developed, and a 
reactor transient in accident conditions was simulated using the 
CESAR code. The accident scenario analysed was a 10-in. cold leg 
break, the break size approaching the upper limit size for small break 
LOCAs; this was chosen because for the safety analyses of AP1000, 
a small break LOCA is defined as a rupture of the reactor coolant 
pressure boundary with a total cross-sectional area less than 1.0 ft2. 
This is considered a Condition III event (infrequent fault) that may 
occur during the life of the plant [6]. The main transient parameters 
obtained by the CESAR simulation, (RCS pressure, break flow, 
passive safety injection flow, cladding temperature, etc.), have been 
compared with the reference results calculated by Westinghouse 
using the NOTRUMP code and a detailed comparison will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Nomenclature  
 
  
ACC accumulator PRHR HX passive residual heat 
removal heat-
exchanger 
ADS automatic depressurisation 
system 
PCCS passive core cooling 
system 
CMT core makeup tank PWR pressurised water 
reactor 
DVI direct vessel injection RCP reactor coolant pump 
IRWST   in-containment refueling 
water storage tank 
RCS reactor coolant 
system 
LOCA loss of coolant accident RPV reactor pressure 
vessel 
PMS protection and safety 
monitoring system 
SGFP steam generator feed 
water pump 
PRHRS passive residual heat removal 
system 
  
 
B.3 AP1000 safety design 
 
 
The AP1000 passive safety design approach is to depressurize the 
RCS if the leak or the break is greater than the makeup capability of 
the charging system. By depressurizing, a lot of borated water in the 
accumulator and in the containment refueling water storage tank 
becomes available for cooling the core [7]. The AP1000 PCCS 
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includes two core makeup tanks (CMTs), two accumulators (ACCs), 
a passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR-HX), an In-
containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST), a sump and 
the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The CMTs are filled 
with borated water at room temperature, and located above the 
Reactor Coolant System (RCS); both are connected with two 
different cold legs by an open ‘pressure balance’ line. During normal 
operation, the outlet valves are closed and the system is static. This 
system operates at RCS pressure, and provides high pressure 
safety injection by gravity of the colder water in the CMTs. The 
pressurized ACCs are filled for 15% with nitrogen at a pressure of 
48.7 bar and for 85% with borated water, providing additional 
borated water to the RCS. The IRWST provides a further source of 
borated water for long term cooling. To attain injection from IRWST, 
the RCS pressure must be lowered until the head of water in the 
tank overcomes the low RCS pressure and the pressure loss in the 
injection lines. One containment sump injects recirculation water to 
the primary system after the primary system is fully depressurized 
and the gravity head becomes great enough. All these systems 
share the same discharge line, called Direct Vessel Injection (DVI) 
lines. The PRHR-HX is a C-tube heat exchanger located inside the 
IRWST above the core promoting natural circulation heat removal 
between the RCS and the tank [8]. The ADS system consist of a 
series of valves, subdivided in four different stages, every stage 
including two lines and four valves. The first three-stage are 
connected to the pressurizer and discharge into the IRWST, the two 
four stage (4A,4B) are connected to the two hot legs and discharge 
inside the containment atmosphere. The aim of ADS system is to 
depressurize the RCS in order to permit the IRWST to discharge into 
the RCS. 
B.4 AP 1000 RCS and secondary circuit model 
 
A preliminary ASTEC model for the AP1000 reactor has been 
developed which represents all of the major primary, secondary and 
passive safety system components. Different type of components 
including volumes, junctions, accumulators, walls, valves and 
pumps were adopted to simulate the fluid systems of AP1000. 
Figure B-1 shows a view of the arrangement of different control 
volumes representing the RCS and the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV).  
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Figure B-1: AP1000 RCS nodalization scheme 
The RPV model was represented in detail using the ICARE module  
(the ASTEC module in charge of the in-vessel core degradation 
simulation) [9]. The ICARE model contains representation of nearly 
all internal components [10]. However during the normal operating 
conditions (steady state) up to the front end sequence (i.e. from the 
initiation of the accident up to the core uncovery), the ASTEC code 
builds automatically a simplified description of the RPV for CESAR 
from the complete ICARE description [11]. When some parameters 
inside the RPV exceed determinate safety values (void fraction at 
the top of the core, cladding temperature, etc.) ASTEC code 
switches the RPV thermal-hydraulic computation from the CESAR 
model to the ICARE model. Since throughout the analysed scenario, 
all the parameters respected the safety criteria, the RPV thermal-
hydraulic was simulated using the simplified model generated by 
ASTEC. The ICARE core detailed model will be used in the further 
work for the severe accident analyses. The RPV model generated 
by ASTEC consisted of four main volumes: core, by-pass, 
downcomer and lower plenum. The first three ones were further 
divided in 21 axial meshes, whilst for the lower plenum it was used 
only one mesh. The nodes that describe the core were simulated 
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using a heat source that generates the residual power. The core 
decay power was accurately calculated by mean of a dedicated 
code, taking into account a fuel with an average enrichment of 4% 
and a burnup equal to 32 GWd/tU. The upper part of the RPV was 
subdivided in 4 standard volumes where the higher part of 
downcomer has been connected to the four cold legs (CLs), and the 
two DVI lines, while the upper-plenum volume is connected to the 
two hot legs (HLs). Both CLs and HLs were represented by 4 
homogenous volumes. The tube side of the steam generators (SGs) 
were subdivided in 13 nodes. To simulate the energy transfer 
between the RCS and secondary circuit the volumes that represent 
the SGs tube side, share the same wall structure along with the 6 
nodes that model the shell side of the SGs in the secondary circuit. 
The same approach has been used to simulate the heat exchange 
between the PRHR-HX and the IRWST. A swollen type volume 
modeled the Pressurizer (PZR). The four reactor coolant pumps 
(RCPs) was represented using system pump following the correct 
technical characteristics. Concerning the PCCS, the IRWST was 
subdivided in 5 volumes; the higher volume is swollen type, and the 
lower volume has been connected to both the DVI lines nodes. The 
ADS valves were represented using the structures systems 
valve,‘SEBIM’ [12], the first three-stage discharging directly inside 
the second node of the IRWST; the spargers were not taken into 
account. Both CMTs are simulated by a single swollen type volume, 
and connected directly to CL and to the DVI. The ACCs are modeled 
by the structure systems ’ACCUMULATOR’. The PRHR-HX is 
represented by mean of 5 homogenous volume. Figure B-2 shows 
a view of the secondary circuit nodalisation used in the simulation. 
The secondary circuit includes the shell side of the two SGs, each 
of which was represented by 7 standard volumes, the high part of 
the SGs was modeled by one volume type swollen (the dome) and 
by one standard volume. The SGs downcomers as well as the two 
main steam lines (MSLs) were subdivided in 4 standard volumes, 
while the steam-head volume represents a sort of condenser. The 
safety valves on the MSLs are simulated using the structure systems 
valve type ‘SAFETY VALVE’. The Steam Generators Feedwater 
Pumps (SGFPs) were connected to the higher nodes of the 
downcomer and were modeled by using system pumps. In this 
study, a 10-in. cold leg small break LOCA is simulated by adding a 
structure “CONNECTI” type ‘BREAK’ to the third node of the cold 
leg, which was connected to the CMT1 volume in the non-
pressurizer side. The break location was specified on the bottom of 
the broken cold leg imposing the relative elevation of the break. 
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Figure B-2: AP1000 secondary circuit nodalization 
B.5 Steady state calculation 
 
To simulate the accident scenario a stationary input deck for the 
CESAR code was built to establish the initial conditions of the 
transient. This input deck was constrained by introducing different 
controllers by mean of structures ‘REGU’. The task of the structures 
‘REGU’ is to adjust the different parameters in order to fit the 
computed response with the expected one. In this way, they were 
set to the desired physical values for PZR level and pressure, SG 
recirculation flow rate, steam produced, water flow across the core, 
just to name a few. All the selected thermal-hydraulic parameters 
values were found in [13]. This stationary transient was run for 
30000 s to verify that the calculated conditions were steady and the 
actual initial conditions of the simulation were achieved. After the 
desired steady-state conditions were achieved, some structures 
‘REGU’ were removed to verify the stability of the modeling. Table 
B.1 shows the comparison between the CESAR thermal-hydraulic 
parameters values obtained in stationary simulation and the nominal 
AP1000 thermal-hydraulic parameters. It can be seen from the table 
that the calculated values were in good agreement with the rated 
values. The restart file generated by this run has been used as initial 
condition for the transient simulation. 
 
169 
 
Appendix B The AP1000 ASTEC model 
 
Table B.1: Main thermal-hydraulic parameters steady state 
Thermal hydraulic 
parameters 
CESAR AP1000 nominal 
operating 
parameters 
Average core inlet 
temperature (K) 
553.882 553.81 
Average core outlet 
temperature (K) 
597.878 596.48 
Pressurizer 
pressure (bar) 
155.1 155.1 
Reactor coolant 
flow per loop (kg/s) 
6879 6728 
Pressurized water 
volume (m3) 
27.96 28.31 
Steam flow from 
NSSS (kg/s) 
948 943.7 
Exit steam 
pressure (bar) 
58.9 57.6 
 
B.6 10 inch LOCA simulation 
 
B.6.1 Accident evolution 
A typical small break LOCA transient in the AP1000 reactor can be 
divided into four different phases [14] namely: the blow-down phase, 
the natural circulation phase, the ADS blow-down phase and the 
IRWST injection phase. When a small break occurs, the RCS 
system undergoes to depressurization. During the RCS 
depressurisation, when the pressure begin to fall up to the reactor 
trip set point (124.1 bar), a SCRAM signal is generated and the core 
power drops rapidly to the decay heat level. When the pressuriser 
pressure further drops below 117 bar, a safety system actuation 
signal (‘S’ signal) is generated. After the ‘S’ signal, both the CMTs 
isolation valves, and the PRHR isolation valves located on their RCS 
delivery lines, open with 5 seconds delay. The SGs are isolated 6 
seconds after the reactor trip signal, due to closure of the turbine 
stop valves, and after another 2 seconds the reactor coolant pumps 
(RCPs) trip. Following actuation of the CMTs and PRHR-HX, two 
natural circulation flow paths are established through which the core 
decay heat is removed effectively. This phase is called blow-down 
phase and its duration is strictly dependent on the size of the break. 
After the RCPs trip, the decay heat is removed by mean of the break, 
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the SGs, the CMT recirculation flow and the PRHR-HX. The 
magnitude of each of these RCS cooling down mechanisms 
depends on the water system inventory. Indeed, once the steam 
generator primary side tubes had drained, because of the RCS 
inventory decrease, the heat exchange between primary and 
secondary circuit is drastically reduced. When this occurs the 
IRWST by mean of the PRHR-HX, becomes the primary heat sink 
for the RCS. The position of PRHR HX above the RCS ensures a 
sufficient inlet and outlet pressure difference which drives the RCS 
coolant to flow from one hot leg, through the C shape heat-
exchanger, and back into its associated steam generator lower 
plenum. Heat transfer from the PRHR-HX tubes to the IRWST 
occurs either by free convection or by boiling, depending on the tube 
outer wall temperature, tank water temperature and pressure in the 
vicinity [15]. The CMTs inject cold borated water into the RCS 
through the DVI lines because of gravity-driven natural circulation 
and hot liquid from the cold legs collects gradually at the top of the 
CMTs, in this way the water level inside the tanks remains almost 
constant. This phenomenon is referred to as the CMTs recirculation 
mode. Until the water in the cold leg does not begin to flash or drain, 
the CMTs system remain in recirculation mode, afterwards the 
system switches to draining mode, and the tanks level, begin to 
decrease. When the pressuriser pressure reaches 48.3 bar another 
natural circulation system starts to inject water into the RCS, the 
ACCs. This system is able to discharge a high flow rate of borated 
water in a short time. Throughout this phase, called natural 
circulation phase the RCS depressurization slows down as coolant 
flashes and tends to be in saturated condition in the primary system 
[16]. When the CMT level drops to 67.5 percent, an ADS actuation 
signal is generated, and ADS stage 1 valves open with a 32 seconds 
delay. This is the beginning of the ADS-blow-down phase. The ADS 
Stage 2 and Stage 3 valves open in a timed sequence thereafter, to 
accelerate the RCS depressurization rate. The flows from the first 
ADS three-stage valves are discharged into the IRWST. In case of 
small break LOCA this first three-stage, usually are not able to 
depressurize the RCS system until the IRWST delivery pressure. 
For this reason when the CMT level reaches 20-percent other two 
stage called ADS stage 4A and ADS stage 4B are activated, with 60 
seconds delay each other. These stages have greater vent 
capability with respect to the other three, and are able to 
depressurize the RCS up to atmospheric pressure also if the other 
three-stage do not work. After the primary system pressure drops to 
values near the containment pressure, injection from the IRWST 
initiates, marking the end of the Small Break LOCA transient and the 
beginning of the long term cooling. This phase is called IRWST 
injection phase. In Table B.2 are listed the protection and safety 
monitoring system (PMS) setpoints and time delay assumed in the 
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small break LOCA analysis for AP1000. 
 
Table B.2: Safety system setpoints and time delay assumed in accident analysis 
Function Setpoint safety system Time delay (s) 
Reactor SCRAM on low 
pressuriser pressure  
124.1 bar 0.2 
‘S’ signal 11.72 bar 2 
PRHR signal ‘S’ signal 5 
CMTs signal ‘S’ signal 5 
RCPs trip ‘S’ signal 8 
ADS stage 1 actuation 
on  CMT low level 
67.5% tank level 
(ADS 1 stage signal) 
32 
ADS stage 2 48 s after ADS 1 stage 
signal 
(ADS 2 stage signal) 
22 
ADS stage 3 90 s after ADS 2 stage 
signal 
(ADS 3 stage signal) 
0 
ADS stage 4A actuation 
on CMT low-low level 
20 % tank level and 128 s 
after (ADS 4 stage signal) 
20 
ADS stage 4B actuation 
on CMT low-low level 
60 s after ADS 2 stage 
signal 
(ADS 3 stage signal) 
2 
IRWST signal p(RCS) < p(IRWST) + 
Head -losses 
0 
 
B.6.2 Accident analysis 
The 10-inch Small Break LOCA is thought to occur in the bottom of 
a cold leg connected to the CMT-1. The event chronology is shown 
in Table B.3  
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Table B.3: Safety events comparison 10-inch LOCA 
EVENT ASTEC  
Time (s) 
NOTRUMP  
Time(s) 
Break open 0 0 
Reactor trip signal 4.3 5.2 
‘S’ signal 5.4 6.4 
Steam turbine isolation 12.5 11.2 
RCP coastdown 10.5 12.4 
Accumulators injection 
starts 
102.2 85 
Accumulator 1 empties 477.8 418.2 
Accumulator 2 empties 478.3 425.5 
ADS 1 Stage 817 750 
ADS 2 Stage 877 820 
ADS 3 Stage 997 940 
ADS 4 Stage 1535 1491 
CMT1 empties ~2000 1900 
CMT2 empties 1830 1800 
IRWST injection starts 1650 ~1800 
 
The predicted results obtained by CESAR are compared with the 
reference values calculated by NOTRUMP performed by 
Westinghouse. NOTRUMP is a specific small-break LOCA thermal-
hydraulic code, which incorporates passive safety features that were 
developed for the AP600 safety analysis, and it was verified against 
integral system test data in the design certification process [16]. The 
table reveals a reasonable agreement between the two codes 
regarding the time sequence of events. Figure B-3 shows the RCS 
pressure history, the duration of the above-mentioned phase and 
the timing of intervention of the PCCS during the transient analysed. 
Once the cold leg break occurs, the RCS pressure drops rapidly 
from the initial operating pressure to the steam generator secondary 
side pressure due to mass and energy loss through the break. The 
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CESAR results, show that the pressure reaches quickly 60 bar, 
while NOTRUMP about 77 bar. The PRHR and CMTs are actuated 
5 seconds after on receipt of the ‘S’ signal at 6.9 s during the blow-
down phase. In Figure B-4 the heat rejection rate by the PRHR-HX 
and the break water and vapour mass flow rate calculated by the 
two codes are displayed. As it can be observed, the behavior of the 
PRHR are quite similar in both the simulations. The higher values of 
the PRHR-HX heat exchanged, computed by CESAR module, in the 
initial phase operation, are mainly due to the greater water mass 
flow, which goes throw the HX, driven by the high RCS pressure. 
The results comparison also shows that at the beginning of the 
natural circulation phase, the CESAR code calculates a lower and 
delayed break vapour discharge than NOTRUMP. This discrepancy 
is due mainly to the different models and parameters adopted by the 
two code for the computation of the critical flow and liquid 
entrainment through the break. Since the quality and the quantity of 
the break discharge flow has a great impact on the system 
depressurization rate; the CESAR simulation predicts a slower RCS 
depressurization process with respect to NOTRUMP during the 
natural circulation phase. Another reason could be due to the coarse 
mesh approach used to simulate the lower plenum. The model 
represents the lower plenum with a single volume. The entrance 
core head losses are reproduced as concentrated head losses at 
the junction, and calculated during the stationary transient to set the 
core mass flow.  This nodalization scheme does not take into 
account, possible recirculation flow inside the lower plenum; this 
lack could have a not negligible effect on the slow initial RCS 
depressurization. Figure B-5 and Figure B-6 show the injected mass 
flow rate of the two CMTs throughout the transient, and, as it 
possible to see on the figures, the calculated results are in good 
agreement. An interesting aspect well captured by CESAR, is the 
reduction of the injection flow associated to CMTs, during operation 
of the ACCs. This is due to the pressurization of CMTs injection line 
by the ACCs, through the direct vessel injection (DVI) lines. Once 
the two ACCs are empty at about 477 s, the CMTs injection flow 
begins to resume. The slower RCS depressurization rate, predicted 
by CESAR, affects the ACCs discharge flow rate, given that, it is 
strongly depended on the pressure difference between the ACCs 
and the RCS. Indeed, as confirmed in Figure B-7 and Figure B-8, 
the ACCs discharge mass flows computed by CESAR, are lower 
and start in delay in comparison with those calculated by NOTRUMP 
code. In both the simulation, it was assumed that when the 
accumulators are emptied, the PRHR-HX, stops to work. This 
assumption is due to the fact that PRHR is designed only to 
exchange heat effectively with the liquid phase. The CMT-2 is the 
first one where the tank level drops to 67.5%, (this is because the 
break is located on the cold leg where the CMT-1 volume is 
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connected) and with a 32 seconds delay the ADS first stage valves 
open, sequentially the other two stages open in a controlled manner. 
These six motor operated valves (2 for each stage) are located in 
the high part of the pressurizer and when they open, a more rapid 
depressurization is calculated. After 1000s, the depressurisation 
effect of ADS-1/2/3 is reduced, and the RCS pressure tends to 
assume a constant value in both the simulations, throughout the 
ADS blow-down phase. The RCS pressure begins again to 
decrease, only after the opening of ADS4-A, and ADS4-B stages 
valves. The CESAR simulation computes a time delay of 115 
seconds between the activation of the ADS4-A stage valves and the 
beginning of water injection from the IRWST into the RCS in 
comparison with about 300 s predicted by NOTRUMP code. The 
IRWST injection flows are illustrated in Figure B-9 and Figure 
B-10respectively. As it can see, the calculated results show a 
reasonable agreement, nevertheless CESAR code compute an 
early injection. In Figure B-11 it is possible to observed the strictly 
correlation between ADS 4 stage discharge flow rate and IRWST 
injection mass flow rate. The remarkable differences concerning the 
ADS4 discharge flows predicted by the two codes, are due mainly 
to the different models used to simulate the liquid entrainment in the 
hot legs, which influences the flow quality and critical flow rate out 
of the ADS4 stages, and it can determine the depressurization rate 
and the system inventory that occurs. In the RCS CESAR model, 
the void fraction in the node located above the core and connected 
to both hot legs was assumed homogeneous in whole volume. As 
shown by the results, this assumption tends, at least initially to 
overestimate the quantity of liquid that enter the hot leg and is 
released by ADS4 stage valves. Figure B-12 shows the comparison 
of void fraction at the top of the core. The trends of the two 
simulations are very similar, but the calculated results by CESAR do 
not capture the initial peak during the blow-down phase and predict 
a greater void fraction value than NOTRUMP, throughout the ADS 
blow-down phase. Figure B-13 presents the RCS water mass 
inventory along with the transient response of the cladding 
temperature, during the 10–in. small break LOCA process. As it can 
be observed the CESAR code computes a lower water mass inside 
the RCS during ADS blow-down phase than NOTRUMP, the result 
is in agreement with the high void fraction at the top of the core 
predicted by CESAR, during the same phase. Concerning the 
cladding temperature illustrated, it is the maximal cladding 
temperature calculated by CESAR, and as it is possible to check 
their values continually decrease during the transient, confirming 
that the PCCS are able to remove the decay heat and mitigate the 
consequence of this accident. 
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B.6.3 Discussion and conclusion 
In the present study, the AP1000 reactor model was developed 
using CESAR, the thermal-hydraulic module of the ASTEC code, 
with the main aim to evaluate its capability to simulate the reactor 
passive systems. A 10 inch small break LOCA accident scenario 
was analyzed and compared with that of NOTRUMP code 
developed by Westinghouse Electric Company. The comparisons 
showed a reasonable agreement in terms of the changing trends. 
The different models adopted in the two codes, mainly cause the 
existing differences in some parameters. CESAR is a module of 
ASTEC integral code and uses simpler thermal-hydraulic models in 
comparison than NOTRUMP, which has been validated against 
applicable passive plant test data [16]. Overall, the results 
comparison between these two simulations confirms that CESAR 
module is able to reproduce the behavior of the passive systems 
during a 10-inch LOCA scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure B-3: RCS pressure 
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Figure B-4: PRHR heat rejection and Break water and steam mass flow 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-5: CMT-1 Mass flow 
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Figure B-6: CMT-2 Mass flow 
 
 
Figure B-7: Accumulator 1 discharge flow 
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Figure B-8: Accumulator 2 discharge flow 
  
 
Figure B-9: IRWST1 flow rate 
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Figure B-10: IRWST1 flow rate 
 
Figure B-11: ADS stage-4 discharge flow 
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Figure B-12: Void fraction at the core exit 
 
Figure B-13: RCS water inventory and peak clad temperature 
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C.    APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
C.1 Summary 
 
In this appendix will be presented a summary of the Phébus FPT3 
benchmark results collected as leader author in the “Final 
Comparison Report on the Phébus FPT3 Benchmark” [1-2]. This 
work has been done at the IRSN SAG/LETR laboratory in the 
Cadarache research center. In the first part of this appendix will be 
briefly introduced the Phébus facility , the Phébus FPT3 test. In the 
second part will be presented the main results of the Phébus FPT3 
benchmark. 
C.2 Introduction 
 
In the frame of the EU network of Excellence the SARNET2 work 
package WP8.3 ”Bringing Research Results into Reactor 
Application” task “Benchmarking of available codes against integral 
experiments” the PHÈBUS FPT3 experiment, has been chosen as 
the basis for this benchmark. The aim was to assess the capability 
of computer codes to model in an integral way the physical 
processes taking place during a severe accident in a pressurised 
water reactor, from the initial stages of core degradation, the fission 
product transport through the primary circuit and the behaviour of the 
released fission products in the containment [3]. The FPT3 test 
studied especially the impact of the boron carbide control rod on the 
fuel degradation and FP speciation and transport in steam poor 
condition [3]. Overall, the four areas covered by the experiment, and 
therefore by the FPT3 benchmark, were the following: 
• Fuel degradation, hydrogen and carbon production, release of 
fission products, fuel, and structural materials ('bundle' part of 
the FPT3 benchmark) from 0 to 17370 s; 
• Fission product and aerosol transport in the circuit ('circuit' part 
of the FPT3 benchmark) from 0 to 17370 s ; 
• Thermal hydraulics and aerosol physics in the containment 
('containment' part of the FPT3 benchmark) from 22500 s for 37 
h ; 
• Iodine chemistry in the containment ('chemistry' part of the FPT3 
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benchmark) from 186960 to 386340 s. 
 
The subdivision of the test in four different areas has permitted to the 
participants to perform integral calculations covering all four aspects 
of the exercise or to calculate any of the above areas in a stand-
alone mode for example one or two of them. The FPT3 Benchmark 
was supported, with participation from 16 organisations in 11 
countries, using 8 different codes.  
 
C.3 The Phébus facility 
 
The test train was located in a loop crossing the central part of the 
PHEBUS driver core, which supplied the nuclear power. In tests 
FPT0, FPT1, FPT2 and FPT3 the fuel rods were 1.12 m long with a 1 
m long fissile zone (total mass of UO2 about 11kg). Two Zircaloy 
spacer grids held in place and arranged in a 5x5 square lattice the 21 
fuel pin on a pitch of 12.6 mm, without the four corner rods, for a total 
of 21 fuel pins as shown schematically in Figure C-1.  
 
Figure C-1: FPT3 fuel bundle radial configuration 
The absorber rod in the centre of the bundle contained Ag-In-Cd in 
the first three of these tests and B4C in FPT3. Only the first test FPT0 
was performed using trace-irradiated fuel. For the rest of the matrix, 
irradiated fuel rods (~ 23 GWd/tU for FPT1, ~ 32 GWd/tU for FPT2 
and ~ 24.5 GWd/tU for FPT3) were used. The Figure C-2 provides a 
schematic layout of the Phébus FP. As it is possible to see in the 
figure the facility, aims to reproduce a 900 MWe pressurised water 
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reactor in scaling 1: 5000. Further details including exact dimensions 
can be found in the FPT3 Final Report [4] and in the FPT3 Data Book 
[5]. 
 
 
Figure C-2: Schematic layou of Phébus FP facility 
The Bundle 
An insulating zirconia shroud with an inner circular ThO2 layer (ZrO2 
in FPT0), an external ZrO2 layer and a pressure tube of Inconel coated 
on the internal face by flame-sprayed dense ZrO2 surrounded the test 
bundle. These three annular structures were separated by two gaps 
under cold conditions. The outer pressure tube was cooled by an 
independent pressurised cooling circuit, with a high mass flow of water 
at a temperature of 438K. The rods were cooled by a measured 
gaseous flow of steam imposed at the entrance. Measurements in the 
bundle involved mainly temperatures: fuel centreline and cladding (for 
fresh fuel rods), control rod, stiffeners, shroud and coolant. After failure 
of the rod thermocouples (TCs), the bundle temperature was 
controlled by shroud TCs located inside and on the outer surface of 
the external ZrO2 insulating layer. Two ultrasonic thermometers 
enabled improved control of bundle temperatures at different levels. 
The tests involving irradiated fuel rods (FPT1, FPT2, and FPT3) 
included 18 rods with intermediate burn-up (no TCs) and 2 fresh fuel 
rods to enable the implementing of some rod TCs allowing a direct 
measurement of fuel temperature. Coolant flow rates, hydrogen 
production and FP were measured in the circuit. In particular, an On 
Line Aerosol Monitor (OLAM) device enabled the detection of major 
events of the core degradation. The measurement systems for the 
power of the driver core and fission chambers located around the 
bundle were also able to detect significant core material relocation 
events. Gamma-scanning examinations of some FPs and activation 
products of bundle structures enabled the mean axial profiles of fuel 
and control rod mixtures to be measured. In addition, a large set of 
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tomographies were performed enabling a rapid and precise overview 
of the bundle degradation and of the final axial distribution of bundle 
materials on the basis of their densities. Final destructive examinations 
included cross and axial cuts for more detailed quantification of the 
bundle degradation, but for PHEBUS FPT3 it was not carried out [6].   
The circuit  
The pipework between the upper end of the fuel bundle and the 
entrance into the containment tank consisted, for the PHEBUS FP 
tests, of the following components: 
• the upper part of the test section (vertical line, ~3m high, internal 
diameter 0.073m reducing in stages until 0.03m), where the gas 
temperature drops to 970 K ; 
•  an isothermal (970 K) horizontal line (~9m long with an internal 
diameter of 0.03m), with sampling devices inside a furnace (point 
C); 
• the vertical steam generator U-tube (~4m high with an internal 
diameter of 0.02m), with pipe walls maintained at 420 K; 
•  another isothermal (420 K) horizontal line (~4m long with an 
internal diameter of 0.03m), with sampling devices inside a furnace 
(point G), and the connection to the containment vessel; 
The vertical and first horizontal line together simulated the hot leg of a 
PWR primary circuit, while the second horizontal line simulated the 
cold leg. 
 
The containment  
 
The containment consist of a 10m³ vessel (5m in height with an inner 
diameter of 1.8m). As for the circuit, representative fission products 
concentrations were preserved. Three vertical condensers simulated 
heat transfer and steam condensation phenomena in reactor 
containment. Their cooled surfaces were covered with epoxy paint as 
a possible source for molecular iodine trapping and organic iodine 
formation. Non-condensing painted structures were attached to the 
three condensers. The outer walls of the vessel were slightly 
superheated in order to prevent any steam condensation and to 
minimise aerosol deposition. The lower vessel part was closed by a 
curved bottom structure including a 0.1m3 sump. The sump had a 
diameter of only 0.584m in order to reproduce a representative 
atmosphere-water exchange surface. It contained a painted coupon. 
The sump water was recirculated by an auxiliary loop. During the 
washing phase another circuit injected water onto the vessel elliptic 
floor, thus washing settled aerosols into the sump. 
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C.4 The Phébus FPT3 test 
 
 
The FPT3 test sequence [5| involved heating of the bundle through 
a succession of power ramps and plateaux, leading to an oxidation 
runaway, further ramps and plateaux leading to fuel melting and 
relocation, with the degradation phase being terminated by reactor 
shutdown at 17370 s (Bundle phase + Circuit phase). The 
transported material was injected into 10 m3 vessel, simulating the 
nuclear building of a nuclear power plant. The 37 h aerosol phase 
started at 22500 s when the containment is being isolated. Airborne 
aerosols were deposited mainly by gravitational settling on the lower 
surface of the vessel (Containment phase). After about 51 h from the 
beginning of the transient, the aerosols deposited on the 
containment floor were washed out into the sump water. The 2 day 
chemistry phase starts at the end of the washing phase; it was 
devoted to the analysis of iodine chemistry under conditions 
representative of severe LWR accident, emphasizing iodine 
speciation. An important objective of the experiment was to study the 
iodine behaviour in the containment vessel, in particular the amount 
and speciation: inorganic versus organic of volatile iodine in the 
atmosphere ( Chemistry phase). 
C.5 The FPT3 benchmark 
 
The Phébus FPT3 benchmark resulted in many conclusions for each 
of the four phases, and for integral code assessment. The most 
important points are given below; a full account is given in [1,6].The 
“user effect” (different results being obtained by different users of the 
same code) is minimised by choosing the most representative results 
for each code, thus excluding the outliers, in an attempt to assess 
the capabilities of the codes themselves, . 
 
Bundle Phase 
 
At the end of the bundle phase the total amount of hydrogen released 
was 120±6 g, whilst the gas release coming from the B4C oxidation 
corresponds to 16 g of carbon dioxide and 17 g of carbon monoxide. 
The release fraction of the main volatile FPs ranges between 64% 
for Cs to around 80% of the initial inventory (i.i.) for I and Te, whilst 
the semi and low volatile FPs release show a wider spreading, see 
Table 1. The physical processes occurred in this phase are strongly 
related on the bundle thermal behaviour. So it was necessary 
correctly reproduce the thermal behaviour of the fuel rods during the 
calibration and preoxidation phase to obtain a correct analysis of 
control rod behaviour, gas release, and bundle degradation. 
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Table C.1 : FPT3 test FP and structural material release experimental data 
 
 
Most of the participants have assumed a reduction of the input 
nuclear power of about 10% and an increased of the thermal 
conductivity of the shroud within the experimental uncertainties, with 
these assumptions, the thermal behaviour of the fuel rods is rather 
well reproduced by the codes. Comparison between measured fresh 
fuel temperatures and results are illustrated in Figure C-3 for 0.5 m 
elevation. The discrepancies during the preoxidation phase are due 
to the lower input power selected for the simulation. In general a 
good overall agreement is observed in the bundle and in the shroud 
up to the end of the first phase; despite this, there are stills some 
difficulties to reproduce the final degradation of the bundle. The 
nearly total destruction of the control rod is reproduced in the 
calculations, but the suspected effects of spreading molten materials 
of the control rods towards fuel rods of the bundle and the B4C-SS 
Release 
element 
Bundle release Deposition in the 
bundle upper 
part 
Fuel release 
 (% initial 
inventory) 
(% initial 
inventory) 
(% initial 
inventory) 
Noble gases    
Kr 72 0 72 
Xe 84 0 84 
    
Volatiles    
Cs 64 9 73 
I 79 1 80 
Te 80 1 81 
Sb 40 n.d 40 
Ag 70 27 70 
Rb 35 n.d 35 
Cd >40 n.d >40 
    
Semi/low volatiles    
Mo 23 30 53 
Ba 6 5 11 
Ru 1 7 8 
Sr 0.05 n.d. 0.05 
La >0.059 n.d. >0.059 
Ce 0.28 n.d. 0.28 
    
Actinides    
U >0.011 n.d. >0.011 
Pu >0.0009 n.d. >0.0009 
    
Control rods and 
structural 
materials 
   
B 78 n.d.  
Sn >29 n.d.  
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eutectics formation and liquid B4C-SS-Zr relocation, are not 
accounted for in the codes (Figure C-4).  
 
 
Figure C-3: Fresh fuel temperature at 500 mm 
 
 
 
Figure C-4: FPT3 final linear mass distribution 
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The need for further code developments of the early phase of core 
degradation is recognized for the absorber rod material behaviour. 
Therefore extensive programmes of separate-effect experiment 
have been performed, such as BECARRE (IRSN) and BOX, LAVA, 
QUENCH-SR (KIT), to enable a better understanding of B4C 
oxidation and interactions with cladding materials. Regarding the 
total hydrogen generation, most of the results are consistent with 
experimental value, in the uncertainty range (~10%) and the kinetic 
of release is captured well enough as it is illustrated in Figure C-5.  
 
 
Figure C-5: H2 mass cumulative release 
 
A remarkable feature of the experiment was the substantial fraction 
of volatilised materials (Cs, Ag, Mo, Ru, and Ba) which has 
redeposited on the more intact upper part of the fuel rods [8]. The 
released material was swept by the steam flow through an 
experimental circuit; deposition of aerosol and vapour in some parts 
of the circuits were measured, as well the flow rates of the different 
elements in cold and hot leg. The deposition took place in the zones 
where thermal gradients are important, just above the fuel bundle 
and in the rising line of the steam generator. In this last zone, the 
mass deposited is enhanced by the formation of boron blockages. 
Another remarkable feature of the experiment was the very high 
iodine gas fraction (~90%) entering the containment during the 
transient, which determines the iodine behaviour in the short term in 
the containment atmosphere. The FPs release from intact fuel and 
control rods followed by the release from the in-core molten pool, 
depend mainly on temperature and oxygen potential but also on 
various physical and chemical processes that occur within the fuel 
matrix and in the surrounding gaseous atmosphere. In this test the 
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main fission products were basically classified according to the 
results of the VERCORS programme [9] in where the results of 
VERCORS and Phébus were consistent. The consequence 
classification is the following: 
 
• Noble gases: Xe, Kr 
• Highly volatile fission products: I, Cs, Rb, Te, Sb, Ag 
• Semi-volatile/low fission products: Mo, Ba,/ Ru, 
 
Concerning the bundle release, all of the experimental data were 
used for cross-checking, for statistical treatment, and for overall 
accuracy estimation. As a result the measured data fall within an 
estimated error band of ± 16% for gamma emitters (I, Te, Cs, Ag, Ru, 
Ba) and ±20% for Mo. An important feature of FPT3 was the 
significant deposition of several elements on the upper part of the 
fuel rods. The lower coolant flow in the test favoured this depositions, 
see Table C.1 and in order to take into account this phenomenon the 
reference value for Mo, Ba, Ru and Cs elements was the fuel release 
The results predicted for xenon and iodine are illustrated in Figure 
C-6 and Figure C-7and Figure 5. The total amounts released were in 
agreement with experimental data, but the kinetic was too quick, 
notably for the MELCOR 1.8 code versions. As regards caesium, all 
the results shown a general tendency to overestimate the total 
release, see Figure C-8. Most of prediction results for molybdenum 
release were in disagreement with the measured data. As stated 
before and as it is possible to see in Figure C-9 the bundle release 
and the fuel release show a large discrepancy 23% and 53% 
respectively, thus approximately 30% of Mo is deposited in the upper 
part of the bundle and revaporisation of such deposits is possible 
later. MELCOR is the only code, which can discriminate between the 
bundle and fuel release, but no participant has provided this 
parameter. In the case of Ru, ATHLET-CD and MAAP4 submissions 
tend overestimate, the final value. The other cases underestimate, 
experimental fuel release values, see Figure C-10. As regard the 
boron release as control rod material is illustrated in Figure C-11. The 
results show a wide spreading mainly due to the model adopted by 
the user, nevertheless the results predicted by ASTEC and ATHLET-
CD codes are included in a range of ±10% and can be consider 
acceptable, taking into account the uncertainties related on the B 
experimental measures. The good predictions of hydrogen 
production as well as the total amount of high volatile FPs released 
are important safety relevant conclusion. The semi-volatile and low-
volatile results are mainly consistent concerning the total amount 
released, but no code can predict correctly the release of all of these 
elements; the modelling need some improvement; because a correct 
prediction is of extreme importance, either due to their radio-toxicity 
and influence on the residual power, or by their propensity to react 
with other fission products. Same consideration are valid for 
structural materials, in spite of they have not radiological 
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significance, they potentially react with fission products, and their 
source terms are therefore necessary for accurate calculation of 
chemistry and transport in the circuit. Furthermore, the structural 
materials also form the bulk of the aerosol mass, affecting the 
aerosol concentration and the agglomeration processes. 
 
 
Figure C-6: Xe cumulative fraction release 
 
 
Figure C-7: I cumulative fraction release 
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Figure C-8: Cs cumulative fraction release 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-9: Mo cumulative fraction release 
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Figure C-10: Mo cumulative fraction release 
 
 
Figure C-11: B cumulative fraction release 
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Circuit Phase 
 
The injected steam flow swept FPs and structural materials (SMs) 
from the degrading fuel bundle through the circuit into the 
containment vessel. They were quantified by online instruments and 
by post-test analyses of the samples collected during the test. The 
experimental results tests shown, that all condensable FPs are 
transported through the simulated primary circuit in aerosol form, 
except iodine and cadmium which were detected mainly in gaseous 
form [8]. On their way through the primary circuit, the aerosols tend 
to deposit mainly where the temperature of the wall and fluid 
decrease strongly or where the flow is diverted: above the bundle, in 
the so-called upper plenum and vertical line and in the upstream part 
of the SG tube. The analyses of FP and SM transport in the Phébus 
FPT3 tests for the entire circuit with the integral codes showed that 
the total deposited mass is underestimated on average by a factor 
1.5. Remarkable features of FPT3 test was the large deposition of 
boron-containing material between the hot leg and cold legs, with the 
potential of forming a partial blockage in the circuit [10-11]. The main 
effect of this phenomenon was the reduction of the tube section, and 
the increase of the deposition surfaces, both effects enhance the FPs 
retention in the involved circuit zones, notably in SG upstream. No 
code could have reproduced these conditions and thus, the 
submitted results tend to underestimate the overall mass retention in 
the circuit. The boron deposition in the primary circuit is not 
considered so important regarding plant safety assessment; taking 
into account that, the number of tubes in a PWR steam generator is 
around 5000 or more, and it is very unlikely that the boron contained 
in the water and in the control rods would form blockages in all the 
tubes at once. In FPT3 with only a single tube, the effect is more 
important and for a correct analysis of the results, considering this 
effect is necessary, maybe reducing the section of the tube. 
Nevertheless, it was also observed difficulties to capture the 
thermophoresis deposition in the upper plenum for elements as Cs 
and Te (Figure C-12), despite that, the steam temperatures along the 
circuit were well predicted by most of the contributions. These 
discrepancies are mainly due to the wrong prediction or assumption 
of the FPs chemical form, and therefore their volatility. However, this 
is also not enough to explain the differences in the upper plenum. As 
regard molybdenum, the general overestimation of its bundle release 
entailed that, the calculated total depositions along the system were 
in agreement with the measured one. It is worth noting that work is 
already in progress to improve circuit modelling in various codes. 
Regarding speciation, account is taken of the importance of caesium 
molybdates, while borates are also being considered. Similarly, in 
MELCOR2.1, caesium molybdate has been introduced as a default 
fission product class.  
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Figure C-12: Te linear mass deposition along the circuit 
 
 
Figure C-13: Total iodine and Caesium deposited along the circuit 
Aerosol phase and containment thermal-hydraulic 
 
The containment analysis is focused on parameters that may have 
an impact on fission product behaviour in the containment, especially 
for aerosol physics. The prediction of the thermal hydraulic 
parameters in the containment as temperature, pressure, 
condensation rate, humidity, etc. was in generally satisfactory and, 
the little differences observed had probably only a weak influence on 
aerosol physics calculations. The evolution of the aerosol airborne 
mass, largely depends on the quality of structural material and FP 
(Cs, Mo) releases calculation, for integral submissions. Most of the 
calculations overestimated the caesium and molybdenum release, 
and underestimated the total deposition along the circuit leads to 
overcalculated total airborne mass in the containment, Figure C-14. 
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Overestimation of the depletion rate seems to be correlated with 
overestimation of the aerosol aerodynamic median mass diameter 
(AMMD), likely due to higher aerosol concentration and 
agglomeration in the containment. The overall aerosol depletion rate 
evolution is generally well enough calculated in the stand-alone 
cases (where the input comes from the test data), Figure C-15 
indicating that aerosol deposition processes are modelled properly. 
 
Figure C-14: Aerosol depletion rate inside the containment (integral cases) 
 
 
Figure C-15: Aerosol depletion rate inside the containment (stand-alone cases) 
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Chemistry phase 
 
Given the difficulty in predicting the iodine source to the containment 
in the integral cases, more reliable assessment of the iodine models 
is obtained using stand-alone calculations with iodine source input 
based on the test data. In these stand-alone calculations, iodine 
deposition on painted surfaces, 54% containment inventory (c.i.), was 
well predicted, Figure C-16; while there were greater discrepancies 
with the organic iodine (RI) fraction in the gas phase, Figure C-17 
(from iodine interactions with paint in the long term) with a tendency 
to over-calculation. The RI has a high safety significance as it is more 
difficult to remove by containment sprays or filtration than I2 inorganic 
iodine which was rather better predicted than organic iodine, Figure 
C-18 [12].  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-16: Iodine deposition on painted surfaces 
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Figure C-17: Organic iodine gas concentration inside the containment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-18: Inorganic iodine gas concentration inside the containment 
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C.6 The Phébus FPT3 test 
 
In this paragragh will be resumed the main conclusion of the FPT3 
benchmark: 
 
• The accuracy of containment calculations in integral cases is 
sensitive to results of calculations for previous stages 
(propagation of uncertainties); 
• Uncertainties on calculation of FPs and SMs (Sn and especially 
B) released from the bundle, along with underestimation of 
deposits in the partial boron-rich blockage (not calculated), 
affect transport in all the subsequent stages, for both the 
kinetics and for the total transported amount; 
• For those codes which calculate the chemistry, the speciation 
is influenced by the calculated release, both regarding the time 
dependence and the total; 
• The deposition of SMs is underestimated, and comparison with 
the data is not easy, given the difficulty of having accurate 
information on B and Sn deposition; 
• Iodine speciation and physical form in the circuit are poorly 
predicted; no code calculated the gaseous iodine fractions in 
the reactor coolant system (RCS). The chemistry models need 
to be improved to tackle properly the involved chemical systems 
both for thermodynamic equilibrium and for reaction kinetics; 
• Given these limitations, it is hard for existing integral codes to 
predict well the containment iodine behaviour, whatever the 
level of detail of the corresponding modelling; uncertainties on 
iodine release from fuel and deposition in the RCS are 
overwhelmed by uncertainties in iodine chemistry both in the 
RCS and the containment, as exemplified by the high iodine gas 
fraction observed entering the containment; 
• The results emphasise that stand-alone evaluations have to be 
performed considering uncertainties on the main processes 
affecting iodine speciation in the circuit and containment, using 
detailed containment iodine codes stand-alone as required to 
determine bounding cases and sensitivities. 
 
C.7 Conclusion 
 
The SARNET benchmark on Phébus FPT3 has provided many 
insights on the ability of severe accident codes to calculate the 
different phases of an accident sequence in an integral manner. 
Several areas where code improvements are recommended, where 
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data are available from Phébus FP tests, have been identified, 
considering the conclusions of a range of studies, particularly for 
iodine chemistry. These are being addressed by several separate-
effects experimental programs, and code improvements have 
been/will be made as a result. When these will be completed, further 
benchmarks have been planned to assess their capability. 
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